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ABSTRACT 
REALISM
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF SOME ARGUMENTS BY MICHAEL DUMMETT 
CHAPTER ONE
k l h i s  thesis is a c r i t ic a l  analysis of arguments which Michael Oummett has 
developed against realism. Oummett characterizes realism as the thesis that 
the meaning of sentences should be analyzed in terms of the notions o ftru th  
Ijand fa ls i ty  which obey the classical principle of bivalence. Before examining 
Oummett's arguments against realism, I consider the two models Oummett proposes 
for analyzing the content of assertions and examine his thesis that the re a l is t  
notion of truth is induced for some sentences by th e ir  use as constituents in 
compound sentences.
IS haptEr two
f-I' begin the examination of Oummett's arguments against realism by noting 
that Oummett allows in his recent work that a Tarskian tru th -theory , couched 
in terms of a non-classical notion of tru th , may act within a theory of meaning 
' as the theory of reference yielding an inductive specification of t ru th -  
conditions. I then present Oummett's d istinction between modest and f u l l -  
blooded theories of meaning and suggest that the difference between them l ie s  
in the fact that the la t te r  type possesses, while the former type lacks, a 
theory of sense, which Oummett conceives of as a series of correlations between 
practical a b i l i t ie s  and T-sentences. I then consider the manifestation form 
of the argument against realism and argue that i t  fa i ls  on several counts.
I then consider the acquisition form of the argument and point out the 
disputable assumptions about language-acquisition on which i t  is based. In the 
concluding section I question whether a theory of meaning which makes 
due allowance for idealization  in the study of semantic competence 
should require a theory of sense of the kind Oummett suggests and question
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why the theory of reference should be responsive to the particular practical 
a b il i t ie s  which Dummett emphasizes.
rif’APTER THREE
this chapter I complete the discussion of Dummett's arguments against realism 
and argue that Dummett has no satisfactory line of defence against my principal 
•' lection to the manifestation form of the argument against realism. I 
then present Dummett's distinction between demonstrations and canonc al proofs 
d his general distinction between between direct and indirect verif ica tions .  
...,en consider Dummett's attempts to characterize mathematical truth  
in terms of canonical proof and general truth in terms of direct ve rif ica tio n .  
I conclude by outlining a problem which confronts a v e r if ic a t io n is t  theory 
meaning of the kind Dummett espouses and show that there is a flaw in his 
jument that a v e r if ic a t io n is t  theory of meaning leads to a rejection of 
classical lo g ic .
CHAPTER FOUR
I begin this chapter by examining Dummett's claim that reductionism is neither 
necessary nor su ffic ien t for an ti-rea l ism. I argue that there is 
a sense in which reductionism is necessary and claim that there is a way of 
uniformly characterizing a n t i - r e a l i s t  positions on a number of subjects in 
terms of the thesis that a sentence is true in virtue of the evidence existing 
t'o r i t .  I then consider Dummett's claim that a re a lis t  interpretation  
o f counterfactuals involves asserting the unrestricted v a lid ity  of the law 
of conditional excluded middle. I conclude by arguing that the..- a n t i - re a l is t  
cannot acknowledge the d e feas ib ility  of evidence for empirically undecidable 
sentences and at the same time meet a legitimate demand that he explain in 
terms which do not beg any questions his conception of truth for such sentences.
This thesis is a record of the research I have undertaken during the past 
four years. I was admitted as a research student under Ordinance General 
No. 12 in October 1976 and enrolled as a candidate for the M.Phil. degree 
in April 197^.
I state that I have composed this thesis, that i t  is a record of work 
done en tire ly  by myself, and that i t  has not been accpeted in any previous 
application for a higher degree in the University of St Andrews or elsewhere
I state that the candidate has f u l f i l le d  the conditions of the Resolution 
and Regulations for the M.Phil. Degree.
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University Press, 1976)
'The Appeal to Use' 'What does the Appeal to Use do for the
Theory of Meaning?' in A. Margalit (e d .) .  
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'Wittgenstein's Philosophy' 'Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics'
'Philosophical Basis' 'The Philosophical Basis of In tu it io n is t ic
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Oxford University Press, 1977)
CHAPTER ONE 
TRUTH AND ASSERTIBILITY 
Introduction
Though this thesis is concerned with realism, I do not intend to produce
a positive account of what realism consists in. My aim is the limited
one of c r i t ic a l ly  analyzing some arguments which have been recently proposed
against realism. These arguments have th e ir  origins, I believe, in
Wittgenstein's la te r  philosophy. But I shall not attempt to trace them
back to th e ir  source. The arguments have a l i f e  of the ir  own. Nor
shall I examine a ll the d ifferen t variants of the arguments to be found in
the l i te ra tu re ,  though from time to time I shall note the s im ila rit ies  and
differences in approach between the philosophers who have adopted the 
1
arguments. I t  would take a much longer thesis to carry out exhaustive 
analysis of the variant a n t i - re a l is t  positions. My aim is simply to 
examine the arguments which have been developed by Michael Dummett.
Dummett's characterization of realism is apt to strike one as strange at 
f i r s t .  Dummett says that realism is a thesis about meaning: i t  is the
thesis that meaning should be analyzed in terms of the notions of truth  
and fa ls i ty  which obey the classical principle of bivalence, that is , the 
principle that every sentence is either true or false. I shall ultimately  
reject the reference to meaning as being an intrusive feature of the 
characterization of realism. But in order to determine the cogency of 
Dummett's arguments against realism I shall temporarily accept his 
characterization of i t .
1. For other a n t i - re a l is t  tracts see Crispin Wright, 'Truth-Conditions and 
C r i te r ia ' ,  Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 1976, 
pp.217-245; 'Strawson on Anti-Real ism'”. Synthèse, 40 (1979), pp.283-299; 
Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics (London: Duckworth, 1980), 
Dag Pravntz, 'Meaning and Proofs: on the Conflict between Classical and
In tu it io n is t ic  Logic', Theoria, XL III  (1977), pp.2-40.
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Opposed to realism is anti-realism. Dummett characterizes an ti-
realism in a number of ways. In most of his works Dummett identifies
anti-realism with the thesis that meaning should be analyzed in terms
of verif ica tion  or warranted a s s e r t ib i l i ty  rather than classical truth.
This is not to say, however, that anti-realism does without a notion
of truth: a suitable non-classical notion of truth is to be defined
in terms of ve r if ica tion , warranted a s s e r t ib i l i ty ,  or whatever notion
is taken to analyze meaning. In his more recent works , however, Dummett
has allowed that meaning may be analyzed d irectly  in terms of truth.
For example in the Preface to Truth and Other Enigmas he says:
Thus I should now be inclined to say that, under any theory of meaning 
whatever - at least, any theory of meaning which admits a distinction  
l ik e  that Frege drew between sense and force -  we can represent the 
meaning (sense) of a sentence as given by the condition for i t  to be 
true, on some appropriate way of construing 'tru e ':  the problem is
not whether meaning is to be explained in terms of truth-conditions, 
but of what notion of truth is admissible, (p .xx ii)
This new approach does not involve the rejection of the fundamental
importance of the notion of ve rif ica tio n , or warranted assertib il i ty .
Rather we are to think of the non-classical notion of truth which explains
meaning as already defined in terms of verif ica tion  or warranted assertib il ity ,
In my discussion of anti-realism I alternate between Dummett's old and new 
characterizations. Which characterization I choose in a chapter depends 
entire ly  on which of Dummett's works I am discussing. For example, 
in those chapters which rely heavily on the a r t ic le  'What is a Theory of 
Meaning? I I '  I use the new characterization, since Dummett's discussion 
in th is a r t ic le  often seems to proceed on the assumption that the core of 
the theory of meaning should take the form of a truth-theory. To foresta ll 
confusion le t  me state c learly which chapters adopt which characterizations. 
Chapters One and Three adopt the old characterization and Chapters Two
~ 3 -
and Four adopt the nev^  one.
Dummett presents his arguments against realism as ones which apply 
independently of subject-matter against a number of re a lis t  positions.
In rebutting Dummett's arguments, I have not considered whether i t  is 
possible to modify his arguments so that they hold locally  against one 
kind of realism, even though they do not hold globally against a ll kinds 
of realism. I suspect that his arguments might be modified to apply with 
some force against platonism, that is ,  realism about mathematics. But 
since Dummett himself considers that his arguments are globally applicable, 
I have thought that i t  is more important to attempt to refute them in 
th e ir  most general form.
Before I consider Dummett's arguments against realism, I wish to discuss 
two particular matters. In §2 of this chapter I shall discuss Dummett's 
claim that fa ls if ic a t io n ,  rather than verif ica tion , should be the central 
notion in the analysis of meaning; and in §3 I shall discuss Dummett's 
thesis that the re a lis t  notion of truth is induced for some sentences by 
th e ir  use as antecedents of conditionals or as modified by tense-operators.
- 4 '
§ 2 Falsi f i  cationism
Dummett te l ls  us that our in tu it ive  notions of truth and fa ls i ty  are 
strongly linked with the notions of an assertion's correctness or in ­
correctness. (Frege, p.419; 'Theory of Meaning I I ' ,  p .83) This is evidenced, 
Dummett says, by our reluctance to apply the predicates 'true' and 'fa lse ' 
to non-assertoric sentences. The simplest and most basic principle  
governing the use of 'true' and 'fa lse ' is that a sentence is true just in 
case its  assertion is correct, and false just in case its  assertion is 
incorrect. The notions of correctness and incorrectness would be the only 
notions of truth and fa ls i ty  that we would need i f  we v/ere only considering 
the atomic fragment of the language. We can put this in another way: 
suppose that our understanding of our language was like  that of someone 
whose only knowledge of a certain language consisted in merely being able 
to use sentences from a phrase-book in appropriate circumstances, without 
understanding the internal structure of the sentences. I f  we were in such 
a position of only being concerned with the content of assertions as a 
whole, Dummett says, a ll that would matter to us would be the conditions 
for the correctness or incorrectness of assertions. ( Frege, p.419)
But how are we to understand these notions of an assertion's correctness 
or incorrectness? Dummett in fact offers us two models for understanding 
these notions: which we are to accept depends upon whether we take the 
notion of correctness or that of incorrectness as primary. To say that 
correctness is primary is to say that the content of an assertion is to 
be characterized in terms of the conditions in which the assertion is 
conclusively established as correct. To say that incorrectness is primary 
is to say that the content is characterized in terms of the conditions 
in which the assertion would be shown to be incorrect, those conditions 
which a speaker rules out by means of the assertion. (Preface, p .x l)
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In both models, the notions of correctness and incorrectness are dependent 
on each other: we do not have to make two separate decisions about v/hich
circumstances make an assertion correct and which ones make i t  incorrect.
In the f i r s t  model, in which correctness is primary, we f i r s t  determine 
vdiich circumstances make an assertion correct and thereby determine the 
circumstances which make i t  incorrect; these la t te r  circumstances are 
simply those which preclude the occurrence of situations which make the 
assertion correct. In this respect, assertions are unlike bets. Because 
there are two consequences attendant on a bet, winning the wager and losing 
i t ,  we must make two separate decisions: we have to decide the cases
in which the bet is won and the cases in which i t  is lost. Consequently, 
there may be cases in which the bet is neither won nor lost. Such a case 
is one in which the bet is made on a condition; i f  the condition is 
not f u l f i l le d ,  the bet is o f f  and nothing is won or lost. ( 'T ru th ',  p.8 )
Dummett argues that assertions are more l ik e  commands than bets. ( 'T ru th ',  
pp.8-10) (The s im ila rity  between assertions and commands, in fa c t, favours 
the model in which incorrectness is the primary notion.) Unlike a bet, 
a command has only one well-defined type of consequence attendant on i t .
This is the right that is acquired by the person who gave the command to 
reproach disobedience. The content of a ccmmand is adequately characterized 
solely in terms of what constitutes disobedience to i t ;  anything which is 
done which does not count as disobedience constitutes obedience to the command 
Similarly, Dummett says, there is just one type of consequence that we 
normally attribute to an assertion: this consequence is that the speaker
is obliged to withdraw the assertion, should i t  prove to be incorrect.
( Frege, pp.417-419) For this reason, one can characterize the content of 
an assertion solely in terms of the circumstances which would show an 
assertion to be incorrect , the circumstances which a speaker intends to
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exclude by means of his assertion.
In making an assertion, a speaker wishes to be understood as excluding 
certain possible states of a ffa irs  and allowing for the possibility  
of others: and i f  his assertion had a determinate content, i t  must
stand determinately in one or other relation to each possible state 
of a f fa irs .  I f  some state of a ffa irs  obtains which he was ruling 
out, then his assertion was incorrect: i f  no such state of a ffa irs
obtains, i t  was correct. ( Frege, pp.417-418)
Dummett goes on to say, a fter  this passage, that one could.characterize
the content of an assertion in terms of the conditions under which the
assertion is correct. To say that an assertion is correct in this model
is tantamount to saying that the speaker had good grounds for making i t .
But, Dummett says, there is no simple lingu istic  consequence of a speaker's
having good grounds for what he says in the same way as there is a simple
consequence of a speaker's making a mistake in what he says. Consequently,
assertions are just l ike  commands in this respect: i t  is the negative notion
disobedience or incorrectness - which is basic.
This argument for the primacy of incorrectness in the description, of the
lingu istic  act of assertion is very inconclusive. There are many differences
between commands and assertions which are obscured by the claim that both 
typehave only one/of consequence attendant on them. (Dummett half-admits this 
in a remark in the Postscript to 'Truth'; see comment ( 6 ) ,  pp.22-23)
One main difference between them can be made plain by using Strawson's
2distinction: commands are essentially conventional while assertions are not.
What does Strawson's distinction amount to? Those lingu istic  acts which are 
not essentially conventional are to be characterized by a complex nesting of 
intentions: the simplest characterization of such an act is that the
speaker intends to produce a certain response in his audience and intends
2. ' Intention and Convention in Speech Acts', Logico-Linguistic Papers,
(London: Methuen, 1974), pp.149-169
that th e ir  response be given as a result of recognizing the speaker's 
f irs t-o rd e r  intention. Linguistic acts which are essentially conventional 
forgo these intentional complexities: in the ir  case conventions or rules
of practice, o rig inally  introduced against a background of reciprocal 
intentions, have taken on a l i f e  of th e ir  own. A conventional act l ik e  a
command usually takes place within a framework of conventions concerning
the status of the commander and the person commanded, the ir  rights and 
obligations, the due penalties for disobedience etc. Typically, no 
such conventions surround acts of assertion; they are usually made with 
the intention of inducing a certain be lie f in the hearer in such a way that
the hearer recognizes this intention.
Distinctions which usually apply to acts of the two kinds Strawson mentions 
apply to commands and assertions. The matter of intentions is irrelevant 
to conventional lingu istic  acts. A command w ill conform to a l l  the 
conventions even though the person giving the command does not show any 
interest in whether i t  is obeyed or not: he may simply be carrying out the
duty of transmitting the orders given by a superior. Indeed, a person 
giving a command may hope that the command is disobeyed so that he may punish 
the person in question. An assertion, on the other hand, would be pointless 
i f  the person le t  i t  be known that he had no intention whatsoever to influence 
the beliefs or behaviour of others. Again, i f  a duly authorized order is 
given, but the hearers do not respond appropriately, there has been a breach 
of convention. But i f  an assertion does not get the right response from 
the audience, there has not necessarily been a breach of convention.
Conventional linguistic  acts like  commands have conventional consequences, 
whereas intentional l ingu istic  acts l ik e  assertions do not. These conventional 
consequences, are often to be stated as consisting of someone's acquiring
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a right or obligation. For example, as Dummett says, disobedience to a 
command given by a Person in authority confers on that person a right to 
punish or at least reproach disobedience. The conventional structure of such 
acts is often linked with the fact that some stake is involved in the outcome 
of the act: this is clearest in the cases in which some penalty or reward
is at issue. The imposition of the penalty or the concession of the reward 
necessitates determinate standards of proper execution of act and response.
But assertions are normally neither penalized nor rewarded; there are no 
conventional consequences attaching to them. Indeed we do not usually 
assess them for correctness or incorrectness in the way we usually judge 
whether a command has been obeyed or disobeyed; for no conventional 
consequence hinges on the assessment of the correctness or incorrectness 
of an assertion in the way that punishment depends on the assessment of 
v^hether a command has been obeyed or disobeyed. There are some unusual, 
formal situations, such as giving evidence in the witness-box or writing  
answers in an examination, where the correctness of assertions becomes 
important because there are rewards or penalties at stake. Our conception 
of the correctness or incorrectness of assertions is intimately connected 
with our grasping that in situations, not always as formal as these, there 
are certain issues which hang on our getting our assertion right or wrong.
But such situations are not the norm.
Dummett himself concedes that assertions do not have conventional consequences 
in the same way as commands. He says that acts of assertion do have consequences 
on people's beliefs and behaviour; but these consequences do not come about, 
as do the consequences attaching to a command, as a result of a recognition 
of the conventions surrounding the acts. ( Frege, p .344; see also pp.301-2; 
pp.330-1) This concession, however, destroys the grounds for the argument
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based on the s im ilarity  betv/een commands and assertions, that incorrectness 
is the primary notion in terms of which the content of an assertion should 
be characterized. Dummett needs some such argument for his claim that we 
should describe the content of an assertion in terms of what the speaker 
intends to rule out by means of the assertion. Yet, on the succeeding 
pages, a fte r  he concedes in e ffect the lack of any basis for this way of 
characterizing assertions, he proceeds to put arguments for the treatment 
of 'truth-value gaps' which re ly  heavily on this ungrounded claim. ( Frege, 
pp.345-348)
Let us suppose that Dummett is r ight: assertions are lik e  commands in
that the negative notion characterizes the content. Let us also suppose that 
both are unlike bets in that they do not allow a gap between success and 
fa i lu re .  What import do these claims have? Dummett puts these claims 
to work in his proposal that, i f  we are following the basic principle for 
the application of 'true ' and 'fa lse ' which accords with the division of 
assertions into correct and incorrect ones, there is no point to saying 
that certain types of sentences are neither true nor fa lse. For example, 
Strawson and Frege have said that statements containing names without bearers 
are neither true nor fa lse. But, Dummett says, when a speaker makes an 
assertion he rules out the possib ility  that a name contained therein may 
not have a referent. For this reason, an assertion which goes awry through lack 
of a bearer for a name is incorrect. A similar claim to Frege and Strawson's 
is von Wright's claim that conditionals whose antecedents are false are 
neither true nor fa lse. In reply to th is , Dummett remarks that a speaker 
in asserting a conditional simply rules out the possibility  of the 
antecedent's being true and the consequent's being false; thus the fa ls i ty  
of the antecedent s t i l l  leaves the assertion a correct one. ( 'Truth 1 pp.11-12; 
Frege, p .345)
- 1 0 -
Nonetheless, there is a point, in Dummett's view, to saying that a sentence 
may be neither true nor fa lse, which relates to the appearance of the 
sentence as a constituent in more complex sentences. ( Frege, pp.420-427; 
'Truth ', pp.12-14) Dummett says that there is no good reason for supposing 
that the contribution that a simple sentence w ill make to the a s s e r t ib i l1ty -  
condition of a complex one w ill in turn consist of its  own assertib ility~  
condition. Knowledge of the meaning of a sentence, according to Dummett, 
w ill involve grasping the content of an assertion of i t  and also knowing 
the contribution i t  makes to determining the content of a complex sentence 
in which i t  is a constituent. He refers to the former as knowing the content 
of the statement and to the la t te r  as knowing its  ingredient sense. ( Frege, 
pp.446-447)
Consider negation as a means of forming complex sentences out of simpler
ones. The result of negating an atomic sentence is not simply to reverse
the conditions for correct a s s e r t ib i l i ty .  We have rather, Dummett says,
to distinguish two d istinct ways in which an assertion of the original
sentence might be incorrect. I f  the names in thé asserted sentence a ll
possess bearers but the assertion is incorrect in the straightforward
way, we are to say i t  is fa lse. I f  i t  is incorrect by reason of a lack of a
bearer for a name, we are to say i t  is false  ^ (The case in which Dummett
2
calls a sentence false is just that in which Frege and Strawson say i t  is
1
false; the case in which Dummett ca lls a sentence false is just that in2
which Frege and Strawson say i t  is neither true nor fa ls e .)  Negation can
now be defined by a three-valued truth-table: negation operates on a
sentence to map a true sentence into one that is false , a false sentence
1 1
into a t  rue one, and a false sentence into one that is s t i l l  false .2 2 
The introduction of the distinction between fa ls i ty  and fa ls i ty  enables
1 2
us to preserve a favoured principle governing negation. This is the principle
- 1 1 -
that a sentence is false i f  and only i f  i ts  negation is true .(Frege, p.422)
1
The use of a many-valued semantics, then, is only called for to preserve 
the in tu it iv e  principles governing negation and other operators. Many­
valued logics have been developed with l i t t l e  regard to in tu it ive  interpretation. 
But an obvious way, says Dummett
to secure an in tu it ive  interpretation for such a many-valued logic,
that is , to exhibit i t  as a genuine semantic structure, is to treat
the distinction betv/een designated and undesignated values as corresponding
to that between truth and fa ls i ty  when these notions are understood
in terms of the correctness and incorrectness of assertion. ( Frege, p.422)
For example, suppose that we have a many-valued semantics with m designated
values, D i,... ,D m , and n^ undesignated ones, U i , . . . ,U n ;  here either m or in
may be 1, but we assume not both. Then to know the content of a statement -
the conditions for its  correct assertion - i t  is necessary only to know
the conditions for i t  to have some designated value. To know the i ngredient
sense of a statement,on the other hand, we have to knov/ the various
conditions for i t  to have each of the m 4- ^  specific truth-values. This
is because the content of a complex statement is not determined uniformly
by the contents of i ts  constitutents.
Dummett puts the point behind this involved discussion quite simply in his 
'Preface'. He says that the notion of presupposition, which Strawson 
introduced to account for statements' being neither true nor false is not 
as fundamental as the notion of assertion. ( 'P reface ', p.xv) Dummett claims 
that i f  we were to be introduced to a language without knowing the internal 
structure of any sentence of the language, or of any other language, i t  
would be in te l l ig ib le  to us to be told that a speaker asserted that some 
condition held. But i t  would be un in te ll ig ib le  to us to be told the 
speaker asserted a certain condition held, presupposing that a certain 
other prior condition obtained. The notion of presupposition would make
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sense only i f  we understood how an account of the internal structure of 
sentences calls for a many-valued semantics.
To put the matter in this way highlights the implausibility of Dummett's
claim. Presupposition is surely in te l l ig ib le  without the explanation of
the internal structure of sentences. Presuppositions are generated through
3the observance of conversational maxims of the kind Grice has described.
The maxims which enjoin one to be as informative as possible forbid one 
to use in an assertion a name which one believes lacks a bearer; to do so 
would be to supply misleading information to one's audience. An understanding 
of how presuppositions are generated does not depend upon a grasp of
the internal structure of a sentence any more than does an understanding
of the relevance of the sentence in a particular context.
Indeed there is nothing d is tin c tive ly  lingu istic  about the processes by which 
presuppositions are created. Grice's conversational maxims are merely 
instances of certain rational modes of conduct individuals adopt to advance 
the ir  mutual interests. One interest any speaker has is to acquire information 
from others. I t  is rational for me, having this interest, to obey Grice's 
maxims concerning informative discourse. I w ill also expect every other 
speaker with the same interest to do the same. Moreover, I w ill expect 
other speakers to expect me to obey the maxims. Knowing that i t  is best 
for me in the long run to be seen to conform to the practice, I w ill only 
assert, a sentence when I think that my information is accurate. Knowing
3. 'Logic and Conversation', in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.) 
The Logic of Grammar, (Belmont: Dickenson, 1975), pp.
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that I am conforming to the practice, other speakers take my assertions 
to be made in the appropriate circumstances. One of these circumstances 
is that the speaker believes that a ll  the names he uses in his assertions 
have bearers.
Now the same structure of reciprocal expectations is present in non-linguistic  
a c tiv it ie s  such as warning. For example, concerned for my own safety,
I toot my horn when I drive around a sharp mountain bend. I expect others 
to do the same and also expect that they w ill expect me to do so as well. 
Knov/ing that i t  is best for me to heed this practice, I toot my horn only 
under appropriate circumstances. Knowing that I am following the practice, 
other motorists take my toots to be made in just the appropriate circumstances.
What happens when an assertion misfires through the fa ilu re  of one of 
i ts  presuppositions? The simplest thing to say in such circumstances is 
that the utterance does not formally constitute an act of assertion.
I t  is consonant with this in tu it ion  to say the assertion is neither true 
nor fa lse. I t  is neither true nor fa lse, not in the sense that i t  has a 
third truth-value, but in the sense that i t  lacks a truth-value altogether.
This construal has the virtue that i t  preserves the favoured principle  
of negation which Dummett mentions: a negation s t i l l  maps a true sentence
into a false one and a false one into a true one. We need not consider 
the case in which the assertion is neither true nor false. For this is not 
a third possibility; rather, i t  is a case which fa l ls  outside the bounds 
of a semantic account of negation.
More could be said on this matter of presupposition. But my purpose in 
this section is mostly to expound some common themes of Dummett's work and
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to c la r i fy  some issues which arise from this exposition. One matter which
needs to be c la r i f ie d  is Dummett's wavering between the two models of the
content of an assertion. This indecision is most marked in the early
essay 'T ruth '. (Dummett admits as much in'Preface! p .x l) In the f i r s t
three-quarters of the a r t ic le ,  Dummett presents the argument for taking
incorrectness as primary and considers the advantages of this proposal.
But in the las t quarter of the a r t ic le  Dummett relies upon a notion of
assertion in v/hich correctness assumes the prominent role to reject the law
of excluded middle. He considers the case of Jones, now dead, who never
encountered danger in his l i f e .  Dummett asks whether we should accept the
logical v a lid ity  of the sentence 'Either Jones was brave or Jones was not
brave'. He argues that we should not because in the circumstances envisaged
there is nothing which would count as evidence for asserting either disjunct.
He goes on to make the general remark:
In order, then, to decide whether a re a lis t  account of truth can be 
given for statements of some particular kind, we have to ask whether 
for such a statement P i t  must be the case that i f  we knew su ffic ien tly  
many facts of the kind we normally trea t as justify ing us in asserting 
P, we should be in a position either to assert P or to assert Hiot p‘ . 
( 'T ru th ', p .16)
This question indicates c learly , I think, that Dummett is presupposing the 
model in which correctness rather than incorrectness plays the prominent 
role. In the other model, in which primacy is thrust on incorrectness, 
no reference need be made to the grounds on which an assertion is made; 
so long as nothing obtains which is excluded by the assertion, i t  is correct 
whatever the grounds on which i t  is made. But in the model that is operative 
in thepassage just quoted, grounds and evidence are a ll important: we can
only assert a disjunction, Dummett says, provided we have suffic ient grounds 
for one disjunct or the other. In his la te r  work, Dummett characterizes 
a correct assertion, so construed under the 'correctness model', in terms 
of the notion of ve rif ica tion . A correct assertion is just one v/hich has
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been or is capable of being verified
I t  is remarkable that Dummett should sh ift  so casually from one model to
another. Of course, his reliance on the model in which correctness is 
be
primary is to /explained by his desire to transfer the in tu it io n is t ic  
account of the meaning of the logical constants in mathematics to an 
account of the ir  meaning in ordinary language. The standard in tu it io n is t ic  
account of formulas containing the logical constants is in terms of the 
provability of the constituent formulas. When the notion of provability  
is translated into a notion more broadly applicable, i t  becomes something 
l ike  warranted assertib il i ty  or v e r i f i a b i l i t y . One rough semantics for the 
logical constants in terms of v e r i f ia b i l i ty  is as follows:
( 1 ) lA  is verif iab le  i f  and only i f  there is a method of verifying that
no verif ica tion  of A is possible.
(2) A V is verif iab le  i f  and only i f  there is a method of verifying  
_Aor a method of verifying
(3) A & B^ is verif iab le  i f  and only i f  there is a method of verifying  
A and a method of verifying
(4) _A—^ ^is verif iab le  i f  and only i f  any method of verifying A can be 
converted into a method of verifying B^.
(5) 3 x A(x)is  verif iab le  i f  and only i f  there is a method of verifying
some instance A(a)
(6 ) Vx  A(x) is verif iab le  i f  and only i f  there is a method of verifying
A(x) irrespective of the value of x.
Of course, when disjunction is understood in this way, the v a lid ity  of the 
law of the excluded middle is called into question: for there is no guarantee 
that we w ill be able to discover, for any A whatsoever, either a method 
of verifying A or a method of verifying that no verif ication of A is possible.
Now contrast this semantics with that we might expect in the other model 
in which incorrectness is the leading concept. In this model, the 
assertib ility -condition for a logically-complex formula is s t i l l  explained
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in terms of the assertib ility -conditions of the constituent formulas.
But the notion of (correct) a s s e r t ib i l i ty  is interpreted d iffe ren tly ;  
now the assertib ility -condition of a formula, complex or simple, is explained 
in terms of what is excluded by an assertion of the formula, or, in other 
words, what would fa ls i fy  an assertion of the formula. A semantics for the 
logical constants in terms of f a ls i f i a b i l i t y  wi l l  be very similar to that 
given above, except that the condition of fa ls if ic a t io n  for a formula 
containing a constant w ill be expressed in terms of the dual constant: 
for example, A v ^  is fa ls i  f iab le  i f  and only i f  there is a method of 
fa ls ify ing  A and a method of fa ls ify ing  B^; or, Vx  A(x)is  fa ls if ia b le  i f  
and only i f  there is a method of fa ls ify in g  some instance A(a)
The formulas valid in the fa ls i f ic a t io n is t  semantics, however, w ill d i f fe r  
considerably from those valid in the ve r if ica tio n is t  semantics. For example, 
the law of excluded middle is valid in the fa ls if ic a t io n is t  semantics.
I t  is easy to see why, even with only the barest sketch of the semantics.
One cannot fa ls i fy  A v l  A. Suppose one could; this would involve fa ls ify ing  
A and!A. But in this semantics, i f  one can fa ls i fy  A one can assert 1 A. 
Thus, i f  one can fa ls i fy  both A and lA ,  one can assert bothlA and TlA.
Since! A &!7  A cannot be va lid , i t  is impossible to fa ls i fy  A v 7 A.
This fact is a ll  the more embarassing for Dummett. The greatest part of 
the a r t ic le  'Truth' is devoted to arguing for a conception of assertion which 
gives rise to a semantics which validates the law of the excluded middle.
In thelast part of the a r t ic le ,  he adopts, without notice, a new conception 
of assertion in which the law is no longer valid . This tension between 
two central themes of his.work, no doubt, led to his change of mind in 
la te r  work about the target of his anti,-rea list arguments. He says in the 
'Preface' that he was mistaken in taking, as a touchstone for realism,
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the acceptance of the law of the excluded middle, rather than the principle  
of bivalence. ( 'P re face ', p.xxx) Earlier in the 'Preface' Dummett 
distinguishes Certain semantic principles from logical laws. (P .xix)
(7) Law of Excluded Middle : A v 1 A
( 8 ) Law of excluded third; i ' l l  A v A)
(9) Law of contradiction: l ( A  & iA )
(10) Law of double negation: l l A —^ A
(11) Principle of bivalence: every statement is either true or fa lse.
(12) Principle of tertium non datur: no statement is neither true nor fa lse.
(13) Principle of exclusion: no statement is both true and fa lse.
(14) Principle of s ta b il i ty :  every statement that is not false is true.
The importance of distinguishing the semantic principles from the logical 
laws, Dummett says, l ie s  in the fact that acceptance of a semantic principle  
normally entails acceptance of the corresponding logical law, but the
converse does not hold. He says his real intention in 'Truth' was to defend
the principle of tertium non datur against the counter-examples brought 
by Strawson but also to attack the principle of bivalence. I f  Dummett were 
to say, as he in fact did in his e a r l ie r  works, that he wants to argue for 
the law of the excluded third and against the law of the excluded middle, 
then we could show that he could only do so on an equivocation with the 
terms 'correct assertion' and 'incorrect assertion'. But by redirecting 
his aim at the principle of bivalence, instead of the law of the excluded 
middle, Dummett escapes from any charge of equivocation. The principle of 
bivalence is not operative in either the ve r if ica tio n is t  or fa ls if ic a t io n !s t  
semantics. Even though the fa ls i f ic a t io n is t  semantics validates the law 
of the excluded middle i t  does not admit a two-valued interpretation: for
the fa ls if ic a t io n is t  logic is the mirror image of v e r if ic a tio n is t  or
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in tu it lo n is t ic  logic. {'Theory of Meaning I I ' ,  p .126)
Where has the discussion of this section l e f t  us? I have been concerned 
to argue that i t  is a mistake to accept Dummett's claim, based on an alleged 
sim ila rity  between commands and assertions, that the content of an assertion 
should be characterized in terms of the conditions in which i t  would be 
incorrect. Any advantage this manoeuvre gives him in the treatment of 
’ truth-value gaps' is based on a misunderstanding of the way in which 
presuppositions arise. I have also argued that Dummett‘s argument against 
realism as identified with the v a lid ity  of the law of excluded middle is 
vit ia ted  by his wavering between the two models of the content of assertion; 
but that his recharacterization of realism in his la te r  works in terms of 
the principle of bivalence instead of the law of the excluded middle 
enables him to escape the immediate problem caused by his wavering between 
the two models. In future I shall assume that, i f  there is just one 
appropriate model, i t  is the v e r if ic a tio n is t model. Ignoring the fa ls if ic a t io n is t  
model w ill not affect the course of the argument: for Dummett couches
a ll his a n t i - re a l is t  arguments in terms of verif ica tion .
§3 The D is t i l la t io n  of Truth from A ss ertib il ity
Our concept of truth, Dummett te l ls  us, is linked most intimately with our 
a b i l i ty  to discern, among the class of assertions, those which are correct 
and those which are incorrect. The way in which we are to understand the 
notions of correct and incorrect assertion depends on which notion we take 
to be the primary one. Following the decision of the las t section, le t  us 
take the notion of correct assertion to be primary. A correct assertion, 
then, is one which the community has suffic ient evidence to verify . Dummett's 
equation of truth with correct a s s e r t ib i l i ty ,  however, clashes with an 
unreflective distinction we make between the case in which an assertion is
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correct and the case in which i t  is true . The distinction cuts both ways: 
there are numerous occasions in which a community of speakers may have 
evidence to ju s t i fy  an assertion and discover subsequently the assertion 
to be fa lse. Conversely, there are many occasions on which a true assertion 
may, on the face of the evidence, appear incorrect.
But where in Dummett's schema of things is there room for this distinction?  
Dummett places great weight on the character of what is learned in acquiring 
a mastery of language. He sketches the following rough picture of the 
process by which we master the lingu istic  a c tiv ity  of making assertions.
( Frege, p .449) We learn to d ifferen tia te  between criticisms of assertions
on grounds of politeness, relevancy, discretion, etc and criticisms on
grounds of correctness. The la t te r  type of criticism relates to the discrepancy
between what is conveyed by a speaker's assertion and the grounds he has
for making i t .  In learning what a correct assertion is , a speaker learns
the practice of seeking and giving the grounds on which an assertion is
made. There appears, at f i r s t  sight, to be no space in this picture
for the notion of truth which transcends the practices, passed on from one
speaker to another, of seeking and giving evidential ju s tif ica tio ns .
Dummett, however, does provide an explanation of how the distinction arises.
We should ordinarily allow, however, that such an assertion, although 
unjustified, might be true, or, although ju s t i f ie d ,  fa lse. I f  future- 
tense sentences could not come within the scope of sentential operators, 
there would be no place for such a distinction between ju s tif ica t io n  
and truth. We should, for example, have no basis for distinguishing 
between an expression of intention and a statement of intention, 
that is , between the forms ' I am going to marry Jane' and ' I intend 
to marry Jane', which d if fe r  not in respect of the circumstances 
in which the ir  utterance is ju s t i f ie d ,  but solely in the ir  truth-  
conditions. This distinction has to do solely with the d ifferent  
behaviour of the two forms as constituents of more complex sentences, 
and, particu larly , as antecedents of conditionals. ( Frege, p.450; 
see also Frege, p.350)
The point seems to be that sentences (15) and (16) have the same a s s e r t ib i l i ty -
conditions.
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(15) I am going to marry Jane.
(16) I intend to marry Jane.
We are given to understand that both are assertible just in case the speaker 
does sincerely intend to marry. But (15) and (16) have d ifferen t truth-  
conditions: (15) is true just in case, when the time comes, the speaker 
does in fact marry Jane; (16) is true, on the other hand, just in case 
at the present time the speaker rea lly  does intend to marry Jane. The 
difference in the ir  truth-conditions, Dummett claims, becomes evident when 
they are made antecedents of conditionals lik e  (17) and (IB):
(17) I f  I am going to marry Jane, then I w ill no longer be a bachelor.
(18) I f  I intend to marry Jane, then I w ill  no longer be a bachelor.
Now (17) and (18) have d ifferen t assertib ility -conditions. The conditional,
in Dummett's view, has assertib ility-conditions which cannot be explicated
in terms of the assertib ility-conditions of i ts  constituent sentences.
The antecedent of the conditional must be true, rather than just correctly
assertible. This is so for the following reason:
The manner in which we are in tu it iv e ly  inclined to apply the predicate 
'true' is often closely guided by the behaviour of the relevant sentence 
when i t  occurs as the antecedent of a conditional. Thus, for example, 
we barely have in natural language any use for conditionals whose 
antecedents are themselves conditionals: and this is surely connected
with our hesitancy in applying the word 'true* to a conditional at a l l .  
( Frege, p .349)
Dummett explores this suggested mode of truth-inducement with a d ifferent  
example.
Again, we should have no need of the distinction between the genuine 
future tense, yielding a statement true or false according to what 
la te r  happens, and the future-tense expressing present tendencies, 
as occurring in , e.g. 'The wedding announced between . . .  and . . .  w ill  
not now take place'. The difference between the two uses of the future- 
tense is registered only in compound sentences, such as a conditional 
whose antecedent is a future-tense sentence, or one involving a compound 
tense like  'was going t o . . . ' .  (For present purposes, at least, tenses 
are to be construed as a kind of sentential operator, so that the 
sentence 'The wedding was going to take place' counts as a complex 
sentence having 'The wedding is going to take place' as a constituent). 
( Frege, p.450)
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In the chapter 'Thoughts' of Frege, Dummett amplifies on the comment that 
the use of compound tenses gives us a notion of truth for future-tense 
sentences which goes beyond correct a s s e r t ib i l i ty .  ( Frege, pp.390-400) He 
provides a number of alternative semantics for tensed sentences to bring 
out this point. The basic structure of each semantics is a branching tree 
structure, the branches in which represent the various total courses of 
of world history which were possible at the moment of creation. Each node 
represents the s ta te -o f-a ffa irs , under a given total course of world history, 
on a particular day. Following Prior, Dummett represents a tensed sentence 
as consisting of a token-reflexive temporal operator and a sentence-radical.
He supposes that the unit of time is a day and represents the future 
temporal operator ' I t  w ill  be the case in n days' time t h a t . . . '  as 'Fn' 
and the pastjtemporal operator ' I t  was the case n days ago t h a t . . . '  as 
'Pn' . In each of the alternative semantics, Dummett makes the simplifying 
assumption that every sentence-radical is determinately true or false at 
at each given node. Some relevant clauses from the 'classical'semantics 
are as follows:
(19) FnA is true (false) at time t  under a total course C of world history
i f  and only i f  A is true (fa lse) at t  + n under C.
(20) PnA is true (fa lse) at time t  under C i f  and only i f  A is true (false)
at t  - n under C.
Dummett then introduces two new notions. The f i r s t  is that of the coincidence 
of two courses of world history C and C  ug to a time t .  He defines 'C 
coincides with C  up to t '  to mean that, for every radical A and every 
t t ,  A is true at t ' under C i f  and only i f  A is true at t ' under C .
He then stipulates that, for any sentence A, A is assertible at t  under C 
i f  and only i f ,  for every C  which coincides with C up to t ,  A is true at 
t  under C .  I f  we take this defin ition of assertibil i ty  as a defin ition  
of tru th , we obtain a 'non-classical' semantics. The relevant clauses of 
this semantics are as follows:
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(21) FnA is true at t  under C i f  and only i f ,  for every C  which coincides
with C up to t ,  A is true at t  + n under C'.
(22) PnA is true at t  under C i f  and only i f ,  for every C  which coincides
with C up to t ,  A is true at t  -  n under C‘ .
This semantics d iffers  from the 'c lass ica l' semantics in a number of ways: 
in the 'classical ' semantics FnA is true at t  under C whenever A is true 
at t  + n under C. But this is not the case with the 'non-classical' 
semantics: for FnA to be true at t  under C, A would have to be true at
t  + n under every C  which coincides with C up to t .  This difference may 
be put in another way: in the'non-classical' semantics, in contrast to
the 'c lassica l' semantics, A may be true at t  under C and yet FnA false 
at t  -  n under C. As Dummett points out, a consequence of this fact 
is that A and Pn(FnA) are not equivalent in the 'non-classical' semantics. 
This happens when A is true at t  under C but Pn(FnA) fa lse, since, for some 
C  coinciding with C up to t  - n, but not up to t , A is false at t  under 
C .
Dummett's point about compound tenses inducing a re a lis t  notion of truth  
f iner than that of a s s e r t ib i l i ty  must be this: we learn that sentences of
the form A and Pn(FnA), given a time t ,  imply each other; that is , we 
learn that sentences lik e  ' I t  is the case now that an election is taking 
place' and ' I t  was the case 3 years ago that an election would take place 
now', uttered at the same time, share the same truth-condition. I t  is 
through learning the ir  equivalence that we grasp the fact that i f  a future- 
tense sentence had been uttered in the past, i t  would have been true at that 
time just in case the future event did in fact take place at a la te r  time.
By grasping this fact we gain an understanding of the distinction between 
the use of future-tense sentences to report present tendencies and the use 
of them to make a statement genuinely about the future, thereby grasping
- 23-
the distinction between the condition for the correct assertion of a future- 
tense sentence and the condition for i ts  truth.
4
Robert Brandom in 'Truth and A s s e r t ib i l i ty ' elaborates on Dummett's f i r s t
example concerning the difference between the announcement and the fu lfilm ent
of an intention. He disputes Dummett's suggestion that (15) and (16) have
the same assertib ility -condition . Brandom suggests that a speaker might
be ju s t if ie d  in believing that he w ill marry Jane on the basis of some
inductive inference or because of a religious prophecy with great authority
in his community, without i ts  being appropriate to say that he intends
to do what he believes he w ill do. Following a suggestion of David Lewis',
5he replaces (16) by (23).
(23) I foresee that I w ill marry Jane.
But I think that one can argue that sentences (15) and (23) d i f fe r  in 
assertib ility-conditions too. In some circumstances, the evaluation of 
an assertion of a sentence l ik e  (15) requires a lapse of time. Suppose 
the speaker has an irascible uncle who has vowed to cut the speaker from 
his w ill on the very day that he marries Jane. The uncle dismisses his 
nephew's assertion that he w ill marry Jane as impetuous. He w ill only 
accept the assertion as correct when the marriage actually takes place.
I f ,  as in this example, we can build a delay in evaluation into the 
assertib ilitycondition of a future-tense sentence, sentences (15) and (23) 
w ill d i f fe r  in the ir  conditions for correct assertion.
Suppose for a moment that a ll  assertions of future-tense sentences require 
a lapse of time before evaluation as correct or incorrect. Let me say now
4. lie Journal of Philosophy, LXXIII, (1976), pp.137-149
5. 'Truth and A s s e r t ib i l i ty ' , p .140
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that in the end I shall modify this assumption. But i f  we put this point 
in the strongest possible form to begin with, we can see more clearly  
the exact way in which the distinction between truth and assertib il i ty  
achieves its  in tu it ive  c la r i ty .  This supposition amounts to assuming that 
there is no distinction between the assertib ility-conditions of future- 
tense sentences and th e ir  truth-conditions. An assertion of a future- 
tense sentence is correct, on this view, just in case the future event i t  
describes does in fact take place at a subsequent time. Given this supposition 
Dummett's claim that the use of future-tense sentences as antecedents of 
conditionals induces a re a lis t  notion of truth will be out of place.
We do not need to use conditionals to discern the difference in truth-  
conditions between (15) and (23): the difference is discernible in the way
they are used on th e ir  own in assertions.
We can incorporate this supposition into the semantic systems which Dummett 
develops for tensed sentences. In these semantic systems the re la t iv iza tion  
of truth-value to a time plays a double role: i t  relates both to the time
of utterance and to the time at which the ascription of truth-value is 
being made. We can separate these notions by re la tiv iz ing  the truth of a 
tensed sentence to twotimes,the time of utterance and the time of assessment. 
The relevant clauses of the modified 'non-classical‘ semantics are ( Frege, ' 
pp.394-395)
(24) ^  uttered at t ,  is true at t ' under C i f  and only i f ,  for every C  
which coincides with C up to t ‘ , A is true at t  under C'.
(25) FnA, uttered at t ,  is true at t '  under C i f  and only i f ,  for every
C  which coincides with C up to t ' ,  A is true at t  + n under C .
(26) PnA, uttered at t ,  is true at t ' under C i f  and only i f ,  for every
C  which coincides with C up to t ' ,  A is true at t  - n under C*.
As Dummett remarks, the equivalence of A and Pn(FnA)is  now restored: that
is , for every t ,  t ' and C, Pn(FnA) , uttered at t ,  is true at t ' under C i f
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and only i f  A, uttered at t ,  is true at t '  under C, The equivalence 
fa iled before just because there was some C‘, coinciding with C up to t  - n, 
but not up to t  and A was true at t  - n but false at t  under C .  But this  
situation cannot arise now since the courses of world history must coincide 
U2 the time of assessment. Suppose we are assessing A and Pn(FnA)now, 
although both were uttered two days ago. By (25) and (26) we know that 
Pn(FnA) is true now in the actual course of world history just in case, for  
every C‘ which coincides with the actual course of world history up to 
now, i f  A had been uttered, i t  would have been true two days ago in C .
These are exactly the truth-conditions for A, uttered and assessed in the 
same circumstances as Pn(FnA).
To conflate truth with a s s e r t ib i l i ty  for future-tense statements in this  
way does f ly  d irectly  in the face of a strong in tu ition that there is a 
distinction to be drawn. This in tu it ion  comes out most strongly in what
Putnam, taking up a suggestion of Dummett's, calls 'the id ea lis t ic  fa llacy
6
argument'. No matter how we construe correct a s s e r t ib i l i ty ,  whether i t  be 
Dummett's construal or Dewey's, Putnam says, correct a s s e r t ib i l i ty  cannot 
amount to truth. For we may legitim ately say that a statement may be 
assertible and s t i l l  be fa lse. This form of argument may be employed in 
the case of future-tense statements. Consider the future-tense sentence 
'A c ity  w ill never be bu ilt  here'. (The example Is from 'Tru th ', p .16)
Suppose we have an oracle that answers every question of the kind, 'Will 
there be a c ity  here in 1990?', ‘ In 2000? ' and that every time we ask i t  
such a question with a specific date i t  answers 'No'. I f  truth just consisted 
in our being in possession of a given amount of information, then we would 
be compelled to say that 'A c ity  w ill  never be bu ilt  here' is true under
6 . 'Reference and Understanding', in A. Margalit (e d .) .  Meaning and Use 
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel) 1979, pp.208-210
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the circumstances imagined. But we do not feel so compelled. We could 
get the answer 'No' for a m illion d ifferen t dates and yet not be assured 
that the sentence was true. For there might be some date we had not tr ied  
which was such that a c ity  was b u ilt  at that time.
Our be lie f that such a future-tense statement might be assertible yet 
false stems from a deeper b e lie f . This is the be lief that the world is 
determinate, even though we have limited epistemic access to i t  in some cases. 
Remote regions of space-time have determinate properties but we may be 
incapacitated from knowing what those properties are by the limitations imposed 
on us by our position in space-time and our physiological make-up. In the 
example above, the truth of the statement depends upon what happens at an 
in f in ite  number of times, although by reason of our lim ita tions, we can 
only judge the correctness of the statement on the basis of a f in i te  amount 
of evidence. The be lie f that the world is determinate in ways which escape 
our limited epistemic a b i l i t ie s  is the heart of realism. The example of 
the future-tense statement does nothing to ju s t i fy  this b e lie f ,  but i t  does 
throw i t  into high r e l ie f .
The e a r l ie r  passages which entertained the equivalence of the notions of 
truth and a s s e rt ib i l i ty  were not without point. The argument in the last 
paragraphsshov^ed that we do draw a distinction between the a s s e r t ib i l i ty -  
condition of a sentence and its  truth-condition, but i t  did not show where 
we draw this distinction. Depending on the context, we may in fact allow 
that the notions coincide for certain types of future-tense sentences.
This is most obvious in cases in which considerable importance attaches to 
making the right prediction and in which there is just a short interval 
between utterance and outcome. In such cases, we may say that an assertion 
of future-tense sentence is correct just in case i t  is true. For example.
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consider a group of scientists conducting a crucial experiment to test 
a certain prediction; they wait until a fte r  the experiment to decide whether 
the prediction is correct or not.
The notion of correct a s s e r t ib i l i ty  is radically context-dependent. Who 
is assessing the assertion as correct? What are the ir  interests in the 
matter? How s t r ic t  are the ir  canons of evidential support? These are a ll  
questions which play some part in deciding whether a statement is correctly  
assertible. When, however, we are presented with sentences like  (15),
(16), and (23), we are given no context to work with. I t  is d i f f ic u l t  in 
such circumstances to judge whether the pairs (15)-(16) and (15)-(23) have 
the same assertib ility -conditions. By putting them in particular contexts, 
as Brandom did with the pair (15)-(16) and as I did with the pair (1 5 )-(23 ),  
we can judge the matter more c learly . Without such contexts i t  is indeterminate 
whether the pairs have the same assertib ility -conditions.
Dummett's thesis about truth-inducing sentential-constexts trades on this  
indeterminacy. By putting sentences (15) and (16) in sentential-contexts, 
Dummett wishes to say that we obtain a clear resolution of the ir  truth-  
conditions. But, in fa c t, by setting them in a context, a lb e it  a minimally 
informative one, what we obtain is a resolution of the ir  a s s e r t ib i l i ty -  
conditions. For example, sentence (15) may be interpreted so that its  
assertion is correct just in case the speaker does have a certain intention, 
namely, the intention to marry,or i t  may be interpreted so that its  assertion 
is correct just in case the speaker f u l f i l s  this intention. The appearance 
of (15) in (17) e ffective ly  resolves this unclarity in favour of the la t te r  
alternative.
But this resolution has nothing to do with the appearance of (15) as antecedent;
—2 8 “
7
rather i t  has a ll to do with the consequent ' I w ill no longer be a bachelor'. 
As i t  appears in the conditional, this sentence makes im plic it reference 
to a point of time at which the speaker w ill cease to be a bachelor and become 
married. By focussing attention on this point of time, the consequent 
forces the second interpretation of the antecedent's assertib ility -condition . 
The fact that this has nothing to do with the appearance of (15) as antecedent 
of a conditional can be brought out by considering the following conditional:
(27) I f  I am going to marry Jane, I must make a formal announcement.
The consequent of this conditional suggests that the f i r s t  interpretation  
of the assertib ility -condition of (15) is appropriate in this case: what
is at issue here is the speaker's having a certain intention, not whether 
the intention is fu l f i l le d .  The use of the conditional is s t r ic t ly  
irre levant to the issue. What is important is that a context is provided 
which determines that one or other kind of assertib ility -condition is 
appropriate. When a conditional succeeds in doing th is , i t  is due to the 
additional information i ts  consequent bears. There are no consequences to be 
drawn about realism or truth from examining the use of compound sentences 
and, in particular, the use of the conditional.
In previous paragraphs I have hedged a l i t t l e  on the exact point at which 
the distinction between truth and correct a s s e rt ib i l i ty  comes into force 
for future-tense sentences. This is because I do not believe that there is 
one point at which the distinction comes into force in a ll contexts.
In some contexts,the condition for the correct assertion of a future-tense 
sentence w ill be just the same as the condition for i ts  truth , and in other 
contexts i t  w ill be d ifferen t. I do not believe that the distinction between
7. I must make i t  clear that the conditionals (17) and (18) are not Dummett's 
but Brandom's.
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truth and correct a s s e r t ib i l i ty  emerges clearly in our everyday use of future- 
tense sentences. Rather, I believe, the distinction emerges most clearly  
in those extreme philosophical examples l ik e  that of *A c ity  w ill never 
be b u ilt  here' which, from the re a l is t 's  point of view, highlight the contrast 
between our limited epistemic access to the world and its  unlimited determinacy, 
I add these remarks, without further development, to make my position clear. 
What is important at this point are the following claims I have argued 
for: we do in fact draw a distinction between truth and a s s e rt ib i l i ty
for future-tense sentences and this distinction does not arise through the 
use of compound sentences, as Dummett suggests.
Dummett seems to claim only for future-tense sentences that th e ir  use as
constituents in compound sentences can induce of a notion of truth finer
grained than warranted a s s e r t ib i l i ty .  I f  Dummett were to make the claim
for other types of sentences, this would be significant for the discussion
of realism. For Dummett says that the notion of truth that can be so induced
obeys the principle of bivalence. (Frege, p.450) Can the use of past-tense
sentences or mathematical sentences as constituents in compound sentences
induce a re a lis t  notion of truth for these sentences? There is one passage
in which Dummett considers this question. After making his claim for future-
tense sentences he says:
This particular example raises no especial d i f f ic u l ty ,  for a conception 
of meaning as founded on verif ica tion  and fa ls if ic a t io n  rather than 
on truth and fa ls i ty ,  for there is no reason why the the verif ication  
and fa ls if ic a t io n  of a sentence should not require a lapse of time.
But i t  necessarily raises the question whether, in other cases, we 
may not acquire a re a lis t  conception of truth for sentences of given 
kinds by learning the use of compound sentences in which they are 
constituents. A case that does raise considerable d i f f ic u lt ie s  for 
a v e r if ica tio n is t  view is that of past-tense sentences. Whereas 
there is no absurdity in the idea of verifying an assertion a fter  i t  
has been made, a verif ica tion  cannot precede the making of the assertion 
verif ied . A previous observation
can serve as conclusively establishing the truth of a past-tense 
sentence only in so fa r  as i t  is known to have been made, e.g. 
remembered; so, from a v e r if ic a tio n is t  point of view, i t  is not 
the past observation i t s e l f ,  but the present memory (or other trace)
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of i ts  having been made which constitutes the verif ica tion  of the 
assertion. This does not mean that the memory has to be treated 
as a datum from which the previous observation is to be inferred: but 
i t  does place the past-tense sentence in the position of an undecidable 
one, one for which we may now have, or la te r  find, a verif ica tion  or 
a fa ls if ic a t io n ,  but for which we possess no effective method of 
obtaining one or the other. ( Frege, p.469)
From th is  passage i t  appears that the use of a sentence as the antecedent 
of a conditional, or as modified by a tense-operator, can induce a re a lis t  
notion of truth only for future-tense sentences but not for past-tense 
sentences. But i f  the use of a type of sentence as a constituent in compound 
sentences rea lly  can induce a re a lis t  notion of truth for that type of 
sentence, i t  should do this for every type of sentence: i f  i t  works for 
future-tense sentences, i t  should work for a l l  types of sentences. (This 
suggests that Dummett must have other reasons, which have nothing to do with 
the behaviour of sentences as constituents in compound sentences, for 
allowing a re a l is t  notion of truth to apply to future-tense sentences but 
not to past-tense sentences.) The passage confirms my conclusion that Dummett's 
thesis about the truth-inducing capacity of certain sentential-contexts 
is not a real explanation of the re a l is t  notion of truth. This notion of 
tru th , which the re a lis t  contrasts with warranted a s s e r t ib i l i ty ,  has its  
origins, as suggested e a r l ie r ,  in a metaphysical conception of the world 
as being determinate in ways which may escape our limited epistemic a b i l i t ie s .
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CHAPTER TWO
CLASSICAL TRUTH AND FALSITY IN THE THEORY OF MEANING
Dummett has proposed a bold identifica tion  of realism with a certain 
thesis about the form of a theory of meaning. He has argued against 
realism on the grounds that the kind of theory of meaning i t  involves 
is unsatisfactory. In this chapter and the next I wish to consider 
whether Dummett's c r i t ic a l  arguments concerning realism are good ones.
I n § l  I shall argue that Dummett identifies  realism with the thesis 
that theory of meaning must be given in terms of notions of truth and 
fa ls i ty  which obey the classical principle of bivalence. In §2 I shall 
examine Dummett's conception of the form which the theory of meaning 
should take. I n i  3 I shall consider Dummett's argument that the form 
which the theory of meaning should take forbids the theory from being 
given in terms of classical truth and fa ls i ty .  I n i  4 I shall examine 
the assumptions about language-acquisition which Dummett makes in 
arguing against realism and in §5 I shall conclude the discussion by 
highlighting and calling in question some even more general assumptions 
of Dummett's argument.
§1 A Truth-Theory as a Theory of Meaning
The equivalence principle turns up many times in Dummett's discussion 
of the form which a theory of meaning should take. I t  is the, principle  
that, for every sentence A, A is equivalent to ' I t  is true that A' 
or to 'S is t ru e ',  where S is the structural-descriptive name of A.
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( Frege, pp.444-445). Various philosophers, apart from Dummett, have
been interested in the principle. Frege held that the predicate 'true'
could not be defined by any other predicate but was subject to the
1
equivalence principle. Wittgenstein, as well as Ramsey, considered
that the stipulation of the principle gave a completely exhaustive
2
explanation of the concept of truth. For Tarski, the principle was
not the object of outright stipulation: rather, the derivab ility  of
the principle for every sentence of the object-1anguage was a condition
of material adequacy on a defin ition of truth framed in a metalanguage
3
that was an expansion of the object-1anguage.
Dummett says that theories of truth have usually had two main objectives 
One is to provide an account of the way in which the predicate 'true' 
is used in a language. ( Frege, pp.455-456) A theory of truth , he 
says, which takes the form of the stipulation that every instance of 
the equivalence principle should hold accomplishes this objective. But 
the other objective is much more far-reaching than an account of the 
use of the word 'true' within the language: i t  is the more ambitious
aim of employing the notion of truth to give a theory of meaning.
A theory of meaning of this kind w i l l ,  in Dummett's view, provide 
an account of how the meaning of a sentence is b u ilt  up from its  
component words in terms of the contribution each word makes to the
1. G. Frege, 'Thoughts', in P.T. Geach (ed). Logical Investigations 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977), p .4
2. L. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, 
(Cambridge: M .I.T . Press, 1975), Appendix I ,  Part I
3. A. Tarski, 'The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages', in 
logic. Semantics, Metamathematics, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956)
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truth-condition of the sentence as a whole; a ll other features of the 
use of the sentence w ill  be derived from its  truth-condition. Dummett 
says that the notions of truth given by the two types of theory may 
diverge. Dummett says, though without any argument, that there can 
be no a priori assumption that the use that is made within the language 
of the predicates 'true ' and 'fa lse ' is precisely that which is required 
when truth and fa ls i ty  are taken as the central notions in a theory 
of meaning. ( Frege, pp.457-458)
In the a r t ic le  'Truth' Dummett proposed an argument, which he thought
4
was to be found in Wittgenstein , to the effect that a redundancy 
theory of tru th , is incompatible with a theory of meaning in terms 
of truth. ( 'T ru th ',  p .7) The redundancy theory of truth is just the 
theory propounded by Wittgenstein and Ramsey: the sole explanation
that can be given of the notion of truth consists precisely in the 
stipulation of every instance of the equivalence principle. A more 
elaborate form of the redundancy theory, actually held by Tarski, is 
that an inductive specification of the truth-condition of every 
sentence of a language, which meets the material adequacy condition 
mentioned e a r l ie r ,  supplies a complete explication of the concept of 
truth for that language. What is problematic about the incompatibility  
which Dummett saw is that some philosophers have viewed a Tarskian 
truth-theory as providing the frame for a theory of meaning: the
inductive clauses of the Tarskian tru th-defin ition  for a language
4. Tractatus Loqico-Philosophicus, (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1971), 4.063
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may be seen as exhibiting the meanings of the sentences of the language,
5
as they are compounded from the meanings of the ir  constituents.
The incompatibility which Dummett saw in 'Truth' arose, however, 
from making the seemingly unwarranted assumption that the redundancy 
theory of truth was to be interpreted as saying the only permissible 
theory of truth is one that is concerned with the way in which 'true' 
is used in the language, and not with the more ambitious task of 
providing a theory of meaning. Given the assumption that this is 
the content of the redundancy theory, i t  is small surprise that i t  
should be seen to be incompatible with a theory which uses truth to 
analyze meaning, (see Frege pp.458-459 for an ex p lic it  formulation of 
this assumption; also 'Preface', pp .v i^vii)
In the a r t ic le  'T ru th ', Dummett had taken the incompatibility, generated
by his construal of the redundancy theory, to show that a theory of
meaning in terms of truth is mistaken.
This substitution does not of course involve dropping the words 
'true ' and ' f a ls e ' ,  since for most ordinary contexts the account 
of these words embodied in the laws ' I t  is true that p i f  and 
only i f  p' and ' I t  is false that p i f  and only not p' is quite 
suffic ien t: but i t  means facing the consequences of admitting
that this is the whole explanation of the sense of these words, 
and this involves dethroning truth and fa ls ity  from the ir  central 
place in philosophy and in particular the theory of meaning.
( 'T ru th ', p .19)
5. D. Davidson, 'Truth and Meaning', Synthèse, V II (1967), pp.304-323;
'In  Defence of Convention T' in H. Leblanc (e d .) .  Truth Syntax and 
Modality, (Amsterdam: North-Holi and, 1973), pp.76-85; ‘Semantics for 
Natural Languages', in G. Harman (e d .) .  On Noam Chomsky, (New York: 
Anchor Books, 1974), pp.242-252; ' Radical In terpretation ' ,  D ialèctica,
27 (1973), pp.313-328.
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In his recent work,Dummett says that he drew the wrong conclusion from 
the argument. Instead of rejecting a theory of meaning in terms of 
tru th , he now rejects the redundancy theory under the narrow interpretation  
he had previously given i t .  In the 'Preface', he gives a b r ie f explanation 
of his volte face (p .x x i i ) .  In the a r t ic le  'T ruth ', he says, he had 
proposed explaining meaning, not in terms of truth , but in terms of 
the conditions for correct assertion. He had then declared that the only 
admissible notion of truth was one under which a statement is true when 
and only when we are able to arrive at a position in which we may correctly 
assert i t .  But he says, i t  would have been better f i r s t  to state 
the restric tion on the application of ' t ru e ' ,  and then to have held 
the meaning of a statement is given by the condition for i t  to be true 
in this restricted sense of ' t ru e '.  The point he was trying to make 
in 'T ru th ', he continues, could have been better made by saying this: 
the notion of truth which has usually been, taken to be central to a 
theory of meaning - namely, the notion which obeys the principle of 
bivalence - renders impossible an account of the lingu istic  a b il i t ie s  
involved in a recognition of the condition for a sentence to be true.
'The problem is not whether meaning is to be explained in terms of 
truth-conditions, but what notion of truth is admissible'. ( 'P reface ',  
p .x x ii;  see also 'Appeal to Use', p .129)
In his recent work Dummett acknowledges the possibility  that a Tarskian 
truth-theory may provide the frame for a theory of meaning. But 
Dummett says that such a truth-theory w ill  perform only the minimal 
task of giving the referentia l structure of the object-1anguage. I t  
w ill provide the referentia l structure by the way of the basis clauses 
which assign references to the atomic expressions. ('Theory of Meaning I I ' ,
- 3 6 “
6
p.74) The basis clauses together with the recursion clauses constitute, 
in a standard truth-theory, a recursive characterization of satisfaction.
The notion of satisfaction is then used to give an ex p lic it  definition  
of truth. In such a truth-theory each T-sentence is derived in a sequence 
of biconditionals. The f i r s t  of these biconditionals results from 
applying the ex p lic it  defin ition of truth to  ^ sentence of the form 'S is tru e '.  
Each succeeding biconditional in the sequence is obtained by applying basis and 
recursion clauses to eliminate semantic vocabulary from the right branch of 
the immediately preceding biconditional.
The important difference between a truth-theory which would provide
the referentia l structure of a theory of meaning for Dummett and a
truth-theory which would do the same for Davidson is in the operative
notions of truth and fa ls i ty .  In Dummett's theory in tu it io n is t ic
truth and fa ls i ty  w ill  be operative while in Davidson's theory classical
7
truth and fa ls i ty  w ill  be. What is the difference between classical 
and in tu it io n is t ic  truth and fa ls ity?  The difference can be put as 
simply as this: the classical notions of truth and fa ls i ty  obey the
principle of bivalence and the in tu it io n is t ic  notions do not.
The significant difference between a classical and an in tu it io n is t ic  
truth-theory, I am claiming, is in respect of the overarching semantic
6 . Davidson himself does not think that a truth-theory does more than
provide referentia l structure. See 'Truth and Meaning', op.c i t .  pp. 310-311
7. I take i t  to be well known that i t  is possible to have an in tu it io n is t ic
truth-theory meeting the material adequacy condition. See Crispin Wright, 
'Truth-Conditions and C r i te r ia ' ,  Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
Suppl Vol 1976, § v i ;  John McDowell, 'Truth Conditions, Bivalence,^nd 
Verificationism ', in Evans and McDowell, Truth and Meaning , op. c i t ,
pp.50-51.
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prlnciple of bivalence. The two theories w ill  not d i f fe r  in respect 
of recursive structure. Each theory w il l  have recursion clauses such as 
these:
( i )  For every sequence s^  s a t i s f i e s i f f  £  does not satisfy (p
( i i )  For every sequence 2  satisfies 'cpv/vp i f f  ^  satisfies ^ or 2
satisfies Y
( i i i )  For every sequence s^  satisfies Vx i f f  for every £ * ,  
where s^differs from ^  in at most the i - th  place, s^  satisfies
As well as agreeing on the systematic dependence of the semantic 
value of a sentence on the sem antic  values of constituents, the two 
theories w il l  agree that the only two semantic values that can be defined 
for complete sentences are truth and fa ls i ty .  What is at issue between 
the two theories is not whether there are two such semantic values, 
but rather whether every sentence must have one value or the other.
Now Dummett identifies  realism with the thesis that a knowledge of the
sense of a sentence consists in knowing the conditions under which i t
is true or fa lse, where the notions of truth and fa ls i ty  obey the
principle of bivalence. The significance of this identification lies
in the restric tion of truth and fa ls i ty  by the principle of bivalence,
rather than the identification  of sense with truth-conditions. John
McDowell is one philosopher who does not understand the significance
8
of the id entif ica tion . McDowell claims that realism, at least in
8 . See 'Truth Conditions, Bivalence, and V e r if ic a tio n ',  op.c i t . ,  passim.
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Dummett's view, is to be identified  with the truth-conditions theory
of sense and not with the principle of bivalence. Anti-realism, he says,
enjoins one to replace truth with verif ica tion  or warranted a s s e r t ib i l i ty
as the fundamental notion in a theory of sense.
The alternative conception of sense would require a novel, an ti­
re a lis t  conception of the world; i f  truth is not independent of 
our discovering i t ,  we must picture the world either as our own 
creation or, at least, as springing up in response to our 
investigations. So v e r if ic a tio n is t  objections to a truth-conditions Ç 
conception of sense would have fa r  reaching metaphysical implications.
What is puzzling here is how a conception of sense, as d istinct from
a conception of tru th , might engender such a view of the world. Even
more puzzling is when McDowell ascribes to anti-realism the view
that an in tu it io n is t ic  truth-theory may act as the frame for a theory of
meaning and that such a theory of meaning is a re a lis t  one since i t
10
retains the identification of sense with truth-conditions. I t  is 
d i f f ic u l t  to believe that an a n t i - re a l is t ,  especially Dummett, would accept 
that an in tu it io n is t ic  truth-theory is a re a lis t  theory. As Dummett's 
recent pronouncements have made clear, the issue of realism is not 
whether we give an analysis of meaning in.terms of truth and fa ls ity  
but whether the analysis makes use of classical truth and fa ls i ty .
The question whether realism is correct or not may be represented as 
turning, in Dummett's view, on whether the principle of bivalence should 
apply to the truth-theory which constitutes the referential structure 
of a theory of meaning. The question cannot be settled by any facts 
about reference which, in Dummett's view, are dealt with by a truth-theory: 
for, aside from the general principles of its  underlying logic, any truth-
9. Ib id , p.48
10. Ib id , § 6
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theory w ill deal with these facts with the same kind of basis clauses. 
The arguments which settle  the question must appeal to considerations 
external to the truth-theory i t s e l f ;  in Dummett's view, to the general 
form the theory of meaning should take. I t  is to these arguments that 
we now turn.
12. Full-Blooded and Modest Theories of Meaning 
In this section I wish to consider the general form which Dummett 
thinks the theory of meaning should take. The following quotations 
i l lu s tra te  Dummett's general conception of a theory of meaning:
. . . a  theory of meaning is a theory of understanding; that is , 
what a theory of meaning has to give an account of is what i t  
is that someone knows when he knows the language, that is , when 
he knows the meanings of the expressions and the semantics of 
the language('Theory of Meaning I ’ , p .99)
Of course what he [a speaker] has when he knows the language 
is practical knowledge, knowledge how to speak the language; 
but this is no objection to its  representation as propositional 
knowledge; mastery of a procedure, of a conventional practice, 
can always be so represented, and whenever the practice is 
complex, such a representation often provides the only convenient 
mode of analysis of i t .  Thus what we seek is a theoretical 
representation of a practical a b i l i ty .  ('Theory of Meaning I I '  
p .69)
A theory of meaning w i l l ,  then, represent the practical a b i l i ty  
posessed by a speaker as consisting in his grasp of a set of 
propositions; since the speaker derives his understanding of 
a sentence from the meanings of its  component words, these 
propositions w ill  naturally form a deductively connected system. 
The knowledge of these propositions that is attributed to a 
speaker can only be an im plic it knowledge.( 'Theory of Meaning I I ' ,  
p.70)
A good way of looking at Dummett's discussion of a theory of meaning 
is as follows: he is concerned to describe the general form of a theory
which would lay open to understanding the whole workings of natural 
language in such a way as to be explanatory even to a creature who is
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to ta l ly  unfamiliar with natural language. The general constraints 
that Dummett thinks such a theory must meet are these: i t  must be a
theory of what a speaker knows in knowing the meaning of the expressions 
and sentences of a natural language; i t  must provide a propositional 
representation of a speaker's semantic competence; i t  must take the form 
of a system of deductively connected sentences; and i t  must be such 
that ta c it  knowledge of the theory can be attributed to a speaker.
I t  might be questioned whether applying constraints such as these is 
necessarily the best way of obtaining the deeply explanatory theory that 
Dummett appears to be concerned with. The lim itation of the constraints 
to semantic considerations is one ground for doubt. But in the remainder 
of the chapter I shall assume with Dummett that these constraints are 
roughly correct.
In ' Theory of Meaning I ' Dummett draws a distinction between modest 
and full-blooded theories of meaning. One way he draws the distinction  
is by saying that a modest theory is one which merely states what is 
known by someone who understands the sentences of a language whereas 
a full-blooded theory explains how these facts are known. Another way 
in which he distinguishes between the two kinds of theories is by saying 
that a modest theory merely gives the meaning of the sentences of a 
language in a way which is explanatory to someone who has some language 
or other, while a full-blooded theory provides an account of the in te r­
pretation of a language which would be explanatory to someone who has 
no language at a l l .  Dummett requires that a theory of meaning be f u l l -  
blooded. From the perspective sketched two paragraphs above Dummett's 
requirement of full-bloodedness in a theory seems natural.
-4 1  -
anMost of 'Theory of Meaning I ' is devoted'to arguing that a Davidsoni 
theory of meaning is a modest theory of meaning which errs either  
through accomplishing no more than a translation manual or through 
requiring a ho listic  interpretation.
A translation manual does not constitute, in Dummett's view, a theory 
of meaning. I t  does not d irec tly  display in what an understanding of 
the translated language consists. A translation manual leads to an 
understanding of the translated language only via an understanding of 
the language into which the translation is made, an understanding which 
i t  does not i t s e l f  supply. Now, in Dummett's view, a Davidsonian 
theory of meaning, which is essentially modest in character, does no 
more than a translation manual in this respect. For the truth-theory  
forming the core of a Davidsonian theory to yield an interpretation of 
the object-1anguage, an understanding of the metalanguage is presupposed.
In proof of this thesis Dummett argues that one could know that a ll 
the axioms of the truth-theory are true and yet fa i l  to understand 
the meaning of the object-1anguage expressions the axioms are supposed 
to govern. For example, in a truth-theory where the metalanguage is 
an extension of the object-1 anguage, one could know that "'London''denotes 
London' is true without knowing the meaning of the expression "London".
One's knowledge of the truth of the axiom would simply be due to a 
knowledge of the meaning of "denotes". What is needed over and above 
a knowledge of the truth of the axiom for the axiom to yie ld an in ter- 11
pretation of the object-1anguage expression is an understanding of "London".
11. In this case the requirement that the metalanguage be understood 
leads to c irc u la r ity . However, in a case where the metalanguage is 
not an extension of the object-1anguage - say the axiom is ' "London" 
denotra Londra' - the requirement that the metalanguage be understood would s t i l l  be necessary but would not lead to c irc u la r ity .
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So, for the truth-theory to y ie ld  to a person an interpretation of 
an expression belonging to the object-language i t  is presupposed 
that the person already understands the metalanguage in which the 
theory is framed. Consequently, in this respect a modest theory of 
meaning of the kind Davidson champions is no better than a translation  
manual: i t  projects one language onto another and makes an understanding
of the f i r s t  conditional on an understanding of the second.
Now Dummett conjectures that the reply Davidson would make to this 
critic ism is to emphasize the ho listic  character of the theory of 
meaning. The theory does not purport to provide a piecemeal explanation 
of a speaker's understanding of each individual expression in the 
language; rather i t  provides at one time an explanation of a speaker's 
understanding of the whole language. Even the constraints which 
Davidson applies to his theory cannot serve to bridge the gap between 
a speaker's knowing the truth of an axiom of the truth-theory and 
knowing the meaning of the expression the axiom governs. For these 
constraints, having to do with maximizing agreement among speakers, 
are global constraints which apply to the whole theory. Dummett objects 
to a ho listic  theory of this kind on the grounds that i t  cannot distinguish 
disagreements over matters of fact from disagreements stemming from 
different interpretations.
I shall not attempt to defend Davidson against Dummett's criticisms; 
for I believe they are good criticisms. Rejection of a modest Davidsonian 
theory of meaning, however, does not entail accepting the kind of f u l l -  
blooded theory of meaning which Dummett embraces. Dummett's conception
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of a theory of meaning is as flawed as Davidson's. To see this 
we must have some more details of what Dummett means by a full-blooded 
theory of meaning.
Another way of seeing Dummett's distinction between modest and f u l l -  
blooded theories of meaning is in terms of a division between theories 
which consist merely of a theory of reference and theories which 
possess a theory of sense as well. (Dummett’ s objections to a 
Davidsonian theory of meaning might be seen as focussing on its  lack of 
a theory of sense.) How exactly does Dummett conceive of the theory 
of sense?
In 'Theory of NIeaningll' Dummett gives a clear characterization of 
the theory of sense. He says that i f  a theory of meaning uses a truth- 
theory to give the referentia l structure of a language, then the 
theory of sense w ill lay down in what a speaker's knowledge of certain 
parts of the truth-theory consist. ('Theory of Meaning I I ' ,  p .74)
I t  w ill do this by systematically correlating certain practical 
a b i l i t ie s  of a speaker with certain sentences of the truth-theory.
I f  the theory of meaning is atomistic then a speaker w ill  be required 
to have the practical a b i l i t ie s  with respect to the axioms. I f  the 
theory is molecular the speaker w ill  be required to have the practical 
a b il i t ie s  with respect to the theorems - the T-sentences - of the 
theory. ('Theory of Meaning I I ' ,  pp.75-76) Dummett confines his 
attention to molecular theories and I shall follow him in th is . In 
such theories the T-sentences state the truth-conditions of sentences 
and the practical a b i l i t ie s  correlated with T-sentences are supposed 
to represent the manifestations of a speaker's knowledge of the truth-  
conditions.
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Now Dummett only ever mentions two kinds of practical a b i l i t ie s  so 
correlated with T-sentences. One kind, which I shall call verbal
a b i l i t ie s , involves giving e x p lic it  explanations of the truth-condition  
of a sentence. Dummett says that a speaker has ex p lic it  knowledge 
of a sentence's truth-condition in this case.
I f  the sentence is of a form which a speaker can come to understand 
by means of a verbal explanation, then there is no problem: his
knowledge of the truth-condition of the sentence is exp lic it  knowledge, 
knowledge which is manifested by his a b i l i ty  to state that condition. 
('Theory of Meaning I I ' ,  p .80)
The other kind of practical a b i l i ty ,  which I shall call recognitional 
a b i l i t y , involves being in a position to observe that the truth-condition  
of a sentence obtains or fa i ls  to obtain. When a speaker has this  
a b i l i ty  with respect to some sentence Dummett says that he has im plic it  
knowledge of its  truth-condition.
. . .  we may identify  someone's [ im p lic it ]  knowledge of the condition 
for the sentence to be true as consisting in his readiness to 
accept i t  as true whenever the condition for its  truth obtains 
and he is in a position to recognize i t  as obtaining, together 
with his practical knowledge of the procedure for arriving at 
such a position, as manifested by his carrying out the 
procedure whenever suitably prompted. (Elements, p .374)
Now i t  is strange that Dummett mentions only verbal and recognitional 
a b i l i t ie s  as manifestations of a speaker's knowledge of a sentence's 
truth-condition. There are several other kinds of a b i l i t ie s  that 
Dummett might have mentioned. Consider a speaker's a b i l i ty  to pursue 
correctly the practices of evidentia lly  evaluating assertions. Even 
Dummett should concede that a speaker could come to understand the 
truth-conditions, however construed, of sentences through recognizing 
the conditions which warrant, to d ifferent degrees, assertions of the 
sentences and the conditions which warrant, to d ifferent degrees, with­
drawals of the assertions. An a n t i - re a l is t  like  Dummett might wish to
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add the following reservation to this claim: when the truth-conditions
of sentences are construed classically and not constructively one could
not 1 earn the classical conception of truth through acquiring the practices
of tentative assertion and subsequent withdrawal; rather that conception
12
of truth would govern the practices. On a re a lis t  understanding of 
these practices of evidential evaluation, a grasp of the classical truth-  
condition of a sentence would be a grasp of the condition which determines 
what counts as good evidence and what counts as damaging evidence for 
the assertion of the sentence. Nonetheless, regardless of whether the 
truth-condition receives a classical or constructivist in terpretation, 
i t  is undeniable that a speaker could manifest his understanding of the 
truth-condition of a sentence by a correct pursuit of the practice of 
evidential evaluation.
An even more glaring omission by Dummett is his fa ilu re  to mention the 
a b i l i ty  of speakers to recognize arguments as valid and invalid . I t  
is clear that there is no better kind of a b i l i ty  to examine in connexion 
with tests of a speaker's knowledge ofssentence's truth-condition than 
his a b i l i ty  to discern the v a lid ity  of an argument which contains the 
sentence as assumption, premiss, or conclusion. The reason for this is 
fam iliar: an argument is valid when and only when the truth of the assump­
tions and premisses necessitates the truth of the conclusion. Consequently, 
a recognition of the v a lid ity  of the argument requires an understanding 
of the conditions under which the assumptions, premisses, and conclusions 
are true. Moreover, by determining whether a speaker accepts classically  
valid or only in tu it io n is t ic a l ly  valid arguments i t  is possible to settle
12. For this point see the exchange between Strawson and Wright: P.F.
Strawson, 'Scruton and Wright on Anti-Realism E tc ', Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society, vol LXXVII, p .16; Crispin Wright, 'Strawson 
lOn Anti-Realism', Synthèse, XL(1979), p .296
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whether he is interpreting the truth-conditions of the relevant 
sentences classically or in tu it io n is t ic a l ly .
I t  is unclear why Dummett should have chosen not to mention these 
a b i l i t ie s ,  possessed by speakers, to follow the rules of evidential 
evaluation and to judge whether arguments are valid or not. ( I  shall 
call these a b il i t ie s  evidential and inferential a b i l i t ie s  respectively.) 
At any rate , they do not lend much support, as we shall see, to his 
criticisms of a re a lis t  theory of meaning which assumes the principle  
of bivalence.
&3 An Argument against Realism
Now Dummett places the whole weight of his attack on realism on certain 
arguments about the form which a theory of meaning should take. From 
§1 i t  is clear that Dummett identif ies  realism with the thesis that 
knowing the meaning of a sentence consists in knowing the conditions 
under which i t  is true or fa lse , where the notions of truth and fa ls i ty  
obey the classical principle of bivalence. What is important about 
this identification is the restric tion of truth and fa ls i ty  by the 
principle of bivalence, rather than the equation of meaning with truth-  
conditions. In fact Dummett envisages the possibility  of a theory of 
meaning in terms of the conditions for a sentence's being true or fa lse; 
the only difference is that he understands the notions of truth and 
fa ls i ty  in tu it io n is t ic a l ly .
The arguments against realism revolve around what Dummett calls  
undecidable sentences:
- 4 7 -
The d i f f ic u lty  arises because natural language is fu l l  of sentences 
which are not effective ly  decidable, ones for which there exists 
no effective procedure for determining whether or not the ir  truth- 
conditions are f u l f i l l e d . . .  Many features of natural language 
contribute to the formation of sentences not in principle decidable: 
the use of quantification over an in f in i te  or unsurveyable domain 
(e.g. over a ll future times); the use of the subjunctive conditional, 
or of expressions explainable by means of i t ;  the possib ility  of 
referring to regions of space-time in principle inaccessible to us. 
('Theory of Meaning I T ,  p .81)
An undecidable sentence, then, is simply one such that no effective
procedure is available to us for finding out whether i t  is true or false
The passage above does not te l l  us the kind of effective procedure 
which is available in the case of decidable sentences but not in the 
case of undecidable ones. In mathematics, an effective procedure would 
be an algorithm l ik e  m ultip lication, addition, etc. But what are the 
analogues of these computation procedures in the case of non-mathematical 
decidable sentences? There is good evidence to show that Dummett 
believes that the only effective procedure we have in the case of non- 
mathematical sentences is observation. (See ‘Theory of Meaning I I ' ,  
pp.98-99; Elements, pp.378-379) So, in short, a non-mathematical 
sentence is undecidable for Dummett because we cannot observe i t  to 
be true or false. This view entails that a ll  past-tense sentences, 
a ll  counterfactuals, and a ll  sentences quantified over an in f in ite  
domain are undecidable. But note that although a sentence may be 
undecidable i t  need not remain undecided: some non-effective method of
verif ication  may settle  the sentence's truth-value.
So what is the argument against the theory of meaning given in terms
13
of classical truth and fa ls ity?  The argument goes like  th is . There
13. This is the form of the argument developed by Crispin Wright 'Truth
Conditions and C r i te r ia ' ,  op.ci t . ,  % II- IV ;  and Dag Prawitz, 'Meaning, , 
and Proofs: on the Conflict between Classical and In tuitnom stic  Logic , 
Theoria, XLIII ( l977), pp.2-40
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is no d i f f ic u lty  in saying what constitutes a speaker's im plic it  
knowledge of the conditions for the classical truth and fa ls i ty  of a sentence, 
just so long as there is some effective procedure available to him which 
w ill put him in a position to recognize d irectly  that one of the conditions 
is satisfied . {'Theory of Meaning 11', pp.80-81) But, in the case 
of empirically undecidable sentences, the only effective procedure 
available to the speaker, namely observation, is fru it le s s . So there 
can be no point to ascribing to someone im plic it knowledge of the 
classical truth-condition of an empirically undecidable sentence.
('Theory of Meaning I I ' ,  pp.81-82) But there is no point either to 
saying that the speaker has ex p lic it  knowledge of the classical truth-  
condition of such a sentence. Even i f  he can state another undecidable 
sentence with the same classical truth-condition, how are we to explain, 
without c irc u la r ity , the way in which he knows the classical truth-  
condition of the new sentence? ( ‘Theory of Meaning I I ' ,  p .82)
Consequently, a speaker's knowledge of the classical truth-condition 
of an empirically undecidable sentence is not of the two kinds which 
Dummett enumerates; in other words, a speaker cannot manifest his 
knowledge through displays of his verbal and recognitional a b i l i t ie s .
Since these a b il i t ie s  exhaust the range of a b i l i t ie s ,  there is no content 
to the ascription to a speaker of knowledge of some sentences' classical 
truth-conditions. I f  we can find no systematic explanation of how a 
speaker may know the conditions of classical truth and fa ls i ty  for  
sentences, these notions of truth and fa ls i ty  cannot play any part in 
a theory of meaning, broadly construed as a theory of understanding.
('Theory of Meaning I I ' ,  pp.82-83)
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Roughly, the form of Dummett's argument is this:
( i )  There are only two possible accounts of a speaker's knowledge 
of a sentence's truth-condition: the account of im plic it  
knowledge and the account of exp lic it  knowledge.
( i i )  A speaker's knowledge of the classical truth-condition of 
an undecidable sentence does not conform to the account of 
im plic it knowledge.
( i i i )  Nor does i t  conform to the account of ex p lic it  knowledge.
I wish to question the truth of ( i )  and ( i i i ) .
I s tart with step ( i ) .  It  says that one can only have either im plic it
knowledge of a sentence's truth-condition, as manifested by recognitional 
a b i l i t ie s ,  or ex p lic it  knowledge, as manifested by verbal a b i l i t ie s .
Now I have characterized two other kinds of a b i l i t ie s  - evidential and 
inferentia l -  to which one can appeal to give content to an ascription 
to a speaker of knowledge of a sentence's truth-condition. Indeed, 
by inspection of a speaker's practices of evidential evaluation one 
can determine that he has a grasp of truth-conditions finer-grained  
than conditions of warranted a s s e r t ib i l i ty  and by inspection of his 
inferentia l practices one can determine that these conditions are 
classical truth-conditions.
As regards step ( i i i ) ,  the argument is unconvincing as wel l .  There 
is no reason that a person cannot manifest his knowledge of an undecidable 
sentence's classical truth-condition by giving another undecidable
sentence with the same truth-condition. His knowledge of the new
sentence's truth-condition w ill  involve his being able to give yet 
another undecidable sentence with the same truth-condition. Now
- 5 0 -
Dummett assumes that this process cannot go on without i t  returning 
fu l l -c i r c le  to the original undecidable sentence. I think that Dummett's 
assumption is correct but i t  does not create a problem for the view 
being considered. One may legitimately explain, provided the c irc le  
is large enough, a speaker's understanding of a number of undecidable 
sentences by his a b i l i ty  to re late the ir  truth-conditions to each other.
This c irc le  of explanatory interdependence is objectionable only i f  one 
holds the be lie f that i t  represents the way in which we learn the 
meaning of the sentences. Dummett's objections to accounting for a 
speaker's knowledge of the classical truth-conditions of undecidable 
sentences in terms of ex p lic it  knowledge can be explained by the fact 
that he holds such a be lie f .
. . .  an ex p lic it  knowledge of the truth-condition of a sentence can 
constitute a speaker's grasp of its  meaning only for sentences 
introduced by purely verbal explanations in the course of the 
progressive acquisition of the language: i t  would notoriously,
be circular to maintain that a speaker's understanding of his 
language consisted,in general, of his a b i l i ty  to express every 
sentence in other words, i . e .  by means of a d is tinct equivalent 
sentence of the same language. ('Theory of Meaning I I ' ,  p .80)
But c learly , i t  is a mistake to believe that the way in which a person 
may manifest his understanding of a sentence must coincide with the 
way in which he learnt the sentence. (For one, there is the problem 
that we do not learn sentences but words.) Once one sees the mistake 
one can also see that there is no objection to taking a speaker's 
knowledge of the classical truth-condition of an undecidable sentence 
to consist in ex p lic it  knowledge. Dummett's strictures against this  
view depend, I think, on i l l i c i t  assumptions about the nature of 
language-acquisition.
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§4 Dummett's Assumptions about Lanquage-Acquisition
In presenting Dummett's argument against realism I freed i t  of the
assumptions about language-acquisition which Dummett makes in 'What
is a Theory of Meaning? I I ' ,  Elements of Intuitionism, and other works.
I presented what has been called the manifestation form of the argument 
14
against realism. But now I wish to consider the acquisition form of 
the argument.
Dummett remarks, on several occasions, that an understanding of a sentence 
usually depends on an understanding not merely of the words which compose i t  
and of other sentences that can be constructed from them, but of 
sentences belonging to a sometimes extensive segment of the language.
( 'Theory of Meaning I I ' ,  pp.78-79; Elements, pp.367-68) The sense 
in which an understanding of one sentence depends upon an understanding 
of a class of other sentences is that in which, in order to grasp 
the meaning of the single sentence, one must have already learnt the 
meaning of the sentences belonging to the broader class. Dummett
suggests that i t  would be possible to construct a partial ordering of
sentences, according as the understanding of one sentence is or is not 
dependent, in the sense explained, upon the prior understanding of
another. Such a partial ordering, he says, would be a model for the
way in which we progressively learn the language.
14. John McDowell, 'On"the Reality of the Past'", in Christopher 
Hookway and Philip P e t t i t ,  (eds.) Action and In terpretation, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) ,S 7, pp.138-9; 
Colin McGinn, 'Truth and Use', in Mark Platts (ed. ) .  Reference, 
Truth and Reality , (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980) p .26
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Now the way in which Dummett actually formulates the argument against 
realism in 'What is a Theory of Meaning? I I '  and Elements of Intuitionism  
is in terms of this model of the progressive acquisition of language.
I set out the premisses of the argument with relevant quotations below.
(a) The rank of a sentence in the partial ordering is an in trins ic
feature of i ts  meaning; in other words, the way in which a sentence
is learnt is an enduring characteristic of its  meaning.
In particular, i t  is evident that, in practice, once we have 
reached a certain stage in learning our language, much of the rest 
of the language is introduced to us by means of purely verbal
explanations; and i t  is reasonable, as well as trad it io n a l,  to
suppose that such explanations frequently display connections 
between expressions of the language a grasp of which is actually  
essential to an understanding of the words so introduced.
('Theory of Meaning I I ' ,  p . 79)
(b) The kind of meaning a sentence possesses, as fixed by its  rank in
the partial ordering, determines whether a speaker can have im plic it or 
ex p lic it  understanding of i t .  A speaker can have im plic it  understanding 
of the sentences which are the minimal elements of the ordering and 
ex p lic it  understanding of the other sentences.
. . .  an ex p lic it  knowledge of the truth-condition of a sentence 
can constitute a speaker's grasp of its  meaning only for sentences 
introduced by means of purely verbal explanations in the course 
of his progressive acquisition of the language... His understanding
of the most primitive part of the language, its  lower levels,
cannot be explained in this way: i f  that understanding consists
in a knowledge of the truth-conditions of sentences, such knowledge 
must be im plic it knowledge...('Theory of.Meaning I I ' ,  p .80)
(c) There are some undecidable sentences which are minimal elements 
in the ordering.
The existence of such[undecidable]sentences cannot be due solely to 
the occurrence of expressions introduced by purely verbal explanations: 
a language a ll  of whose sentences were decidable would continue to have 
this property [of decidability] when enriched by expressions so 
introduced. ('Theory of Meaning I I ' ,  p.81)
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I t  follows from these premisses that at least some undecidable sentences 
are minimal elements in the partial ordering of which a speaker can have 
only im plic it understanding. But, in Dummett's eyes, as we saw e a r l ie r ,  
the ascription to a speaker of im plic it  understanding of an undecidable 
sentence's classical truth-condition is without content.
I believe that the premisses of this argument are disputably false.
Any sentence containing an expression which has become more precise 
in meaning through use in sc ien tif ic  discourse (eg. mass, simultaneity) 
constitutes a counter example to premiss (a):  the way in which such
an expression was introduced to us is not an enduring t r a i t  of its  
meaning. In view of the fa ls i ty  of (a) ,  i t  is unreasonable to suppose 
that (b) is true: the way in which one f i r s t  learnt an expression does
not determine the appropriate way to manifest one's understanding of i t .  
As regards (c) ,  i t  is not true that a fragment of a language consisting 
only of decidable sentences would continue to have the property of 
decidability when new expressions are introduced by verbal explanation. 
Consider the fragment consisting of sentences describing a person's 
behavioural states. One can introduce the expression 'pain' in terms 
of a set of behavioural expressions in this way: pain is what causes
a person to evince a certain range of behavioural states when certain 
stimulus conditions are present. The addition of the expression 
'pain' to the fragment permits the formation of undecidable sentences 
such as 'John is in pain' ,
A more general d i f f ic u lty  with this argument concerns the partial 
ordering of sentences in terms of which the argument proceeds. The 
question is: How does this partial ordering represent a model of 
language-acquisition? Now i t  is c learly a mistake to believe that one
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can put sentences in an ordering in such a way that the sentences 
learnt f i r s t  occur as minimal elements and sentences learnt subsequently 
occur as non-minimal elements of the ordering. This is for the simple 
reason that we do not learn sentences. As we progressively acquire 
a language, we learn individual words and phrases and the syntactic 
constructions in which the words and phrases may occur.
Perhaps Dummett's be lie f that there is a partial ordering of sentences 
which reflects facts about language-acquisition relies upon the assumption 
that there is a primary partial ordering of words and phrases reflecting  
the order in which they were learnt and a derivative partial ordering 
of sentences,obtained by taking the ranks of the individual words 
composing a sentence as arguments for a function which gives us, as 
value, a rank in an ordering for the whole sentence. This assumption, 
however, entails that the function assigning ranks to sentences in 
the derivative partial ordering is so completely specified as to 
discriminate between sentences, perhaps of d ifferent lengths, with a 
mixture of primitive and complex words.
Even on the supposition that such a function is feasible, i t  is incorrect 
to believe that i t  w ill  y ie ld  an ordering of sentences of the kind 
Dummett wants. Dummett intends the ordering of sentences to determine 
the sentences of which i t  is appropriate to have ex p lic it  understanding 
and the sentences of which i t  is appropriate to have im plic it understanding 
But these two types of understanding - or better, ways of manifesting 
one's understanding - relate d irec tly  to the appropriate units of 
language-acquisition: the difference between im plic it and exp lic it
understanding corresponds to the difference in the way we learn the 
units of language-acquisition. We have seen that words, and not sentences.
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are the appropriate units of language-acquisition: i t  makes sense to
speak of having im plic it or ex p lic it  understanding of words but not of 
sentences. So no matter how completely specified the function which 
yields the derivative partial ordering of sentences, i t  cannot provide 
one with any grounds for saying that, for an undecidable sentence 
containing a mixture of primitive and complex words, a speaker has 
completely im plic it or completely ex p lic it  understanding of the 
sentence. In fact, the speaker has im plic it understanding of some 
words and exp lic it  understanding of others.
Thus Dummett's actual presentation of the argument against realism 
depends upon many assumptions about language-acquisition which I have 
argued are, at the very least, very disputable. These assumptions,
I believe, can only be conclusively established as true or false by 
psycholinguistic investigations. For this reason I shall turn to 
matters where philosophical arguments can be decisive.
^5 Two More General Objections
I have produced objections to both the manifestation and acquisition 
forms of Dummett's argument against realism. But I think that more 
general criticisms can be brought against Dummett's general conception 
of the form which the theory of meaning should take. I t  is 
convenient at this point to have a p ic to ria lization  of Dummett's 
general conception of the theory of meaning. Below is a diagram 
which represents Dummett's conception
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Tacit knowledge of the 
theory of reference is 
attributed to a speaker 
to account for his 
semantic competence
Theory of Reference 
consisting in a truth-  
theory which allows the 
structure-reflecting  
derivation of a T- 
sentence for each 
sentence S,
_ V
A Speaker's Semantic Competence 
consisting in an a b i l i ty ,  with 
regard to each sentence S, either  
to restate S's truth-condition or 
so recognize whenever its  truth-  
condition is f u l f i l le d .
is a theoretical '  
representation of
Theory of Sense 
Consisting in a correlation  
of T-sentences with 
practical a b i l i t ie s
The f i r s t  critic ism I wish to make of Dummett's conception of the theory 
of meaning concerns the requirement that the theory have, as a component, 
a theory of sense. I t  is this requirement which makes his theory 
of meaning a full-blooded one, d is tin c t from a modest theory like  
Davidson's. Dummett's characterization of the theory of sense is 
unusual. Frege simply describes the sense of an expression as what is 
known by a speaker who understands the expression. Dummett's 
conception of sense is completely d ifferen t from Frege's in that i t  
requires the theory of sense to specify not just what a speaker knows 
in understanding an expression but how this knowledge is manifested.
The theory of sense, in Dummett's view, must correlate with each 
T-sentence, ‘S is true i f  and only i f  p ' ,  which states what a speaker 
understands who knows the truth-condition of S, a practical linguistic  
a b i l i ty  which is the manifestation of this knowledge. Why does Dummett 
require the theory of meaning to contain, as a component, a theory 
of sense, so conceived?
There are passages in 'The Philosophical Basis of In tu it io n is t ic  
Logic' (pp.216-218) and 'W tat does the Appeal to Use do for the 
Theory of Meaning?' (pp.133-135) which explain Dummett's reasons for
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insisting that the theory of meaning should contain not only a theory 
of reference which states what a speaker knows in understanding the 
sentences of a language, but also a theory of sense which states how 
this knowledge is manifested. Dummett says that the source of the 
additional requirement of a theory of sense l ies in Wittgenstein's 
dictum that meaning is exhaustively determined by use. Dummett 
interprets the dictum as entailing that every aspect of sentence- 
meaning should be completely manifestable in the observable features 
of speakers' linguistic  practice. Consequently, these features of 
speakers' linguistic  practice w ill  constrain the account that is given 
of what speakers understand in knowing the meanings of sentences.
To put this in terms of Dummett's conception of the theory of meaning: 
a theory of meaning, conforming to the Wittgensteinian dictum, wi l l  
require a theory of sense to constrain the way in which the theory 
of reference represents speakers' knowledge of sentence-meaning.
The theory of sense w ill  constrain the theory of reference by ruling 
out any conception of truth which does not allow the systematic correlation  
of T-sentences with the practical a b i l i t ie s  which make up general 
linguistic  practice.
Now what is the basis for the Wittgensteinian dictum its e lf?  In 
'The Philosophical Basis of In tu it io n is t ic  Logic' Dummett argues 
for the dictum on the basis of the very general thesis that meaning 
is essentially communicable, (pp.216-218) Communication re lies  upon 
the fact that the meanings a speaker associates with sentences are 
publicly accessible to other speakers through his linguistic  
practice. Now i f  meaning were not exhaustively manifestable by use, 
we could suppose that some aspect of a sentence's meaning is not 
manifested in lingu istic  practice. But this would be to entertain
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the absurd be lie f that some aspect of a sentence's meaning is incommunicable,
I do not wish to dispute the Wittgensteinian dictum that meaning 
should be exhaustively manifestable in use. What I wish to dispute 
is the particular way in which Dummett employs the dictum as a constraint 
on the theory of meaning. My f i r s t  objection to Dummett's general 
conception of the theory of meaning is that the application of the 
Wittgensteinian dictum as a constraint on the theory of reference 
overlooks the conditions of idealization which must surround that theory. 
Where a complex physical system is being studied, considerations 
of simplicity and explanatory power in the theory require that the 
processes constituting the physical system be studied under idealization. 
Consequently, i t  is to be expected that a theory of a linguistic
15
competence w ill  operate under idealizations concerning speaker-hearers.
When there is such idealization in a theory there is no clear guarantee 
that there w ill  be a complete, or even a p a r t ia l ,  matching of sentences 
of the theory with specific a b i l i t ie s  constituting the competence being 
studied. For example, i t  would be unreasonable to expect that to 
every sentence produced by a generative grammar there corresponded 
an a b i l i ty  on the part of a speaker to recognize effec tive ly  that 
the sentence was grammatical or ungrammatical. The simplest and most 
explanatory grammar may need to be viewed as operating under the 
idealization that the speakers have unlimited memory and unlimited 
attention span. In this case the sentences which the grammar issues 
in may be so long that no actual speaker has the memory or attention 
span to judge whether they are grammatical or not.
15. For a classic statement of this position see Noam Chomsky Aspects of 
the Theory of Syntax, (Cambridge: M. I .T.  Press, 1976) Chap 1;
Reflections on Language , (Glasgow: Fontana Books, 1976) Chap I ;
Rules and Representations, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980)
Chapts 1-3
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Now consider a theory of semantic competence which takes,as phenomena 
to be explainedjthe evidential and inferential a b i l i t ie s  that I adverted 
to in §2 . I t  is conceivable that such a theory of semantic competence, 
in attempting to provide some systematic explanation of speakers' 
practices of evidential evaluation, would need to credit them with 
a conception of truth which is finer-grained than warranted a s s e r t ib i l i ty .  
For i t  is reasonable to claim that understanding how different types 
of evidence for sentence f a l l  short of being conclusive requires a 
grasp of the sentence's truth-condition, which is the measure of the 
inconclusiveness of the evidence. Moreover, a systematic explanation 
of speakers' inferential practices might also require seeing this 
fine-grained conception of truth as satisfying the classical principle  
of bivalence. For example, i f  speakers regularly accept arguments 
having the form of dilemma or reductio ad absurdum then i t  would 
be reasonable to conclude that the speakers' concept of truth is 
the classical one. Under these circumstances, there would be some 
content to a theory of semantic competence which employed the idealization  
that speakers could observe d irectly  whether the truth-condition 
of a sentence, no matter whether i t  concerns remote or accessible 
states of a f fa irs ,  is f u l f i l le d  or not. I f  such an idealization served 
the purposes of theory-construction - the regimentation of phenomena 
into simple and explanatory order - then i t  would be in principle  
possible for the idealization to have a role in the theory. In such 
a case there would be no complete correlation of sentences of the 
theory with actual recognitional a b i l i t ie s  possessed by speakers.
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This conception of the role of idealization in theory does not rule
out the possibility  of explanations of the actual phenomena of which
the theory is supposed to be a model. The theory, embodying various
idealizations, does that job with the aid of paramaters. In the way
that theories of memory and language-processing might be added as
16
parameters to an idealized theory of syntactic competence, so a 
theory of human perception might be added as a parameter to the theory 
of semantic competence, as described above, to explain speakers' 
actual recognitional capacities with regard to the truth-conditions 
of sentences.
What this conception of the role of idealization does rule out is the 
view that the theory must be exhaustively explicable in terms of the 
phenomena within its  domain. Dummett c r it ic ize s  a theory of meaning 
which takes the sense of a sentence to consist in the conditions for 
its  classical truth and fa ls i ty  on the grounds that an ascription of 
understanding to a speaker of certain classes of sentences cannot be 
exhaustively explained in terms of a speaker's verbal and recognitional 
a b i l i t ie s .
Acknowledging sentences as true or false is among the things 
which he [the speaker] learns to do; more precisely, he learns 
to say and do various things as expressions of such acknowledgement, 
But knowing the condition which has to obtain for a sentence 
to be true is not anything which he does ; nor something of 
which anything that he does is the direct manifestation. We 
have seen that, in some cases, we can explain acceptably enough, 
in terms of what he says and does, what i t  amounts to to ascribe 
such knowledge to him. But in other, crucial, cases, no such 
explanation appears to be available, [ la s t two i ta l ic s  mine]
(Theory of Meaning I I ' ,  pp.82-83)
16. See Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, op. c i t ,  
Chap 1 , § 2  and the artic les  cited therein.
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The thrust of my objection to Dummett is that he gets the direction 
of explanation wrong. I t  is not a speaker's verbal and recognitional 
a b i l i t ie s  which are supposed to explain his knowledge of the theory 
of reference but the other way round. The theory of reference is 
supposed to be a model or theoretical representation of a speaker's 
semantic competence consisting, in Dummett's view, of a cluster of 
verbal and recognitional a b i l i t ie s .  Given the amount of idealization  
necessary for theory-construction, i t  is not plausible to suppose 
that the phenomena should explain the theory or that there should be 
a simple mapping of sentences of the theory onto isolated phenomena.
My second objection to Dummett's general conception of the theory of 
meaning concerns the explanatory power of the theory of reference.
This part of the theory of meaning consists of a recursive tru th-  
theory which models the way in which the senses of sentences are 
compounded from the senses of th e ir  constituents. But the theory 
of reference is also supposed by Dummett to provide a theoretical 
representation, via the theory of sense, of the cluster of practical 
a b il i t ie s  which make up a speaker's semantic competence. The question 
I wish to raise is whether the theory of reference can provide such 
a representation of a ll  the heterogeneous linguistic  a b i l i t ie s  which 
make up semantic competence. As instances of these linguistic  a b i l i t ie s ,  
Dummett cited verbal and recognitional a b i l i t ie s  and I cited evidential 
and inferentia l a b i l i t ie s .  I t  is clear, I believe, how a truth-  
theory may provide a theoretical representation of a speaker's inferential 
a b i l i t ie s :  the truth-theory wi l l  give a model of the systematic
contribution each expression - in particular, each logical constant - 
makes to the truth-conditions of the sentences in which i t  occurs
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and so w ill  give a model of the inference-potential of these sentences.
But i t  is not so clear how a truth-theory, with its  recursive specification  
of the truth-conditions of sentences, w il l  y ie ld a theoretical representation 
of a speaker's recognitional or verbal a b i l i t ie s .
I am not raising the question whether the theory of reference, given 
in terms of a central conception of tru th , can account for a l l  the 
pragmatic a b i l i t ie s  which are involved in the theory of force. In 
my depiction of Dummett's programmatic conception of the theory of 
meaning I l e f t  out the theory of force. This theory gives an account, 
in Dummett's view, of the various kinds of linguistic  acts which may 
be effected by the utterance of a sentence. I t  does this by yielding, 
for each type of lingu istic  act ,  a uniform account of how an utterance 
of an arb itra ry  sentence, with a known truth-condition, may effect 
an act of that type. ('Theory of Meaning I I ' ,  pp.72-75)
Dummett draws a distinction between a speaker's pragmatic a b i l i t ie s  
which are the subject of the theory of force and his semantic a b i l i t ie s  
which are the subject of the theory of reference. He says that 
his argument against realism does not relate to any inadequacy on 
the part of the theory of force to provide a fa ith fu l representation 
of pragmatic competence but rather relates to the fa ilu re  of the 
theory of reference to provide a fa ith fu l representation of semantic 
competence, in particular of verbal and recognitional a b i l i t ie s .
('Theory of Meaning I I ' ,  p .82) The question I am raising is this: 
why should the theory of reference be required at a l l  to be responsive 
to a speaker's verbal and recognitional ab ilit ies?
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I suggest that Dummett's requirement that the theory of reference, 
in the form of a recursive specification of the truth-conditions of 
sentences, should provide a theoretical representation of a speaker's 
recognitional and verbal a b i l i t ie s  is misplaced. The appropriate 
range of a b i l i t ie s  to form the subject-matter of the theory of reference, 
so conceived, are the inferential a b i l i t ie s  possessed by speakers.
These a b i l i t ie s  involve being able to discriminate valid from 
invalid arguments. Possession of these discriminative powers 
entails understanding the truth-conditions of the sentences which 
enter into the arguments: for a valid argument is just one in
which the truth of the sentences acting as premisses or assumptions 
necessitates the truth of the sentence acting as the conclusion.
I t  is the connexion between truth and va lid ity  which makes a theory 
of reference, in the form of a recursive specification of sentences' 
truth-conditions, an appropriate model of speakers' inferentia l abi l i t i es .
In order to provide a contrast with Dummett's conception of a theory of
part of
meaning I diagram below/the semantic component of the theory of meaning 
of the kind I am envisaging.
A recursive Semantics
in terms of tru th , but 
not necessarily in the 
form of a truth-theory
Parameters 
describing factors involved 
in speakers' actual judge­
ments about v a lid ity
explain
A speaker's semantic 
competence consisting in
A probability calculus
Parameters 
describing factors involved 
in speakers' actual judge­
ments about evidential support
inferential a b i l i t ie s  
which issue in judgements 
about whether arguments 
are valid
explain
evidential a b i l i t ie s  
which issue in judgements 
about whether sentences 
are well supported
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Such a theory, even in its  most schematic formulation, is to ta l ly  'different 
from Dummett's. The difference does not just reduce to a difference over 
the phenomena which the theory of meaning must account for: Dummett has 
verbal and recognitional a b i l i t ie s  while I have evidential and inferent­
ial a b i l i t ie s .  In acknowledging the need for idealization in theory- 
construction, the theory sketched above lacks any equivalent to Dummett's 
theory of sense, which connects theory with phenomena in a piecemeal 
fashion. In acknowledging the modular structure of semantic competence,
i t  posits, in contrast with Dummett's theory, d ifferent theoretical
17
representations for the d ifferen t constitutive a b i l i t ie s .
I t  is significant to observe that this conception of the theory of meaning 
does not fa l l  into either category of modest or full-blooded theory.
I t  is not a full-blooded theory: i t  does not contain a description 
of how a speaker's im plic it knowledge of the sentences of the theory 
is manifested. But such a theory is not modest e ither. I t  conveys 
more information than the facts which a speaker knows when he knows 
the meanings of the sentences of a language: i t  provides an explanation
of the way in which a speaker, on individual occasions, exercises 
the a b i l i t ie s  constituting his semantic competence.
17. For a discussion of the modular structure of lingu istic  competence,
from which I have learnt much, see Noam Chomsky, Rules and Representations 
op. c i t . ,  pp.40-46, 60-61, 89«90.
-65- 
CHAPTER THREE 
VERIFICATIONÎSM AND LOGIC 
In this chapter I shall discuss the way in which Dummett thinks that his 
argument against realism necessitates a repudiation of classical logic in 
favour of in tu it io n is t ic  logic. In Si I shall complete the discussion of issues 
raised by Dummett's argument against realism. I shall argue that Dummett has 
no satisfactory line of defence against my principal objection to his argument 
against real ism. In §2 I shall present Dummett's distinction between demonstrations 
and canonical proofs and his more general distinction between direct and 
indirect verif ications. In § 3  I shall consider the way in which Dummett 
attempts to characterize mathematical truth and general truth in terms of 
these distinctions. In §4 I shall discuss a problem which confronts a ve rif ica tion is  
theory of meaning of the kind Dummett espouses and show that there is a flaw 
in Dummett's argument that a v e r if ic a tio n is t  theory of meaning leads to a 
rejection of classical logic.
§1 Dummett's Arguments against the Appeal to Inferential A b il it ies  
Dummett identifies realism with the thesis that a speaker's understanding 
of the sentences of a language should be analyzed in terms of the notions 
of classical truth and fa ls i ty .  Dummett's argument against realism, 
so conceived, relies heavily on using Wittgenstein's dictum that meaning 
should be exhaustively manifestable in use as a constraint on the theory 
of meaning, that is ,  the theory of what a speaker knows in understanding 
the sentences of the language. Wittgenstein's dictum is used as a constraint 
on the theory of meaning in the sense that i t  restric ts  the concept 
of truth to be employed in the recursive specification of sentences' 
truth-conditions.
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None of the objections I lodged against Dummett's argument in the last  
chapter was intended to involve a denial of Wittgenstein's dictum. One 
objection, lodged in §5 of the las t chapter, was that a sophisticated 
adherence to the principle, which makes due concession to the amount of 
idealization involved in constructing a systematic and explanatory theory 
of meaning, does not require that sentences of the theory be connected 
in a piecemeal fashion with practical linguistic  a b i l i t ie s .  An ea rlie r  
objection, lodged in §2 , was that i f  speakers' inferential a b i l i t ie s  
are included as part of the use in which speakers' understanding of sentences 
can be manifested, then there are no grounds for denying, even given the 
application of Wittgenstein's dictum as a s t r ic t  constraint on the theory 
of meaning in the way that Dummett intends, that speakers can manifest 
th e ir  knowledge of the conditions for the classical truth and fa ls i ty  of 
sentences.
This last  objection is an obvious one to make. Therefore, we should 
expect Dummett to have some response to i t .  There are, in fa c t,  two 
lines of argument in Dummett's work which can be seen as responses to 
this objection. One line of argument is this:
This answer[ involving the appeal to inferential a b i l i t ie s ]  is thin.
-, I t .  is undoubtedly the case that i f  we have a grasp of some conception 
of truth for mathematical statements with respect to which the principle  
of bivalence holds, then the laws of classical logic are valid; 
but i t  is hardly plausible that the mere propensity to reason in 
accordance with these laws should constitute a grasp of such a notion 
of truth. ( Elements, p .376)
Dummett is certainly correct when he says that merely having a disposition 
to employ classically valid inferences cannot constitute a grasp of the 
notions of classical truth and fa ls i ty .  As he goes on to say a fte r  the passage
S I -
quoted, even i f  we were trained to apply the classical laws of logic to a range 
of sentences, such training would not of i t s e l f  equip us with an understanding 
of the conceptions of truth and fa ls i ty  under which every sentence of the range 
must be determinately either true or fa lse. A grasp of these notions, is ,  
in fa c t,  presupposed by a training in the classical modes of reasoning.
Without denying th is ,  one can s t i l l  argue that the acceptance by most speakers 
of classically  valid inferences constitutes a part of l ingu istic  use which 
manifests, even though i t  does not explain, speakers' knowledge of the classical 
truth-conditions of sentences. Conformity with the Wittgensteinian dictum does 
not impose the strong requirement that a concept, partly constitutive of 
meaning, should be exhaustively explicable in terms of use, but only the weak 
requirement that an understanding or a knowledge of the concept be exhaustively 
manifestable in use. The position I hold entails that speakers have a conception 
of classical truth which governs th e ir  customary inferential practices. Of 
course, this position leaves unanswered the question of how we acquire this  
governing conception of truth. This is a question which goes beyond the 
scope of this thesis. My aim in this thesis is merely to determine whether 
Dummett's argument against realism is cogent. I believe that the argument is 
not cogent because the re a lis t  may legitimately appeal to our classical 
inferential practices as constituting that part of our use of language which 
manifests our knowledge of sentences' classical truth-conditions.
Another line of argument against my appeal to classical inferential practice 
might be to acknowledge that this practice is part of our use of language 
but to assert that nonetheless i t  stands in need of revision. This line  
of argument might be seen in the passages in which Dummett insists that the 
need to harmonize d ifferent aspects of use may lead to revision of some 
aspects of use. {'Theory of Meaning I I ' ,  pp.103-105) Dummett mentions
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two aspects of the use of a sentence in this connexion: the conditions
under which one is ju s t if ie d  in making a statement and the consequences 
which one is entitled  to draw from the statement's being made. The 
in tu it ive  requirement of harmony which Dummett imposes on these two aspects 
of use, in respect of some type of statement, is that the addition of 
a statement of the given type to a language does not enable one to deduce 
any other type of statement which was previously not deducible. (For discussion 
of the distinction between conditions and consequences and the required 
harmony between them, see Frege, pp.354-358; pp.362-363; pp.396-397; 
pp.453-455)
Dummett says that the distinction between the two aspects of use is a 
generalization of a proof-theoretic d istinction between the role played 
by introduction-rules and the role played by elimination-rules in systems 
of natural deduction. ( Frege, p.454) Since I find the proof-theoretic 
distinction to be clearer than the more general distinction between the 
two aspects of the use of a sentence, I shall present the argument 
for the revision of our classical in ferentia l practices in terms of the 
proof-theoretic distinction.
In a system of natural deduction, the introduction-rule for a logical 
constant can be seen as giving the condition for its  application and the 
elimination-rule as giving a consequence of its  application. Gentzen’ s 
original idea in setting up his systems of natural deduction was that 
the introduction-rule for a logical constant gives a defin ition of the 
constant. The elim ination-rule, in Gentzen's words, ' is  only a consequence 
of the corresponding introduction-rule, which may be expressed somewhat
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as follows: when making an inference by an elimination-rule, we are allowed
to "use" only what the principal sign of the major premiss "means" according 
to the introduction rule for this sign. '
Gentzen requires that there be a certain relation between the introduction
and elimination rules for a logical constant. This relation is described
2
more formally by Prawitz's principle of inversion.
Let I and J be the introduction and elimination rules for a logical 
constant c. I f  A is a consequence of applying the elimination rule 
J, then a deduction of the major premiss of J, the last  step of which 
consists of an application of the introduction-rule I ,  must already 
contain a deduction of A.
When a pair of introduction and elimination rules satisfy this principle, 
they are in harmony in the sense that th e ir  addition to a set of sentences 
is a conservative extension of the set. (A theory 0 in language L is a 
conservative extension of P  in language Lo i f  and only i f ,  for every 
formula A of Lo, i f  0 V*A th e n P h A .)  For example, consider a set of 
sentences P  in a language Lo and suppose that, for two formulas A and ^  
of L o , T h A  and P . After the addition of the introduction and 
elimination rules for to Lo, the only way to deduce by means of these
rules a formula of Lo without '&' is by applying the introduction and
1. G. Gentzen, 'Investigations into Logical Deduction', in M.Szabo (ed. ) .
The Collected Papers of Gerhard Gentzen, (Amsterdam, North-Holi and, 1969),
p .80
2. See Dag Prawitz, Natural Deduction, (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell,
1965), pp.32-35; 'Ideas and Results in Proof Theory' ,  in J.E.  Fenstad 
(ed. ) .  Proceedings of the Second Scandinavian Logic Symposium,
(Amsterdam: North-HoHand, 1971), pp.246-247.
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el im ination ru le  consecutively as below:
A
A & B
A
But since the introduction and elimination rules for satisfy the
one of the premisses 
principle of inversion, the deduction o f /  of the elimination-
rule already contains a deduction of the consequence of the elimination-
rule. In fact this is the deduction of A from P. So i t  is clear in this
case that the consecutive application of the introduction and elimination
rules for w ill  allow us to deduce from V  only the formulas of Lo
which were deducible from P w ithout the ru le s ;  o r , in other words, tha t
the addition of the introduction and elimination rules for to Lo
cons titu tes  a conservative extension o f  P.
Dummett says that the fact that our use of sentences does not meet the 
requirement of harmony creates grounds for c r it ic iz in g  the use. ('Philosophical 
Basis', p .222) In particular, our use of the classical rules of inference 
is c r it ic izab le  on the grounds that they do not meet the requirement of 
harmony. They do not meet the requirement of harmony in the sense that th e ir  
addition to the atomic fragment of f irs t-o rd e r  logic constitutes a non­
conservative extension of the fragment.
I f  we consider a fragment of natural language lacking the sentential 
operators, including negation, but containing sentences not e ffective ly  
decidable by observation, i t  would be impossible for that fragment 
to display features embodying our recognition of the undecidable
71 -
sentences as determinately true or fa lse. The assumption of bivalence 
for such sentences shows i t s e l f  only in the acceptance of certain forms 
of inference, classically but not in tu it io n is t ic a lly  valid . Hence 
i t  would be unsurprising i f  the introduction into the language of 
logical constants, treated as subject to the classical laws, rendered 
i t  possible for us, on occasion, to derive the truth of an atomic 
statement which would not have been recognized without the use 
of argument: and thus the extended language would not be a conservative
extension of the original one re la tive  to our recognition of tru th .
( 'Deduction', p .317)
But the fact that the classical rules of inference do not constitute a
conservative extension of the atomic fragment, re la tive  to a constructivist
notion of tru th , is not by i t s e l f  grounds for c r it ic iz in g  the classical
rules. I t  has to be shown f i r s t  that the relation of deducibility which
holds among formulas of the atomic fragment is to be explained in terms
of this constructivist notion of truth. I t  is known that the classical
rules of inference in a system of natural deduction meet the requirement
of conservative extension, when the relation of deducibility which holds
among formulas of the atomic fragment is explained in terms of classical 
3
truth. So how is Dummett to ground his assumption that the appropriate 
notion of truth for the atomic fragment is the constructivist notion?
The following passage te l ls  us:
I t  w ill  always be legitimate to demand, of any expression or form of 
sentence belonging to the language, that its  addition to the language 
should yield a conservative extension; but, in order to make the notion
of a conservative extension precise, we need to appeal to some concept
such as that of truth or that of being assertible or capable in 
principle of being established, or the l ik e ; and just which concept 
is to be selected, and how i t  is to be explained, w ill depend upon 
the theory of meaning that is adopted. {'Philosophical Basis', p .222)
3. See Dag Prawitz, 'Ideas and Results in Proof-Theory' ,  op.c i t . ,  p .256 
and p.260
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Duiïimett's strategy seems to be: f i r s t ,  to establish that a s s e r t ib i l i ty ,
ve rif ica tio n , or some notion other than classical truth should be the central 
notion in the theory of meaning; second, to argue that, given this fact, the 
appropriate notion of truth for the atomic fragment is a non-classical notion 
of truth; th ird , to argue that the classical rules of inference constitute a 
non-conservative extension of the atomic fragment re la tive  to this non-classical 
notion of truth. ( I  shall discuss th is strategy in greater detail in § 4 )
I have argued, however, that Dummett’ s argument for repudiating classical truth  
as the central notion in the theory of meaning does not go through. Consequently, 
his argument for rejecting classical rules of inference, on the basis of the ir  
fa ilu re  to meet the requirement of conservative extension, does not go through eithei
In any case, since the argument for rejecting the classical rules of 
inference, on the basis of th e ir  fa ilu re  to meet the requirement of 
conservative extension, depends for the support of its  v ita l assumption 
on Dummett's argument for repudiating classical truth in the theory of 
meaning, i t  would be question-begging to appeal to the former argument 
as a defence against an objection of the kind I have lodged to the la t te r  
argument.
In conclusion, both lines of argument against my appeal to speakers' 
inferentia l a b i l i t ie s ,  as partly constitutive of use, do not succeed in 
showing that the appeal to these a b i l i t ie s  does not form the basis of a 
sound objection to the manifestation form of the argument against realism'.
The f i r s t  line of argument against the appeal to these a b i l i t ie s  was that 
a speaker could not acquire an understanding of the classical notion of
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truth through a training in the use of classical rules of inference.
My reply to this line of argument was to say that, a ll  the same, a speaker 
can manifest his understanding of the classical truth-conditions of 
sentences through employment of c lassically valid inferences and that this  
is a l l  that is needed to refute the manifestation form of the argument 
against realism.
The second line of argument against the appeal to in ferential a b il i t ie s  
was that, even i f  speakers' customary inferential practice is part of 
use, the practice is c r it ic iza b le  for not meeting the requirement of harmony 
between d ifferent aspects of use. My reply to this line of argument 
was that the claim that our customary employment of classical rules
of inference does not meet the requirement of harmony depends upon the 
soundness of the argument against realism; so this second line  of 
argument cannot, on pain of c irc u la r ity ,  act as a defence of the argument 
against realism.
§2 Direct and Indirect Verifications
As a preliminary to developing a critic ism  of Dummett's ve rif ica tio n is t  
theory of meaning, I must explain two distinctions Dummett makes: a particular
distinction between demonstrations and canonical proofs and a more general 
distinction between direct and indirect verifications.
Constructivists have usually emphasized Gentzen's conjecture about the 
roles of introduction and elimination rules in a system of natural deduction 
for the reason that the introduction-rules, which, according to Gentzen's 
conjecture, give the meanings of the logical constants, run parallel 
with the informal in tu it io n is t ic  explanation of the meaning of logical
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constants. The in tu it io n is t  informally explains the meaning of a logical
constant by stating the condition for a construction to be a proof of a
sentence which contains that logical constant as principal operator.
The following table embodies the standard in tu it io n is t ic  explanations
5
of the meanings of the logical constants.
( i )  We have a proof of A & ^  i f f  we have a proof of A and we have a 
proof of B^.
( i i )  We have a proof of A v ^  i f f  we have a proof of A or we have a 
proof of
( i i i )  We have a proof of A—>]B i f f  we have an effective procedure which,
applied to a proof of A, yields a proof of !B.
( iv )  We have a proof of V^A(x) i f f  we have an effective procedure which, 
applied to a term t ,  yields a proof of A {t).
(v) We have a proof of j x.A(x) i f f  we have a proof of A ( t ) ,  for some term t
(1  A is defined as A HJL, where J . is  the constant for absurdity.)
Now Dummett argues in a number of places that i t  is necessary to re s tr ic t  
the type of proof which enters into the above explanations ('Philosophical 
Basis', pp.239-242; Elements, pp.390-393) I f  the in tu it io n is t  does not 
re s tr ic t  the type of proof to which his explanations of the logical constants 
appeal, then his explanation of the meaning of disjunction, in particular,  
w ill  be incorrect. The in tu it io n is t*s  explanation of the meaning of 'V  
is that we have a proof of A v 2  just in case we have a proof of A or we 
have a proof of B. But in ordinary in tu it io n is t  practice, a construction
4. See Dag Prawitz, 'Meanings and Proofs: on the Conflict between Classical 
and In tu it io n is t ic  Logic', Theoria, X L ÎII  (1977), p .25; 'Ideas and Results 
in Proof Theory' ,  op.c i t . ,  pp.244-245
5. See A. Heyting, Intuitionism, (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1956), pp.97-99;
p .102
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is considered to be a proof of A vlA, in the case where A is decidable, 
even though i t  is not a proof of A or of 1 A. This is legitim ate, in the 
in tu it io n is t 's  view, i f  the construction supplies an effective procedure 
for finding a proper type of proof for one of the disjuncts.
So i t  is clear that the type of proof to which the in tu it io n is t  appeals 
in his explanation of disjunction cannot be the kind of construction which 
constitutes a proof of A v 1 ^  without being a proof of A or of 1  A.
This la t te r  type of construction is what Dummett calls a demonstration.
The informal proofs that are found in mathematical artic les and text books 
are also demonstrations and they are to be distinguished from the canonical 
proofs which may enter into the in tu it io n is t 's  explanation of the meaning 
of logical constants.
A similar argument for the need for this distinction could be based on the 
existential quantifier (See Elements, pp.391-392)
Dummett argues that reflection on the in tu it io n is t 's  informal explanation 
of implication yields a deeper reason for drawing this distinction ('Philosophical 
Basis', p .241; Elements, pp.392-393) I t  is plain, he says, that the notion 
of proof being used in the in tu it io n is t ic  explanation of implication is one 
which does not allow unrestricted use of the elimination rule for implication, 
namely modus ponens. For i f  i t  did, the explanation of the meaning of the 
constant would be vacuous. One could admit anything one likes as constituting 
a proof of A -^ ^ , and i t  would remain the case that we have an effective  
which, applied to a proof of A, yields a proof of B_. The effective procedure 
would consist simply of adding the proof of A -^ ^  to the proof of A and
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inferring IB by modus ponens. But this is not what the in tu it io n is t  
intends by his explanation of implication. What he intends is that the 
proof of A-^B^ should supply a means of converting a proof of A into a
proof of ^  which does not appeal to any modus ponens which has A-4 B^ as
major premiss. Once again the in tu it io n is t ic  explanation of a logical 
constant must be couched in terms of a restricted type of proof.
A similar argument can be given for the claim that the in tu it io n is t ic  
explanation of the meaning of V xA(x) must be couched in terms of a 
restricted type of proof which does not have VxA(x) as the premiss of an 
application of the elimination-rule for the universal quantifier (universal 
instantia tion). (See Elements, pp.393-394) This restricted type of 
proof which is needed for the in tu it io n is t ic  explanations of implication 
and the universal quantifier is that of a canonical proof.
These arguments show that the biconditionals which express the in tu it io n is t 's  
explanation of the meaning of the logical constants should be framed in 
terms of canonical proofs. So we should replace ‘proof with 'canonical 
proof' at each of the occurrences of the former in both the le f t  and
right branches of the biconditionals ( i )  to (v ) .  From now on when I refer
to (1) and (v ) ,  I shall understand them as having been changed in this way. 
When we change the biconditionals and also add one stating when we have 
a canonical proof of an atomic formula, we have an inductive specification  
of a canonical proof. A suitable clause to cover the atomic case is 
the following:
(v i)  We have a canonical proof of an atomic formula 7^  i f f  we have a proof 
of A in an atomic system S.
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(An atomic system is determined by a set of individual, operational, and
predicate constants and a set of inference rules which have atomic formulas
5
as both premisses and consequences. )
This inductive specification of a canonical proof, given by the clauses
( i )  to ( v i ) ,  is precise. But we might ask what shape the canonical proof 
w ill have in the natural deduction system Gentzen developed for in tu it io n is t ic  
logic. I t  is natural to assume that there w ill be an inference-rule of 
the system corresponding to each of the inductive clauses. An inductive 
clause w ill constrain the corresponding inference-rule in this way: 
the consequence of the inference-rule w ill f u l f i l  the condition stated 
in the le f t  branch of i ts  corresponding biconditional i f  the premisses 
meet the condition stated in the right branch of the biconditional. I t  
is clear that only the introductictt^rule for a logical constant can satisfy  
the constraint imposed by the inductive clause for that constant.
I f  we were considering only the rules for &, v, 3  and V ,  we could describe 
a canonical proof as one consisting solely of applications of introduction- 
rules. The introduction-rule for implication, however, creates a problem. 
While the introduction-rule for implication satisfies the constraint imposed 
by inductive clause ( i i i ) ,  the condition for introducing —^ in a natural 
deduction proof is weak: the suffic ient condition for inferring A-^B^
is that we have a deduction of B^ from A, where there are no constraints 
placed on this deduction. Such a deduction may consist of applications of
6. For further details about atomic systems see Prawitz, 'Ideas and 
Results in Proof Theory", op. c i t . ,  pp.242-243
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elimination as well as introduction rules. This is to say that, although 
thein troduction-ru le  satisfies the constraint imposed by the inductive 
clause for implication, there is a discrepancy between the meaning 
conferred on—^ by this inductive clause and the meaning o f c o n v e y e d  
by its  introduction-rule in the system of natural deduction.
I f  we say that a formula occurring within a deduction is in the main
stem of the deduction just in case i t  depends only on in i t ia l  premisses
and not on assumptionsto be closed, then one can describe a canonical
proof, as given in Gentzen's natural deduction system for in tu it io n is t ic
logic, as follows: a construction is a canonical proof i f  and only i f
its  in i t ia l  premisses are atomic sentences, its  final conclusion is a
sentence, and every complex sentence in the main stem is deduced from
7
its  immediate premisses by an introduction-rule.
Now this description of a canonical proof holds good only for deductions 
in f irs t-o rd e r  logic. But Dummett wishes to apply the distinction between 
canonical proofs and demonstrations to a ll f irs t-o rd e r  mathematical proofs 
which are in tu it io n is t ic a l ly  va lid . I t  is a question of some complexity, 
which Dummett discusses at length in one place, whether i t  is legitimate 
to generalize the distinction in this direction. ( Elements, pp.396-403)
I shall not follow up this particular question. For Dummett thinks that 
the distinction can be generalized, not just for mathematical sentences
7. This description of a canonical proof is derived from Prawitz's
discussion in Appendix A of 'Ideas and Results in Proof Theory', o p .c it ,  
pp.284-290 and from informal discussion by Dummett in an unpublished 
paper 'The Justification and Criticism of Logical Laws'.
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but for a ll  sentences, as the distinction between direct and indirect  
verifications. He explains the direct means of verifying a sentence in 
this way:
The direct means of verifying the statement is that which corresponds,
Step by step, with the internal structure of the statement, in 
accordance with that model of meaning for the statement and its  
constituent expressions which is being employed. The possibility  
of establishing the statement d irec tly  must be envisaged by anyone 
who grasps the meaning of the statement.. . ( 'Deduction' pp.312-313)
Dummett says that the possib ility  of establishing a sentence by indirect 
means need not be envisaged by anyone who grasps its  meaning. This is 
for the reason that
. . . [ a n  indirect verif ica tion] w ill  involve also statements which do 
not belong to that fragment of language, an understanding of which is 
essential to an understanding of the statement i t s e l f ,  statements 
which may therefore be of a greater complexity than i t .  ( 'Deduction'.p.313)
Dummett also characterizes the distinction between the direct and the
indirect means of verifying a sentence in terms of the network model of
8
language which Quine gives in his essay 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'.
Quine's model of language consists in an image of i t  as an articulated  
structure of deductively interconnected sentences. Quine employs this model 
in his attack on the po s it iv is t thesis that the verification of a sentence 
consists in a bare sequence of sense-impressions. The model is supposed 
to represent the in tu it ive  claim that the process of verifying a sentence 
usually depends upon establishing deductive connexions with the other 
sentences
8. in From a Logical Point of View, (New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1963) 
pp.20-46
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In terms of Quine's model, Dummett characterizes the d irect means of 
verifying a sentence, which, in his view, is recognizable by anyone who 
grasps the meaning of the sentence, as that means of verif ica tion  which is 
fixed by the sentence's position in the network of sentences. At the 
periphery of the network, sentences are d irectly  verif ied  by observation 
and at the other extreme, at the centre of the network, sentences are 
directly  verif ied  by computation or deduction. An indirect means of 
verifying a sentence is one which does not proceed in the manner fixed 
by the sentence's position in the network. For example, a deduction of 
an observation sentence from general laws is an indirect verif ica tion  of 
the sentence, (see 'Deduction', pp.298-299)
Now Quine has an additional purpose, besides that of attacking the 
positiv is t notion of ve r if ic a tio n , in advancing the image of language 
as a network of deductively interconnected sentences. His other purpose
is to use the image as a model for his claim that there is no principal
9
means of verifying a sentence which is constitutive of i ts  meaning.
Quine espouses holism: the meaning of a sentence just consists of a ll the 
possible means of verifying a sentence, including those which involve 
deduction from sentences more deeply embedded in the network. So, in fa c t,  
Dummett and Quine employ the image of language as a structure of deductively 
interconnected sentences for precisely contrary purposes: Quine employs
i t  as an in tu it ive  model of his ho lis tic  theory of meaning and Dummett 
employs i t  as an in tu it ive  model of his molecular theory of meaning.
9. 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', ib id , pp.37-46
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Dummett rehearses in many places the be lie f that holism amounts to the 
denial that a systematic theory of meaning is possible. ('Philosophical 
Basis', pp.218-219; 'Deduction', pp.301-304; Elements, pp.365-367)
A systematic theory of meaning, in Dummett's view, must assign a meaning
to every sentence, independently of other sentences in the language
which do not contain its  constituents. A molecular theory of meaning of
the kind Dummett favours is a systematic theory of meaning in this sense:
i t  analyzes the meaning of each sentence in terms of the condition for
its  direct ve rif ica tion , as determined by the conditions of direct verif ica tion
for its  constituents. Dummett says that such a molecular theory of meaning,
in so far as i t  is systematic, w il l  pick out one aspect of use and show
how other aspects of use are in harmony with i t ;  in particu lar, i t  w ill
show how the direct verif ica tion  of a sentence is in harmony with its
possible indirect verif ications. The direct and the indirect verifications
are in harmony, Dummett says, just in case i t  can be shown that i f  a
sentence has been indirectly  verif ied  i t  could have been d irectly
verif ied . ('Philosophical Basis', pp.221-222)
One line of argument against Dummett might proceed by scrutinizing his 
claim that holism amounts to a denial that a systematic theory of meaning 
is possible. I do not wish to pursue this l in e , as I believe that there 
are particular criticisms that can be made of Dummett's conception of 
meaning and truth which show that they are flawed.
10. Susan Haack adopts this line of argument in'Dummett on the Justification  
of Deduction', (unpublished manuscript)
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§3 Mathematical Truth and General Truth
A topic which crops up in several places in 'The Justification of Deduction' 
is the informativeness of deductive inference or, in other words, the 
way in which deductive inference increases our knowledge.( 'Deduction', 
pp.299-300, pp.311-315) The principal way in which a deduction can be 
informative is by establishing a sentence as true.
Dummett's main interest in this topic seems to be to determine what constraint 
the informativeness of various kinds of deductive inference pi aces on an 
a n t i- re a l is t  conception of truth . One way of interpre^ ting Dummett's 
discussion is to see i t  as starting with a conception of tru th , in particular  
a conception of mathematical tru th , which he then revises to accord with 
the informativeness of the two kinds of mathematical proof, canonical 
proofs and demonstrations.
I suggest that the conception of truth Dummett starts with is this:
(1) A mathematical sentence is true i f  and only i f  we possess an 
in tu it io n is t ic a l ly  valid canonical proof of i t .
The informativeness of canonical proofs accords well with this conception
but the informativeness of demonstrations does not. In a case where we 
possess a demonstration of a sentence, but not a canonical proof, we 
s t i l l  consider that the demonstration establishes the truth of the sentence.
Yet this notion of truth does not square at a ll with (1 ) .  To allow for
the informativeness of demonstrations one must weaken (1) as follows:
(2) A mathematical sentence is true i f  and only i f  we possess/intu itionistically  
valid canonical proof or an in tu it io n is t ic a l ly  valid demonstration of i t .
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An essential part of this characterization is that a proof which establishes 
a sentence as true must be an in tu it io n is t ic a l ly  valid one. In 'The Justification  
of Deduction' Dummett refers to the possib ility  of a semantic characterization 
of in tu it io n is t ic  v a lid ity .  But the approach which Dummett can be seen as 
relying on in many places is a syntactic characterization of v a lid ity . The 
leading idea of this approach is that a canonical proof, as inductively
specified by ( i )  to (v i)  in § 2 ,  bears i ts  v a lid ity  on its  face, as each step
in such a proof proceeds in accordance with the in tu it io n is t ic  explanations 
of the meanings of the logical constants. An arbitrary deduction is then 
defined as valid just in case we have an effective procedure for transforming
i t  into such a canonical proof.
For the sake of simplicity, I shall consider in my discussion just the case 
of closed deductions, that is ,  deductions every assumption of which is closed 
and every parameter of which is proper. The in tu it io n is t ic  v a lid ity  of a 
closed deductionTTof a sentence A can be specified inductively by giving 
clauses for the case in which A is an atomic formula and the cases in which 
A is B & V C^, 3  xA(x), and VxA (x). For any particular case, the induction 
clause runs like  this: T T  is valid i f f  we have an effective procedure for  
transforming T T  into a canonical proof T T  of A.
11. Dummett adopts this approach to characterize v a lid ity  in the
unpublished paper 'The Justification and Criticism of Logical Laws', 
The approach was developed by Prawitz; see Appendix A of 'Ideas and 
Results in Proof Theory', op. c i t . ,  where Prawitz gives the inductive 
defin ition of v a lid ity  for closed deductions, described above, and 
then extends i t  to open deductions in the system M(S), that is ,  
the system of natural deduction the language of which is determined 
by the descriptive constants of the atomic system S and the rules 
of which are the rules of S and the minimal logic M. Prawitz 
says that his inductive defin ition covers in tu it io n is t ic  v a lid ity ,  
as the in tu it io n is t ic  natural deduction system is identical to M(S+), 
where S+ is the extension of S obtained by adding the in tu it io n is tic  
absurdity rule.
- 84-
Now this inductive specification of v a lid ity  characterizes the notion 
of in tu it io n is t ic  v a lid ity  for any arb itrary  proof, whether i t  be a canonical 
proof or a demonstration. In both cases we can say that, i f  we possess 
a proof of a sentence which is valid we also possess an effective procedure 
for obtaining a canonical proof of the sentence. In the case in which 
the proof we possess is a valid canonical proof this is clearly true: 
possessing such a proof, we thereby possess an effective procedure for 
obtaining its  validity-guaranteeing canonical proof, namely i t s e l f .
In the case in which the proof we possess is a valid demonstration 
this generalization is also true: the proof, together with the procedure
for e ffective ly  transforming i t  into its  validity-guaranteeing canonical 
proof, constitutes an effective procedure for obtaining this canonical 
proof. (In this case I shall say that the demonstration yields the 
effective procedure for obtaining the canonical proof.)
Taking note of this generalization and making the assumption that we
can generalize the distinction between canonical proofs and demonstrations
to a ll in tu it io n is t ic a l ly  valid mathematical proofs, we can simplify
the defin ition of mathematical truth given by (3 ). Combining this
mathematical
generalization with the fact that a /  sentence is true only i f  we 
possess an in tu it io n is t ic a l ly  valid canonical proof or demonstration 
of i t ,  we can establish that a mathematical sentence is true only i f  
we possess an effective procedure for obtaining a canonical proof of i t .  
Since i t  is clear that i f  we possess an effective procedure for obtaining 
a canonical proof of a sentence then i t  is true, we can establish both 
directions of the following biconditional.
(3) A mathematical sentence is true i f  and only i f  we possess an effective  
procedure for obtaining a canonical proof of i t .
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This is ,  in fa c t, the defin ition of truth which Dummett settles on in 
'The Justification of Deduction' as the most satisfactory a n t i - re a l is t  
conception of truth meeting the constraints imposed by the need to account 
for the informativeness and the v a lid ity  of deductions, ( in  'The 
Philosophical Basis of In tu it io n is t ic  Logic' Dummett also argues for 
this same conception of mathematical truth on the basis of d ifferent  
considerations. See pp.232-247)
I t  may be possible coherently to adopt a strongly idea lis t view, 
and equate the truth of a statement with its  actual recognition as 
true, at least by indirect means. But, i f  epistemic advance by 
indirect deductive inference is to be possible, truth must go 
beyond recognition of truth by direct means alone; while, i f  we 
are not to fa l l  into holism, i t  must have some defin ite  relation to 
the direct means whereby the truth of the statement can be established, 
since that direct means reflects the content of the statement according 
to the model of meaning we have adopted. In the case of mathematical 
statements, the relationship can, i f  we are disposed to do so, be 
taken to be as close as this: that a statement is to be recognized
as true only i f  we possess an effective means in principle of 
establishing its  truth by direct means. ('Deduction', pp.313-314)
Now the.conception of mathematical truth given by (3) is framed by Dummett 
to meet two constraints: the f i r s t  constraint is that i t  allow for the
informativeness of deductive inference and the second constraint is that 
i t  be compatible with an account of the va lid ity  of deductive inference.
Dummett seems to propose in 'The Justification of Deduction' that demonstrations 
be treated as a special test case of the capacity of a conception of 
truth to meet these two constraints. The conception of truth embodied in
(3) satisfies the constraints in the special case of demonstrations in 
the following way: i t  allows for the informativeness of demonstrations
in that a demonstration can establish a sentence as true in the sense 
defined and i t  is compatible with an accoujit of the va lid ity  of demonstrations 
in that any sentence established as true, in the sense defined, by a
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demonstration could have been established as true, in the same sense, 
by a canonical proof. This last fact shows that the conception of truth 
embodied in (3) is compatible with the syntactic account of the va lid ity  
of demonstrations in the sense that i t  is a necessary condition for a 
demonstration to be valid on this account that this fact obtain. For, 
i f  a demonstration of a sentence is valid on this account, we must have 
an effective procedure for obtaining a canonical proof of the sentence; 
consequently, i t  must be the case that i f  the sentence is established by 
the demonstration, i t  could have been established by a canonical proof 
(namely, the one which guarantees the demonstration’s v a l id ity ) .
Dummett generalizes the defin ition (3) into a defin ition of truth for 
a ll  sentences. A rough statement of the de fin ition , to be modified 
la te r ,  is this:
(4) A sentence is true i f  and only i f  we possess an effective procedure 
for obtaining a direct verification  of i t .
Generalizing the defin ition of mathematical truth, given in (3 ),  into 
a defin ition of general truth , given by some clause l ik e  (4 ) ,  is 
legitimate only i f  i t  can be shown that there should be constraints 
on the defin ition of general tru th , analagous to the particular constraints 
in mathematical truth. Perhaps, i f  one can make sense of the distinction  
between direct and indirect verif ica tions, one should admit that a general 
conception of truth should allow for the possibility that an indirect 
verification can establish a sentence as true. But in what sense is i t  
legitimate to demand that a conception of general truth be 
compatible with the v a lid ity  of indirect verifications? (This demand, 
of course, presupposes that a ll indirect verifications are deductions.
I shall come back to this point.) In particular,
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can one make out grounds for stipulating that an indirect verif ication of 
a sentence is valid i f  and only i f  we have an effective procedure for  
obtaining a direct verif ica tion  of the sentence in the same way that one 
can make out grounds for stipulating that a demonstration is valid i f  
and only i f  we have an effective procedure for obtaining a canonical 
proof of the same sentence? I believe that one cannot make out any such 
grounds. But before discussing th is matter, I shall consider a particular  
example of an indirect verif ica tion  and consider how the defin ition of 
tru th , given by (4) applies to i t .
An example of an indirect verif ica tion  which Dummett himself gives 
involves the proof which Euler gave to the problem of the Konigsberg 
bridges. ('Deduction', p .308) The conclusion of the indirect verif ication  
in Dummett's example is the sentence 'A person S has crossed at least 
one bridge at least twice' and the indirect verif ication i t s e l f  consists 
of the direct verif ica tion  of the premiss 'S has crossed every bridge' 
and an application of the general procedure involved in Euler's proof 
to prove the conditional ‘ I f  S has, on a certain day, crossed every 
bridge, then S has crossed at least one bridge at least tw ice'. This is 
an indirect verif ica tion  because the direct means of establishing the sentence 
'S has crossed at least one bridge twice ' is not by deduction but by 
observation. But this indirect verif ica tion  is cogent because i t  yields 
an effective procedure for obtaining the direct verif ica tion  of the 
sentence. The procedure which the indirect verif ica tion  yields is effective  
because the general procedure involved in Euler's proof embodies a method 
for e ffec tive ly  transforming any set of observations, d irectly  verifying  
that S crossed every bridge, into a set of observations, d irectly  
verifying that S crossed some bridge twice. Dummett's idea seems to be that
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one carries out the effective procedure for obtaining the direct verif ica tion  
of the sentence in question in this way: one takes the set of observations
which verify  the premiss 'S has crossed every bridge' and feeds them 
into the general procedure involved in Euler's proof.which rearranges 
them into a set of observations d irectly  verifying the conclusion. 
('Deduction', p .308)
The situation depicted in this example is unusual. I t  is only at the
time at which I make the observations which verify  the premiss 'S has
crossed every bridge' that the indirect verif ication yields an effective
procedure for obtaining a direct verif ication  of the conclusion 'S has
crossed some bridge tw ice'. This is because i t  is only at such a time that
the set of observations d irec tly  verifying the premiss are su ffic ien tly
detailed to be transformed by the general procedure , involved in
Euler's proof, into a direct verif ica tion  of the conclusion. But at a
time at which I have only memories of the observations verifying that S
crossed every bridge or at any time in which I have to rely on the
testimony of another person, the general procedure of Euler's proof w ill
not deliver a direct verif ica tion  of the conclusion. The reason is that
the memories I have or the testimony I rely on might suffice to establish
the premiss but might not be su ffic ien tly  detailed to act as input to the
12
transformation which would otherwise give a representation of the situation  
described by the conclusion.
This example shows the dangers of generalizing a mathematical thesis 
into a general empirical thesis without checking to see whether the change
12. I am using the word 'representation' in a semi-technical sense: I
take an observation of,a  memory o f, or a be lie f about a configuration of 
objects to be representations of that configuration.
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in subject-matter necessitates a modification of the thesis. The example 
bears out a disanalogy between the way in which a procedure for transforming 
representations of configurations of mathematical objects d iffers  from a 
procedure for transforming representations of configurations of empirical 
objects. The former type, of procedure can be carried out at any time because 
the configurations of objects are timeless and the representations of 
the configurations are reproducable at w i l l ;  but with the la t te r  type 
of procedure, there are restrictions on the times at which the transformation 
procedure can be carried out,due to the fact that configurations of empirical 
objects are transitory and representations of configurations are not 
reproducible at w i l l .
The query I wish to raise is whether an indirect verif ica tion  always yields an 
effective procedure for obtaining a direct verif ica tion . A modification of 
Dummett's own example shows that th is is not the case. One might ind irectly  
verify  the sentence ‘ S crossed some bridge twice' on the strength of a deduction 
from the premiss 'S crossed every bridge', which one accepts on the basis of 
someone else's testimony, and the conditional, ' I f  S crossed every bridge, then 
S crossed some bridge tw ice ', which one accepts on the basis of Euler's proof*, 
yet in this case the indirect ve r if ic a tio n , as described, does not yie ld an 
effective procedure for obtaining a direct verif ica tion  of the conclusion.
This example shows that the defin ition of general truth given by (4)
is not correct. I believe that i t  is with some such example in mind
that Dummett modifies his characterization of truth , when he generalizes
i t  from the mathematical to the general case. Dummett actually characterizes
truth in the general case, not by (4) as I supposed e a r l ie r ,  but as follows:
But, in the general case, we cannot demand a relationship as close 
as this: we should have, rather, to say that [a sentence is true
i f  and only i f ]  we possess an effective method for arriving at a 
direct verif ica tion  of the statement, provided that we are given a 
suffic ien tly  detailed set of observations. For example, Euler's 
proof gives us an effective general means for finding, from any
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observation of the complete route which leads to a verification  of the 
premiss, a verif ica tion  of this conclusion: but, in a given case,
we may have verif ied  the premiss without having noticed or recorded 
the whole route in d e ta il .  ('Deduction', pp.313-314)
This new characterization of truth in the general case is not en tire ly
clear. I understand i t  in this way:
(5) A sentence is true at a certain time i f  and only i f  i t  is the case 
that we possess at the time an effective procedure for obtaining a 
direct verif ication  of the sentence or i f  we had a su ffic ien tly  
detailed set of observations at the time, we would possess an effective  
procedure for obtaining a direct verif ication  of the sentence.
This discussion has been concerned with how closely Dummett can make the 
connexion between truth and our possession of an effective procedure for 
obtaining a direct ve rif ica tion . I t  seems that the connexion is closer 
in the mathematical case than in the general case. In the mathematical 
case the connexion arises naturally from the need to show that the 
defin ition of mathematical truth is compatible with the v a lid ity  of demon­
strations as well as canonical proofs. But why should there be a connexion 
at a ll in the general case? My conjecture is that Dummett requires the defin ition
of general truth to be compatible with the v a lid ity  of indirect verif ica tions, 
where i t  is presupposed that a ll indirect verifications involve deduction.
I am supposing that Dummett generalizes the syntactic account of v a lid ity  in 
terms of the general notions of direct and indirect verif ications. Under 
this generalization, an indirect verif ica tion  is valid just in case i t  is 
effec tive ly  transformable into a direct verif ica tion . But does this generalized 
account of v a lid ity  make sense? This is one of the questions which I shall 
consider in the next section.
§4 Problems Confronting Verificationism
I think i t  is appropriate at this point to step back and consider from 
a broader perspective the various theses and distinctions which have 
been discussed in the preceding sections of this chapter. From such 
a perspective we should be able to command a clear view of the way Dummett
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marshals the theses and distinctions in defence of his verif ica tio n is t  
theory of meaning.
In the las t chapter I considered in detail Dummett's argument against taking 
the central notion in the theory of meaning to be classical tru th , or, in 
other words, against taking the meaning of a sentence to consist in i ts  classical 
truth-condition. Dummett's argument, or at least the manifestation form of 
i t ,  re lies  heavily on the Wittgensteinian dictum that meaning should be 
exhaustively manifestable in use. I argued in the las t chapter and again in 
§1 of this chapter that adherence to the Wittgensteinian dictum does not 
compel acceptance of Dummett's argument. Let us set this objection aside 
and consider how Dummett proceeds to elaborate a theory of meaning which 
he believes conforms to the Wittgensteinian dictum.
Dummett says that we should analyze meaning, not in terms of the conditions 
for the classical truth of sentences, but in terms of the conditions which 
conclusively verify  sentences. ('Philosophical Basis', p .227; 'Theory of 
Meaning n ' ,  pp.110-111) ( I  shall overlook in this discussion Dummett's 
occasional remarks that fa ls if ic a t io n ,  and not verif ica tion , should be the 
central notion; see§2 of Chapter One for a discussion of these remarks.
I shall also overlook Dummett's acknowledgement in his recent works that the 
conditions which verify  empirical sentences may be inconclusive; see §3 
of Chapter Four for a discussion of this recent development of his views.)
Dummett thinks that a theory of meaning in terms of vérification-conditions  
succeeds where a theory in terms of truth-conditions fa i ls .  While we cannot, 
in Dummett's view, sensibly credit a speaker with knowledge of an undecidable 
sentence's truth-condition, we can sensibly credit a speaker with knowledge 
of such a sentence's vérification-conditions: for a speaker can effective ly
recognize when such conditions obtain or fa i l  to obtain.
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I believe, however, that a theory of meaning, couched in terms of the 
conditions which verify  sentences, whether conclusively or inconclusively, 
faces perhaps insuperable d i f f ic u lt ie s .  One of these d i f f ic u lt ie s  concerns 
the fact that for every sentence there are many admissible verif ications.
At f i r s t  sight, i t  seems that this fact should make every sentence multiply 
ambiguous: given the thesis that the meaning of a sentence just consists
in the condition for i ts  verif ica tion  and the fact that the sentence has many 
admissible verifications, i t  seems to follow that the sentence has more than 
one meaning. On closer scrutiny, however, one sees that the conclusion 
only follows on the assumption that a sentence has an individual meaning 
which is independent of other sentences of the language. This assumption 
is repudiated by holists l ik e  Quine who assign a special place to verif ication  
in th e ir  discussions of meaning. As I remarked in % 2, the image of language 
as a network of deductively internconected sentences, which Dummett appeals 
to as the in tu it ive  model for his v e r if ic a t io n is t  theory of meaning, has been 
used by Quine and other holists to express th e ir  view that the meaning of a 
given sentence depends on a ll the other sentences of the language to which i t  
may be in fe ren tia lly  related. A holist l ik e  Quine can sidestep the problem 
of ambiguity simply by saying that every possible verif ica tion  of a sentence, 
whether i t  proceeds by observation or deduction, is constitutive of the sentence's 
meaning and this is not a special problem but is , rather, a general fact 
about the way a sentence of the language has meaning.
But Dummett wishes to retain the assumption that each sentence has an 
individual meaning which is independent of other sentences which do not 
contain its  constituents*, he declares over and over that holism amounts 
to a denial that a systematic theory of meaning is possible. So the question 
naturally arises of how he gets round the problem of ambiguity.
- 93-
One can see Dummett's solution to' th is problem most c learly  in the mathematical 
case. Here the solution resides in the distinction between canonical proofs 
and demonstrations. In §2 I outlined Dummett's arguments for supposing that 
the meaning of the in tu it io n is t lc  logical constants must be specified in terms 
of canonical proofs. I t  turned out that the clauses specifying the meanings 
of the constants constitute an inductive defin ition of a canonical proof.
The canonical proof of a sentence has the special property that i t  proceeds, 
step by step, in accordance with the meaning of the logical constants contained 
in the sentence; consequently, a grasp of the meaning of the sentence, as 
i t  depends on its  logical structure, w ill involve envisaging the possib ility  
of i ts  being proved in the canonical fashion. So the meaning of a sentence 
of f i r s t  order logic is tied d irec tly  to i ts  canonical proof, i f  i t  in fact  
has one. This overcomes the problem of ambiguity: for while there are many
possib ilit ies  of proving a sentence by a demonstration, i t  is only the possib ility  
of establishing the sentence by its  associated canonical proof that is 
constitutive of i ts  meaning.
Dummett generalizes the distinction between canonical proofs and demonstrations 
in two steps: the f i r s t  step involves the generalization of the distinction
from f irs t-o rd e r  logic proofs to a l l  mathematical proofs and the
second step involves the generalization from the mathematical proofs to 
general empirical verif ications. Although one might have qualms about the 
f i r s t  step of the generalization procedure, I have chosen to focus on the 
second step. The analogue of a canonical proof in the general case is a direct 
verif ica tion ; so the meaning of an empirical sentence is closely associated 
with the method for d irec tly  verifying i t .  Just as in the informal semantics 
of in tu it io n is t ic  logic the meaning of a sentence is given by the condition 
for its  canonical proof and this condition is given in turn by the conditions 
for the canonical proofs of the sentence's subformulas, so in the general
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theory of meaning, the meaning of a sentence is given by the condition for 
i ts  direct verifica tion  and this condition is given in turn by the conditions 
for the direct verifications of the sentence's constituents. {'Theory of 
Meaning I I ' ,  p .115)
I wish to question the te n ab ility  of the general distinction between direct 
and indirect verif ications. Dummett Intends us to understand this distinction  
in terms of his adaptation of Quine's network model of language. In his 
adaptation, each sentence has a distinctive meaning which is fixed by its  
position in the network: the direct verif ica tion  is that verif ica tion
which is determined by the sentence's position in the network and an 
indirect verif ication is one which is not determined in th is way. But once 
one tr ie s  to go beyond this schematic formulation of the d istinction, i t  is 
d i f f ic u l t  to find answers to particular questions. For example, what are 
the direct methods of verifying the sentences 'The sun is 93 million miles 
from the Earth', ' I f  Napoleon had not invaded Russia, he would have 
ruled Europe', and 'The neutron has quarks'? I f  the model of a network of 
deductively interconnected sentences is of any explanatory value, i t  should 
give us a method of explaining which chains of deductive connexions are those 
constituting the direct verifications of the sentences. But I claim 
i t  is very implausible to say that there are particular chains of deductive 
connexions recognition of which is constitutive of our understanding of 
sentences. At most, i t  can be said that,in  understanding a sentence, we 
we know only whether i t  can be verif ied  by observation or not. For this 
reason Dummett's distinction applies only to observation sentences: i t  is
only for these sentences that the contrast between a verif ication by 
observation and a verif ication which proceeds by other means can be made.
In fact, the only examples which Dummett gives of how the distinction  
between direct and indirect verifications applies concern observation sentences 
('Deduction', p .299; p .308; 'Philosophical Basis', pp.220-221)
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The fact that Dummett's distinction between direct and indirect verifications  
can be in te l l ig ib ly  attributed only to observation sentences means that the 
problem of ambiguity remains unsolved for a ll  non-observation sentences.
Any theory of meaning which retains the assumptions that each sentence 
has a content which can be specified independently of most other sentences • 
of the language and that the content of each sentence is to be analyzed 
in terms of the conditions for i ts  verif ication w ill be in tension with the 
fact that each sentence has countless admissible verif ica tions, most of 
which involve deduction from other sentences. A natural way of resolving 
this tension is to say, as Dummett does, that each sentence is associated 
with a single special verif ica tion  in terms of which its  content is 
specified. But for any non-observation sentence i t  appears that the selection 
of the special content-giving verif ica tion  w ill be quite arb itrary . In 
this case the only way to resolve the tension between the fact that each 
non-observation sentence has many verifications which involve deduction 
from other sentences and the assumption that the content of each 
sentence must be specified independently of most other sentences is to 
say that each verif ica tion  confers a d istinct content on the sentence, 
or, in other words, that the sentence is ambiguous.
Perhaps, i t  is a recognition of these facts which motivates philosophers 
l ik e  Quine to embrace holism as the only feasible conception of meaning 
within a ve if ica tio n  framework. For Dummett, however, holism is not 
a philosophical option: in his view, holism rules out the possibility  of
revising aspects of our use of language. In Dummett's characterization 
of holism, every part of our use of a sentence, especially the inferences 
into which i t  may enter, is constitutive of the meaning of the sentence 
and hence sacrosanct. One can see that such a view would be unacceptable 
to Dummett: for he believes that a repudiation of the notion of classical
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truth as the central notion in the theory of meaning in favour of some 
non-classical notion must entail a change in the logical laws and inferences 
we accept.
I believe i t  is a legitimate question to ask how Dummett can reconcile 
his proposal that we revise those parts of our use of language relating  
to our employment of classical rules of inference with his acceptance of 
the Wittgensteinian dictum that meaning is use. Dummett attempts to answer 
this question by saying that there is a need to systematize the various 
aspects of our in ferentia l use and to show that they are in harmony.
Two aspects of our in ferentia l use that Dummett mentions are the conditions 
under which one is ju s t if ie d  in making a statement and the consequences 
which one is entitled to draw from the statement's being made. (As I 
remarked in §1, these aspects are supposed to be generalizations of the 
roles played in a natural deduction system by the introduction and the 
elim ination-ru les.) Dummett says that these aspects are in disharmony 
when i t  can be shown that the addition of a statement to a set of sentences 
permits the deduction of a sentence which could not previously be deduced; 
in other words, these aspects are in disharmony when the addition of a 
statement to a set of sentences yields a non-conservative extension of the 
set. ('Philosophical Basis', p .221)
In &1 I discussed a claim which seems to be part of Dummett's argument 
for repudiating classical logic in favour of in tu it io n is t ic  logic. The 
claim was that the addition of classical rules of inference to a set 
of natural language sentences, lacking any sentential operators, would 
constitute a non-conservative extension of the set. I f  this were in fact 
the case, this would show that the rules of inference are not in harmony
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and are, consequently, subject to critic ism  and revision. But I pointed
out that this claim could only be one part of the argument; for an additional
premiss is needed to show that the deducib il ity -re la tion , in terms of which
the notion of a conservative extension is to be defined, must be explained
in terms of a non-classical notion of truth. The question then arises
how this premiss, to the effect that a non-classical notion of truth,
rather than a classical notion of tru th , is the appropriate explanans of
the dedu c ib il ity -re la tio n , is i t s e l f  to be grounded. I quoted a
passage from Dummett in which he claimed that this question is settled by
the appropriate theory of meaning. To cut a long story short, I believe
that Dummett's argument for repudiating classical logic in favour of in tu it ion is tic
logic goes l ik e  th is . The arguments against realism show that we should
take ve r if ica tio n , and not classical tru th , as the central notion in the
theory of meaning; given the notion of ve rif ica tion , we can define a notion
of non-classical truth with which to explain the deducibility-re lation
and so argue that the addition of the classical rules of inference are a
non-conservative extension of the atomic fragment of the language.
So the definitionsof truth discussed in the last section constitute a 
v ita l part of Dummett's strategy for repudiating classical logic. Since 
Dummett believes that we should reject classical logic, not just for 
mathematical sentences, but also for empirical sentences, i t  is the defin ition  
of general truth embodied in (4 ) ,  or rather (5 ) ,  which is relevant to 
this strategy. I wish to consider here whether this defin ition makes 
much sense. In particu lar, I wish to raise the question of why we should 
believe that there is any connexion between truth and our possession, 
given su ffic ien tly  detailed observations, of an effective procedure for  
obtaining a direct ve rif ica tio n . The defin ition given by (5) is modelled 
a fte r  the defin ition of mathematical truth given by (3 ).  In this case.
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the connexion between truth and our possession of an effective procedure 
for obtaining a canonical proof arises naturally from the syntactic 
account of the v a lid ity  of demonstrations. On this account, a demonstration 
(that is , a non-canonical proof in f irs t-o rd e r  logic) is valid just in case 
i t  yields an affective procedure for obtaining a canonical proof of the 
same sentenc. But is i t  at a ll  sensible to extend this account and say 
that an indirect verif ica tion  is valid just in case i t  yields an effective  
procedure for obtaining a direct verification?
I wish to set aside two issues which complicate the situation. The 
extension of the notion of v a lid ity  in this way presupposes that a ll 
indirect verifications are deductions: th is , of course, accords
with the fact Dummett only applies the distinction between direct 
and indirect verifications to observation sentences. Let us for the 
moment ignore the fact that an indirect verif ication need not take the 
form of a deduction. The other complicating issue is that, even in the 
example of an indirect verif ica tion  - the example of the Konigsberg bridges - 
which lends i t s e l f  most readily to Dummett‘ s arguments, the account of v a lid ity  
has to be complicated to allow for the fact the indirect verif ication  yields 
an effective procedure for obtaining a direct ve r if ica tion , only given 
a su ffic ien tly  detailed set of observations. Let us ignore this complication 
as well. For these tv/o complicating issues are only symptoms of a more 
general problem with extending the syntactic account of v a lid ity  in the 
way that Dummett must suppose. This general problem is that the syntactic 
account of v a lid ity  makes sense in the area of f irs t-o rd e r  logic where 
the notion of a canonical proof and a demonstration are well-defined; but 
when these notions are generalized into the notions of direct and indirect 
verif ica tions, the syntactic account ceases to have a clearcut sense. For 
example, suppose that, a fte r  measuring the pressure and volume of a certain
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body of gas, I deduce from the ideal gas law that i t  has a certain 
temperature. I t  is obscure, even supposing that I possess su ffic ien tly  
detailed observations, how the indirect ve rif ica tion , consisting in the 
deduction from the gas law, could be e ffec tive ly  transformed into a direct 
verif ica tion , consisting in an observation.
The heart of my critic ism  is that Dummett inappropriately generalizes a
notion which properly belongs to formal logic. This critic ism could be
made of the way Dummett generalizes many other logical concepts and distinctions;
for example, the notion of conservative extension and the distinction
between introduction and elimination-rules. But I chose to make this
particular critic ism  because, without a generalization of the syntactic
account of v a l id ity ,  Dummett has no grounds for modelling the defin ition
of empirical truth a fte r  the defin ition of mathematical truth in (3)
and without some such defin ition of truth in terms of ve r if ica tio n ,
the path from his acceptance of a v e r if ic a tio n is t  theory of meaning to
a rejection of classical logic is by no means clear. Dummett's strategy
for rejecting classical logic is , f i r s t  to argue that the theory of meaning
should be given in terms of verif ica tion  and then to define a notion of
truth in terms of verif ication with which to explain the deducibility-
re lation . I believe my arguments cast doubt on whether Dummett's definition
of truth in terms of verif ication  can be seriously motivated.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ANTI-REALISM AND REALITY
In previous chapters anti-realism has been characterized solely as the 
thesis that meaning should not be analyzed in terms of the notions of truth 
and fa ls i ty  which obey the principle of bivalence. In this chapter I 
shall f i l l  in some more details of the characterization of anti-realism by 
examining a range of claims that Dummett makes concerning the a n t i- re a l is t 's  
conception of re a li ty .  I shall try  to show at appropriate places how these 
claims connect up with the arguments from the theory of meaning considered 
in Chapter Two.
In ^1 I shall consider Dummett's claim that reductionism is neither necessary 
nor suffic ien t for anti-realism. I shall argue that there is a sense in 
which reductionism is necessary and claim that there is a way of uniformly 
characterizing a n t i - re a l is t  positions on a number of subjects in terms of the 
thesis that a sentence is true in virtue of the evidence existing for i t .  In 
&2 I shall consider Dummett‘ s claim that a re a lis t  interpretation of counter- 
factual s involves asserting the unrestricted va lid ity  of the law of conditional 
excluded middle. In §3 I shall argue that the a n t i - re a l is t  cannot acknowledge 
the de feasib ility  of evidence for empirically undecidable sentences and at 
the same time meet a legitimate demand that he explain in terms which do not 
beg any questions his conception of truth for such sentences.
§1 Reductionism
In the a r t ic le  'Realism' Dummett f i r s t  announced a programme for reinterpreting  
a range of metaphysical disputes relating to d ifferent subject-matters.
In the a r t ic le  he reinterprets each dispute as a conflict between a re a lis t
“ 101 -
and an a n t i- re a l is t  view of the truth-conditionsof a class of sentences.
This class of sentences Dummett calls the disputed class. He characterizes 
realism and anti-realism in the most general way as follows:
Realism I characterize as the be lie f that statements of the disputed 
class possess an objective truth-value, independently of our means of 
knowing i t :  they are true or false in virtue of a re a l i ty  existing
independently of us. The a n t i - re a l is t  opposes to this the view that 
statements of the disputed class are to be understood only by reference 
to the sort of thing which we count as evidence for a statement of that 
class. That is ,  the re a lis t  holds that the meanings of statements of, 
the disputed class are not d irec tly  tied to the kind of evidence for them 
that we can have, but consist in the manner of their determination as 
true Or false by states of a ffa irs  whose existence is not dependent 
on our possession of evidence for them. The a n t i - re a l is t  insists, on 
the contrary, that the meanings of these statements are tied d irectly  |
to what we count as evidence for them, in such a way that a statement |
of the disputed class, i f  true at a l l ,  can be true only in virtue of I
something of which we could know and which we should count as evidence I
for its  truth. The dispute thus concerns the notion of truth appropriate |
for statements of the disputed class; and this means that i t  is a i
dispute concerning the kind of meaning which these statements have.
( 'Realism', p .146)
I shall say that realism and anti-realism , as characterized by this passage,
1
are global realism and anti realism. A local realism or anti-realism is 
an instantiation of the global sort in a particular dispute. Among the 
particular disputes Dummett considers are the dispute between the common-sense 
re a lis t  and the phenomenal 1st over sentences about material objects, the 
dispute between the sc ien tif ic  re a lis t  and the posit iv is t over sentences 
about unobservable phenomena, the dispute between the platonist and the 
constructivist over mathematical sentences, the dispute between the mental 
re a lis t  and the behaviourist over sentences about mental states, events, 
and processes, and the dispute between re a lis t  and a n t i- re a l is t  over sentences 
about the past and the future.
1. I shall adopt Dummett's terminological expedient of treating 'realism' 
and 'anti-realism' as common nouns, capable of taking plurals..
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Dummett says in the Preface to Truth and Other Enigmas that he intended to say ,
in 'Realism' and other artic les  that the abstract structure of each dispute was
the same only in so far  as the local realisms and anti-realisms were instances
of the global conceptions. ( 'P re face ', pp.xxx-xxxi) Apart from the fact
that they are instances of a common global conception, local realisms d if fe r
considerably from each other and the same is true for local anti-realisms.
In particular, Dummett says that i t  is a mistake to suppose that a ll local
anti-realisms are reductionist. I t  was an error made by traditional interpretations
of the metaphysical disputes to view each local anti-realism as maintaining
2
a reductive thesis. I shall assume that a reductive thesis has the form:
(1) Sentences of class K reduce to sentences of class R
where K is the disputed class of sentences and R is what Dummett calls the 
reductive class of sentences. Dummett holds that i t  is neither necessary nor 
suffic ient for a position to be a n t i - re a l is t  that i t  maintain a reductive 
thesis. ( 'R e a lis m p p .156-157, 'The Reality of the Past', pp.359-362)
The fact that a local anti-realism need not be reductionist follows from a 
condition Dummett imposes on reduction, Dummett assumes that i f  the sentences 
of a disputed class K reduce to sentences of a reductive class R i t  must be the 
case that
(2) Sentences of class R are in te l l ig ib le  independently of sentences of class K.
Now one part of the traditional interpretation of a local anti-realism which 
Dummett takes over is that the sentences belonging to a reductive class 
express the existence of what would ordinarily  be thought of as evidence for  
sentences of the disputed class. For example, the sentences to which the
2. A good example of a traditional interpretation of some of the metaphysical 
disputes Dummett considers is A.J. Ayer's, The Problem of Knowledge, 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969). Ayer characterizes the position in
each dispute which Dummett would call a n t i - re a l is t  as a reductionist one; 
see pp.79-80, 82-83, and 118-29. Also see C.H. Whiteley, 'Epistemological 
Strategies', Mind, LXXVIII (1969), pp.25-34
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traditional anti-real 1st about the past thinks that the disputed sentences 
reduce state the existence of evidence, some of i t  in the form of memories, 
for the sentences about the past; and the sentences to which the traditional 
a n t i- re a l is t  about the future thinks that the disputed sentences reduce state 
the existence of evidence, some of i t  in the form of intentions, for sentences 
about the future.
Just because Dummett agrees with the traditional interpretation of the
character of sentences belonging to a reductive class, he asserts that
contrary to the traditional interpretation, the local anti-realisms about
the past and the future cannot be reductionist. Sentences about the past
and the future cannot reduce to sentences about memories and intentions:
such reductions would violate the condition stated in (2 ). For one cannot
state, Dummett says, that a person has a certain memory without specifying
what the memory is of nor can one state that a person has a certain intention
without specifying what i t  is an intention to do. I take i t  that what
Dummett is saying is that the only way in which to express the sentences
stating the existence of evidence,in the form of memories,for the sentence
' I t  was the case that p' is some variant of 'S remembers that i t  was the case
that p' and the only way to express the sentence stating the existence of
evidence,in the form of present intentions,for the sentence ' I t  w ill be the
case that p' is some variant of 'S intends to bring i t  about that i t  w ill
be the case that p '. Certainly i f  th is is true, then the sentences of the 
classes
reductive/ stating the existence of memories and intentions w ill not 
be in te l l ig ib le  independently of the sentences of the disputed classes.
( I  shall come back to this point)
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Dummett also argues that i t  is not su ffic ient for a position to be a n t i- re a l is t  
that i t  embrace a reductive thesis. His argument is based on the fact that 
a local realism may embrace a reductive thesis. For example, a re a lis t  might 
propose a reduction of sentences about character-traits to sentences about 
physiological constitution such that to each character-tra it there corresponds 
a determinate physiological condition, which is either present in or absent 
from each individual at any given time. This reduction would ju s t i fy  the 
principle of bivalence for the disputed class of sentences and could not 
be thought of as sustaining anti-realism about character-traits .
A necessary condition for anti-realism about a class of sentences
is , in Dummett's eyes, a denial that the principle of bivalence applies to 
sentences of the class. In some cases, an a n t i - re a l is t  may support his 
denial of bivalence for a class of sentences by arguing that the sentences 
reduce to sentences of another class and that the reduction does not sustain 
bivalence for the sentences in question. For example, Dummett argues that 
sentences about character reduce to sentences about behaviour and the reduction 
takes such a form that a situation may arise in which there is no true 
sentence about a man's behaviour which would render true, at a particular  
time, the sentence 'S is generous' nor any true sentence about his behaviour 
which would render true, at that time, the sentence ' S is not generous'.
In this way, Dummett employs the reduction to reject the re a l is t 's  insistence 
that the sentence 'S is generous' must be either true or fa lse , that S must, 
at a given time, either possess or lack the character-tra it of generosity.
So a local anti-realism may embrace a reductive thesis for sentences of a 
disputed class but what distinguishes the reduction as a n t i - re a l is t  is the 
fact that i t  does not sustain the principle of bivalence for the sentences of 
the class.
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Dummett makes ready use of the notion of reduction in discussing the relationship 
between anti-realism and reductionism. But how exactly is this notion to 
be understood? In the passages in which Dummett discusses reductionism he 
specifices that sentences of a class K reduce to sentences of class R just 
in case the following condition holds:
(3) For every sentence A of K, there is a sentence A* of R such that A is
true i f  and only i f  A' is true. ('Theory of Meaning I I ' ,  p .94; 'Realism', 
p .156; 'Reality of the Past', p .360)
Dummett says in the cited passages that a reduction need not be full-blooded
in the sense that i t  requires sentences of the disputed class to be translatable
into sentences of the reductive class. Such a requirement could not be met
in cases in which a disputed sentence A is correlated with a sentence A'
which is compounded out of an in f in i te  number of other sentences. The
essence of a reduction is , not that A be translatable into A ', but that A
i f  true at a l l ,  be true in virtue of the truth of A'.
All that needs to be maintained by a reductionist is th a t ,  whenever
any statement of the disputed class is true, i t  is true in virtue of the
truth of some statement of the reductive class, that the notion of truth  
as applied to statements of the disputed class is simply given by means 
of the connection with the reductive class, so that i t  makes no sense to 
suppose that a statement A of the disputed class is true without there 
being a corresponding true statement of the reductive class, in the truth  
of which A, in the particular case, consists. ( 'R e a lity  of the Past', 
pp.360-361)
I believe i t  is clear that Dummett's defin ition of reduction does not capture 
the idea what whenever a sentence belonging to a disputed class which is the 
subject of a reductive thesis is true, i t  is true in virtue of the truth of 
a reductive sentence,Dummett's defin ition merely states that, when a reductive 
thesis applies, a disputed sentence is true under the same circumstances as 
a reductive sentence. As fa r  as the defin ition goes, a sentence A' of R 
might be true in virtue of the truth of the sentence ^  of K. Dummett's 
defin ition is inadequate, as i t  stands, because i t  does not express
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any asymmetry between the disputed sentences and the reductive sentences in 
terms of which the direction of reduction can be fixed.
What is the relevant asymmetry between disputed and reductive sentences?
Dummett never e x p lic it ly  formulates the asymmetry and so we must probe
his intentions. A clue is offensd by Dummett‘s remarks about the character
of disputed sentences which reduce to reductive sentences and the character
of disputed sentences which do not. In 'The Reality of the Past' Dummett
says that when disputed sentences are the subject of a reductive thesis
their  truth-conditions are expressed by the corresponding reductive sentences
and when disputed sentences are not the subject of a reductive thesis their
truth-conditions are ones which a speaker can simply recognize whenever
they obtain without his having any means of expressing the fact that they obtain
otherwise than by the use of the disputed sentences themselves. ( 'R ea lity  of the
Past', p .359; p .361)
These characterizations of the two types of disputed sentences are very 
reminiscent of Dummett's characterizations of sentences the truth-conditions 
of which can be known e x p lic it ly  and sentences the truth-conditions of which 
can be known im p lic it ly . (see §2 of Chapter Two for the distinction between 
im plic it and ex p lic it  knowledge of truth-conditions.) I argued in Chapter 
Two that Dummett believes that i t  is a sentence's position in a partial 
ordering of sentences whichdetermines whether its  truth-condition can be 
known e x p lic it ly  or im p lic it ly . The partial ordering i t s e l f  is determined by
the relation 'An understanding of  depends upon an understanding of . . . ' ,
where this relation holds between two sentences, A and just in case one 
must have already learnt the meaning of the in order to grasp the meaning 
of A, Dummett intends this partial ordering to be a model of a speaker's 
progressive acquisition of language.
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My conjecture is that, in determining the appropriate model for a speaker's
knowledge of a sentence's truth-condition, this partial ordering thereby
determines whether the sentence, on the supposition that i t  belongs to a
disputed class, reduces to a reductive sentence or not. I f  my conjecture
is correct, i t  w ill  y ie ld an answer to the question of what the relevant
asymmetry is between disputed and reductive sentences. In his discussions
Dummett usually assumes that an understanding of a sentence the truth-
condition of which is known e x p lic it ly  depends upon an understanding of the
sentence which states that truth condition. So, presumably, an understanding
of a disputed sentence which is the subject of a reductive thesis depends
upon an understanding of the correlated reductive sentence. I f  this is
the case then the relevant asymmetry between disputed and reductive sentences
which fixes the direction of reduction can be formulated as follows:
(4) An understanding of the sentences of K depends on an understanding of 
the sentences of R.
This relation between disputed and reductive sentences is of the right kind 
to f ix  the direction of reduction^as the relation must, by defin ition , 
be antisymmetric in order to determine the partial ordering of sentences.
So another conjecture is that clause (3 ) ,  together with clause (4)^when i t  
is understood to be couched in terms of a relation which is reflexive, 
trans itive , and antisymmetric, constitute a defin ition of reduction which is 
consonant with Dummett's intentions.
This conjecture about the defin ition of reduction explains many of Dummett‘s 
remarks.
F irs t ,  i t  explains his imposition of clause (2) as a condition on reduction. 
I f  a disputed sentence reduces to a reductive sentence in virtue of the fact 
that an understanding of the disputed sentence depends on an understanding
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of the reductive sentence, then the reductive sentence must, i f  the reductive 
is to be genuine, be in te l l ig ib le  independently of the disputed sentence.
Clause (2) ensures that the relation which determines the direction of 
reduction is antisymmetric. But i t  is unnecessary as a clause in the defin ition  
of reduction because i t  is implied by clause (4) when this clause is understood 
under the stipulation that the relation i t  expresses is re flex ive , transitive , 
and antisymmetric.
Secondly, my conjecture about the defin ition of reduction explains Dummett's 
numerous remarks, made in the context of discussions of reductionism, that 
sentences ascribing dispositions to people or objects reduce, in certain 
circumstances, to counterfactuals about the overt behaviour of the people 
or objects. The categorical sentences reduce to counterfactuals, Dummett 
says, only i f  we learn to assert them, as in fact we do, in terms of the 
conditions under which we can assert the corresponding counterfactuals.
(See in particular 'Theory of Meaning I I ' ,  pp.92-93) In other words, the 
categorical sentences reduce to counterfactuals only i f  an understanding of 
the categorical sentences depends on an understanding of the corresponding 
counterfactuals. So i t  seems that in these discussions about dispositional 
sentences Dummett assumes some condition l ik e  (4) as necessary for reduction 
to counterfactual form. ( I  shall discuss more textual evidence confirming 
my conjecture about Dummett's defin ition of reduction in the third section.)
I f  Dummett does indeed assume some such clause as (4) i.n his construal of 
reduction, then his construal of the notion of reduction is heir to the 
objection I lodged in %4 of Chapter Two to the partial ordering of sentences
determined by the relation 'An understanding of ___ depends on an understanding
of . . . ' ,  I objected in that section of Chapter Two that there can be no such 
partial ordering of sentences: the appropriate relata of the relation
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are words and not sentences since words and not sentences are the units of 
linguistic  acquisition.
Besides this objection, I believe there is another objection to including
any such clause as (4) in the defin ition of reduction. The inclusion of
clause (4) makes reduction depend upon a semantic relation holding between
sentences; but reduction, I believe, is a metaphysical or ontological
matter. Dummett seems to acknowledge this point when he says that reductionism need to
does not/involve any thesis about the transia ta b il i ty  of sentences of one 
class into sentences of another.
Reductionism does not, of course, have to take the strong form of 
asserting the transiatabi1i ty  of statements of one class into statements 
of another; i t  is fundamentally concerned with the sort of thing which 
makes a statement of a given class true, when i t  is true. { 'Theory 
of Meaning I I ' ,  p .94)
Now a defin ition of reduction w ill state that sentences of one class reduce
to sentences of another class under certain circumstances. Despite the
lingu istic  formulation of reduction, i ts  actual import l ie s  in the metaphysical
view of the world which the lingu istic  relation between sentences reflects .
The import of a given reduction of a disputed sentence to a reductive sentence
is that there is no fact which makes the disputed sentence true over and above
the fact which, makes the reductive sentence true; or, to employ Dummett's
favoured mode of expression, when the disputed sentence is true, i t  is true
in virtue of the truth of the reductive sentence- . Clause (3) of the
part of
postulated defin ition of reduction expresses/the metaphysical import of 
reduction. For this reason i t  is unobjectionable. Clause (4 ) ,  on the other 
hand, is objectionable for intruding semantic considerations into a metaphysical 
question. Whether one sentence reduces to another is determined, not by 
semantic considerations such as whether one must have learnt the reductive
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sentence in order to grasp the meaning of the disputed sentence, but by the 
metaphysical consideration of whether there is in the world anything over and 
above the fact which makes the reductive sentence true which could make the 
disputed sentence true.
I f  we re ject clause (4) in the postulated definition of reduction on the 
grounds that i t  makes reduction depend on intrusive semantic considerations, 
then we should also reject the weaker clause (2) on the same grounds. But 
i t  is on the basis of clause (2) that Dummett argues that reductionism is 
not necessary for anti-realism. For example, Dummett makes the dubious 
claim that one can only express the existence of evidence, in the form of 
memories and intentions, for the sentences ' I t  was the case that p ' and 
' I t  w ill be the case that p' by some variants of 'S remembers that i t  was 
the case that p ' and 'S intends to bring i t  about that i t  w ill be the case 
that p' and, consequently, these la t te r  sentences, which would otherwise be 
the reductive sentences in the disputes about the re a l i ty  of the past and 
the future, are not in te l l ig ib le  independently of the former sentences, 
which are the sentences under dispute. Thus clause (2) is not met in these 
cases and Dummett concludes that the local anti-realisms about the past and 
the future are not reductionist in form.
But seeing reductionism from the metaphysical perspective makes one doubt 
Dummett's conclusion. His claim about the fa ilu re  of the sentences expressing 
the existence of memories or intentions to satisfy clause (2) seems to be 
orthogonal to the issue of whether the a n t i- re a l is t  should say that what 
makes a sentence about the past or the future true is the evidence existing 
for i t .  After a l l ,  i t  seems to be a contingent fact about our language, i f  
i t  actually is a fact, that we can only express sentences stating the 
existence of memories or intentions by employing sentences about the past or
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the future. I f  we had a name for each piece of evidence, as in mathematics 
where we sometimes give proofs names, for example Euclid's proof, then we 
would have a way of referring to a memory or an intention without describing 
the content of i t .  In this case, clause (2) would not pose an obstacle 
to interpreting the local anti-realisms about the past and the future as 
being reductionist in form. But, i t  seems that a condition, postulated 
as necessary for reduction, which can be met by a mere change in contingent 
features of our language does not have any bearing on the question to which 
the reductionist must provide an answer: In virtue of what are sentences
about the past and future, and, more generally, sentences of any disputed class, 
true?
I am claiming that reductionism is a metaphysical, and not a semantic, 
matter in the following sense: to say that one sentence reduces to another
is to say that the sentences have the same truth-condition, but this is not 
to say that they have the same meaning. This way of expressing the content 
of a reductive claim may seem paradoxical; but this is only because i t  is 
assumed that the meaning of sentences is to be analyzed in terms of classical 
or non-classical truth-conditions. Dummett expresses this assumption as 
the thesis that there is one central notion in the theory of meaning, 
namely truth, by means of which a ll  the d ifferent aspects of meaning or 
use can be determined. This thesis informs Dummett's conception of the 
theory of meaning as consisting of two major parts. One is the central 
part which gives the theory of reference, conceived of as a classical or 
or non-classical truth-theory yielding an inductive specification of truth-  
conditions, and the theory of sense, conceived of as a series of correlations 
between practical a b i l i t ie s  and T-sentences. The other is the supplementary 
part which consists of a number of general principles embodying uniform 
methods of deriving every aspect of a sentence's meaning or use from its
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truth-condition, as laid down by the central part of the theory. ( ‘Theory 
of Meaning I I ' ,  p .75)
In Chapter Two I found fa u lt  with Dummett's arguments that the theory of 
sense constrains the theory of reference in such a way that the notion of 
truth employed by the truth-theory must be non-classical. But these 
objections I lodged were ones of d e ta il .  What I am now considering is that 
Dummett's whole way of looking at the theory of meaning is mistaken. Dummett 
never produces any argument for the assumption that the theory of meaning 
must have a central notion in the way described. I t  is certainly not a priori 
truth that the theory of meaning should be given in this way. In Chapter 
Two my objections to Dummett's arguments led to another picture of the way 
a theory of meaning might be given. In this picture there was no central 
notion of the kind that Dummett envisages: the theory was subdivided into
a whole range of sub-theories, each providing a theoretical representation 
of some separate lingu istic  competence .
Picturing the theory of meaning in this way does not involve denying truth  
a ' place in the theory. For example, the sub-theory which is supposed to 
provide a theoretical representation of our inferential a b i l i t ie s ,  that is ,  
our a b i l i t ie s  to judge whether informal arguments are valid or not, w ill 
employ a notion of truth. For, a convenient way of providing a theoretical 
representation of these a b i l i t ie s  is to assign a truth-condition to each 
sentence as its  inference-potential, that is ,  i ts  capacity to combine with 
other sentences in valid inferences. Since the inference-potential of a 
sentence is determined, in part, by its  structure, the truth-condition of a 
sentence w ill be determined, in part, by its  in fe ren tia lly  relevant structure. 
In this sub-theory the role of truth is necessitated by the nature of the 
particular competence which the sub-theory is supposed to model. But there
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is no reason for supposing that the necessity for a notion of truth in this  
sub-theory w ill carry over into other sub-theories.
My claim that there is no central notion to the theory of meaning of the 
kind that Dummett envisages, or more loosely, meaning need not be analyzed 
in terms of classical or non-classical truth-conditions, amounts to a 
proposal for reidentifying realism and anti-realism. Up until now I have 
followed Dummett in identifying realism about sentences of a disputed class 
with the thesis that the meaning of the sentences should be analyzed in 
terms of the notions of truth and fa ls i ty  which obey the principle of 
bivalence and in identifying anti-realism with a denial of this thesis.
While I s t i l l  believe that an acceptance of bivalence for sentences of a 
disputed class is characteristic of a local anti-realism and a rejection of 
bivalence for the sentences is characteristic of the corresponding local 
anti-real ism,I believe that the notion of meaning is irre levant to the 
characterizations of these positions. To mimic the f i r s t  passage quoted 
from Dummett in this chapter: a local realism is correctly identified with
the thesis that the conditions for the truth of the disputed sentences consist 
in objective states of a ffa irs  which obtain or fa i l  to obtain, regardless 
of the evidencewe possess for them and a local anti-realism is correctly  
identified with the thesis that the conditions for the truth of the disputed 
sentences consist in our capacity to possess evidence for the sentences.
Consequently, a dispute between re a lis t  and a n t i- re a l is t  concerns the notion of truth
appropriate to the disputed sentences. But i t  does not follow from this
that i t  is a dispute concerning the kind of meaning which these sentences have.
The claim that meaning must be analyzed in terms of classical or non- 
classical truth-conditions is most implausible in discussions of reductionism.
To take Dummett's own example, a re a lis t  may propose a reduction of sentences
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about character-traits to sentences about physiological conditions in order 
to ju s t i fy  his claim of bivalence for the former sentences. His proposal 
of a reduction embodies the claim that a sentence about somebody's character 
at a particular time has the same truth-condition as a sentence about the 
person's physiological condition at that time; but i t  would be absurd 
to view the re a l is t 's  proposal of a reduction in this case as involving 
the claim that the sentences have the same meaning, I believe that a 
reductive claim, whether made by re a l is t  or a n t i - re a l is t ,  must be seen to 
be independent of semantic considerations. In particular, I agree with 
Dummett on the point that reductionism does not need to take the form of 
a thesis about translation: a reduction maps disputed sentences onto reductive
sentences with the same truth-conditions but does not require them to have 
the same meaning.
I think that when we see reduction as a purely metaphysical matter, there 
is a sense in which we can view a ll local anti-realisms as being reductionist.
I f  we abandon, as seems reasonable in view of the arguments above, clauses 
such as (2) or (4) in the defin ition of reduction, then we can frame 
the following simple characterization of any local anti-realism: a local
anti-realism involves the thesis that the disputed sentences
reduce to reductive sentences in the sense that there are no facts which 
make the disputed sentences true over and above the facts which make the 
reductive sentences true. For reasons given above, this uniform characterization 
of local anti-real isms is not intended to be an endorsement of the traditional 
view that a ll  local anti-realisms involve the claim that the disputed 
sentences are translatable into reductive sentences. In order to avoid 
the traditional associations of the term 'reduction' I shall in future employ 
the term 'quasi-reduction' in discussing the uniform characterization of 
local anti-realisms.
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Before we can understand what this uniform characterization comes to I 
need to define the notion of quasi-reduction. Part of what i t  means to 
say that a disputed sentence quasi-reduces to a reductive sentence is to 
say that they have the same truth-condition. So clause (3) of the defin ition  
of reduction which I attributed to Dummett can be retained. But I also 
need to settle  on some asymmetry-creating relation between disputed and 
reductive sentences, in place of that expressed by clauses (2) and (4 ),  
with which to f ix  the direction of quasi-reduction.
Traditional interpretations of local anti-realisms have usually had an
3
anti-sceptical motivation ; consequently, the asymmetry-creating relation  
has usually been one which assigns some kind of epistemological p r io rity  
to reductive sentences over disputed sentences. The reductive sentences, 
in a traditional interpretation of a local anti-realism, invariably  
correspond to e ffec tive ly  recognizable facts. The disputed sentences, on 
the other hand, are problematic for the a n t i - re a l is t  just because they 
purport to correspond to facts which are not effective ly  recognizable.
I suggest, then, that we employ the difference with respect to effective  
recognizability between the facts expressed by the reductive sentences and 
the facts expressed by the disputed sentences to f ix  the direction of 
quasi-reduction. Adopting the lingu istic  mode of description, we can 
express the appropriate clause expressing the asymmetry between the types 
of sentences lik e  this:
(5) Sentences of R are decidable and sentences of K are undecidable.
So my defin ition of quasi-reduction is this: the sentences of K quasi-
reduce to sentences of R just in case the conditions stated in (3) and (5) hold.
3. See A.J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, op.c i t . ,  pp.75-81
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ï believe that a ll local anti-realisms conform to a certain pattern, in 
that a ll  involve the thesis that the disputed sentences quasi-reduce to 
certain reductive sentences. Moreover, I believe that when one ignores 
Dummett's comments about reduction and dislodges the semantic accretions 
from his characterization of anti-realism, one can see that Dummett's 
interpretations of local anti-realisms in his past works conform to this  
pattern. (As I shall argue in%3, Dummett makes remarks in his most recent 
works which constitute a radical deviation from this pattern) In the 
disputes which Dummett considers in the a r t ic le  ‘Realism' the a n t i - re a l is t  
singles out a class of privileged sentences which describe facts constituting 
evidence for the disputed sentences. For example, the phenomenalist
4
singles out sentences reporting actual observations or sense-datum experiences , 
the pos it iv is t singles out sentences about observable phenomena such as 
pointer-needie readings, the constructivist singles out sentences stating 
the existence of proofs, the a n t i - re a l is t  about the past singles out sentences 
stating the existence of memories and other forms of records about past 
events, and the a n t i - re a l is t  about the future singles out sentences stating 
the existence of intentions and tendencies in the course of events. In 
a ll  these cases the sentences which the a n t i - re a l is t  singles out as privileged  
are decidable, or in other words, they describe effec tive ly  recognizable 
facts; they may be seen as constituting the reductive sentence to which 
the disputed sentences quasi-reduce.
Let me sum up the conclusions of this section. I have argued that Dummett's 
construal of the notion of reduction is in error: the antisymmetric relation
4. As Dummett makes clear in'Realism', though he expresses the point d iffe ren tly ,  
phenomenalism does not have to take the form of asserting that every 
material-object sentence quasi-reduces to a sentence couched in sense- 
datum language; phenomenalism may simply say that material-object 
sentences quasi-reduce to sentences reporting observations which have 
actually been made. (See 'Realism', pp.157-159)
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which I have conjectured i t  involves is not suitable for defining the reduction 
of one sentence to another sentence and makes reduction depend upon irrelevant 
semantic factors. I have also argued, contra Dummett, that there is a sense 
in which a ll  local anti-realisms are reductionist. I have defined a notion 
of quasi-reduction which captures the essential metaphysical import of 
reduction and omits the irre levant semantic considerations which intrude on 
Dummett's conception of reduction. By appealing to this notion of quasi- 
reduction, I have argued, in a way which seems to accord with Dummett's 
own remarks about various local anti-realism , that a ll local anti-realisms 
can be uniformly characterizable as involving the following thesis: disputed
sentences quasi-reduce to reductive sentences in the sense that what makes 
the former true is just what makes the la t te r  true.
%2 Counterfactuals and Character-Traits
In 'What is a Theory of Meaning? I I ' Dummett l is ts  the d ifferen t sentence- 
forming operations which he thinks are chiefly responsible for our capacity 
to frame undecidable sentences. The l i s t  consists of the past-tense, 
quantification over unsurveyable or in f in i te  to ta l i t ie s ,  and the counter- 
factual. (p .98) The undecidable sentences which result from the f i r s t  
two sentence-forming operations belong to disputed classes of sentences 
discussed in the las t section: past-tense sentences obviously are the subject
of the dispute between the re a l is t  and the a n t i - re a l is t  about the past and 
sentences quantified over in f in i te  to ta l i t ie s ,  depending on whether they 
are empirical or mathematical, are the subject of the dispute between the 
sc ien tif ic  re a l is t  and the pos it iv is t or the dispute between the platonist 
and the constructivist. Counterfactuals, on the other hand, do not belong 
to the disputed class of sentences for any particular dispute between the 
re a lis t  and a n t i - re a l is t .  The significance of counterfactuals lies  in the 
fact that, in Dummett‘ s view, sentences belonging to most disputed classes are
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equivalent in content, under certain circumstances, to counterfactuals. 
('Realism', p .148-149; pp.160-163; 'Theory of Meaningll' ,  p .90)
Since counterfactuals do not belong to any one disputed class, anti-realism  
about counterfactuals is anomalous with respect to the pattern of local 
anti-real isms I sketched in the las t section. So I shall devote this section 
to considering the a n t i - re a l is t  interpretation Dummett gives to counter- 
factual s and the way he tr ies  to rebut a re a l is t  interpretation of them.
To begin with, consider a favourite example of Dummett's concerning the 
sentences
(6) Jones was brave.
(7) Jones was not brave.
Dummett says that i f  ever Jones was in a dangerous situation and acted 
bravely then we can assert (6 ); and i f  ever he was in a dangerous situation 
and.did not act bravely then we can assert (7 ) .  But Dummett has us suppose 
that Jones, who is now dead, never encountered danger in his l i f e .  In 
this case, Dummett says, (6) and (7) are equivalent in content to (8) and
(9) respectively.
(8) I f  Jones had been in a dangerous situation, he would have acted bravely.
(9) I f  J ones had been in a dangerous situation, he would not have acted bravely
an
Dummett uses these equivalences in/argument against a re a lis t  interpretation  
of (6) and (7 ). The argument runs l ik e  th is: I t  might be the case that
however many facts we know of the kind which we normally count as grounds 
for asserting a counterfactual about a person's behaviour, we s t i l l  know
nothing which ju s t if ie s  the assertion of either (8) or (9 ). But, on the
supposition that Jones never encountered danger in his l i f e ,  (6) is 
equivalent to (8) and (7) is equivalent to (9 ). Consequently, i t  might be
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the case that we might know nothing which ju s t i f ie s  the assertion of either  
(6) or (7 ).  In short, since a situation may arise in which we are not 
entitled  to assert
(10) I f  Jones had been in a dangerous situation, he would have acted bravely 
or i f  Jones had been in a dangerous situation, he would not have acted 
bravely.
a situation may arise in which we are not entitled to assert
(11) Jones was brave or Jones was not brave.
(See 'Truth', pp.14-16; 'Postscript to Truth", p .23; 'Realism', pp. 148-150)
As this argument stands, i t  is not l ik e ly  to be compelling against a person
who adopts a re a lis t ic  interpretation of 'Jones was brave'. The re a lis t
may reply that, while we may never know su ffic ien tly  many facts to ju s t i fy
asserting either'Jones was brave* or 'Jones was not brave', a ll  the same
'Jones was brave' is either true or false. For this argument to be compelling,
Dummett needs to make the assumption, which the re a lis t  is bound to re ject,
that a sentence is true only in virtue of facts of the kind which we regard
as grounds for asserting the sentence. Dummett does indeed make this
question-begging assumption in his presentations of the argument, For
example, in 'Truth' Dummett makes the following remark:
His [the a n t i - re a l is t 's ]  ground for rejecting B's [the re a l is t 's ]  
argument is that i f  such a statement as ‘Jones was brave' is true, 
i t  must be true in virtue of the sort of fact we have been taught to
regard as justify ing us in asserting i t .  (p .16; see also 'Realism', p .149)
But this assumption is not what primarily concerns me here. Rather I wish 
to consider in detail the way in which Dummett uses the equivalences between
(6) and (8) and between (7) and (9) to infer from the fact that we may not 
be entitled  to assert (10) the fact that we may not be entitled  to assert (11). 
ijschematize Dummett's view of the relations between senteness(6) and (9) 
below.
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(6) Jones was brave -^-----------------r - ( 8 ) I f  Jones bad been in a dangerous
' v  ! situation he would have acted bra: X !
(7) Jones was not brave—-------------------' (^9) I f  Jones had been in a dangerous
situation he would not have acted 
bravely
Complete lines connect equivalences and broken lin es , connect contradictories.
A query I wish to raise is whether (6) is genuinely equivalent to (8) 
and (7) genuinely equivalent to (9 ).  The problem is this: i f  the pairs
are equivalent, then (8) and (9) should be contradictory in the same way 
as (6) and (7 ). But when (8) is fa lse , (9) need not be true and vice versa.
For example, to say (8) is false is to deny that Jones would have necessarily 
acted bravely in a dangerous situation; but this does not amount to asserting 
that Jones would necessarily not have acted bravely in such a situation.
I claim that the true contradictions of (8) and (9) are:
(12) I f  Jones had been in a dangerous situation, he might not have acted bravely,
(13) I f  Jones had been in a dangerous situation, he might have acted bravely. 
Since (8) and (9) fa i l  to be contradictories and we know that (6) and (7)
are contradictories, the equivalence of (6) with (8) and the equivalence of
(7) with (9) fa i l  to hold. Moreover, with the fa ilu re  of these equivalences, 
the equivalence of (10) with (11) must fa i l  as well.
Sentences (10) and (11) are instances of the schemas A v"] A and Acht^ v 
5Ad->i B. The f i r s t  is ,  of course, the law of excluded middle and the second 
"  6
is the law of conditional excluded middle, Dummett assumes that a re a lis t
5. I use the symbolism '  CW . . . '  for the following sentential contexts:
I f  i t  (were Ithe case that . . . ,  then i t  would (be Hhe case th a t . . .
(had been) lhave been)
6. Robert Stalnaker gives i t th is  name in "A Theory of Conditionals', in 
Ernest Sosa (e d .) .  Causation and Conditionals, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1975), pp.163-179
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interpretation of counterfactuals w ill involve accepting in a ll instances of the 
law of conditional excluded middle in the same way that a re a lis t  interpretation  
of categoricals involves accepting a ll instances of the law of excluded middle.
I believe this assumption is mistaken. The re a lis t  must embrace the law of
excluded middle but not the law of conditional excluded middle. In fact the law
of conditional excluded middle is not a law at a l l :  there are straightforward
counterexamples to i t  which the re a lis t  can readily acknowledge.
These counterexamples fa l l  into two categories. One category is of cases in which
the antecedent A requires supplementation before i t  can determine either or"? B^.
For example, consider a fam iliar puzzle case: ' I f  Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots 
then Bizet would have been Ita lia n  or i f  Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots,
then Bizet would hot have been I t a l ia n ' .  I believe that this disjunction is
false. The antecedent, as i t  stands, does not suffice to determine either that
Bizet would have been Ita l ia n  or that he would not have been Ita l ia n .  There might,
of course, be some factor which together with the antecedent would determine one
consequent or the other: for example, the fact that Bizet's parents were more
inclined to move to I ta ly  than Verdi's parents were inclined to move to France. The
other category is of cases in which we believe, on quantum-mechanical grounds or
because some voluntary agent is involved, that nothing can determine either B or ") B.
In these cases, no addition to A, which does not, in conjunction with A, log ica lly
imply_Bor“]B^ , suffices to determine one consequent or the other. The following
is a case in question: ' I f  a l ig h t  beam were to fa l l  upon this atom , i t  would remain
atom
in its  ground state, or i f  a light-beam were to fa l l  upon t h is / i t  would assume a
higher energy le v e l ' .  On quantum-mechanical grounds, we know that this disjunction 
7
is fa lse. (See .'Philosophical Basis', pp.244-245)
7. David Lewis argues that i f  unrestricted va lid ity  were to be granted to the 
law of conditional excluded middle, then i t  would be impossible to distinguish 
the external negation of a counterfactual - (Ao-^B^ ) - from its  internal
negation - AtHl_B. Moreover, i f  one defines a 'might' counterfactual in 
terms of a 'would' counterfactual so that A ^ ^  i f  and only i f i ( A a ^ i ^ ) ,  
the indistinguishability of external and internal negations means that 
'might' and 'would' counterfactuals are also indistinguishable. See 
Counterfactuals, (Oxford; Basil Blackwell, 1973) pp.79-80
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A natural mistake might be to suppose that I am objecting to the law
ACH92 V "1_B But this law is in fact valid from a re a lis t 's  point of view.
( I t ,  rather than Ao^B  ^ v A C H 1£, should be called the law of conditional
excluded middle.) I t  is indeed true that i f  Bizet and Verdi were compatriots,
Bizet would or would not have been I ta l ia n .  I t  is also true that i f  a
light-beam were to fa l l  upon this atom, i t  would remain in i ts  ground state
or assume a higher frequency leve l. In an adequate logic for counterfactuals,
8
At»_Bv A O -> l^  should imply A M ^  v 1 B^ but not vice versa. So a re a lis t  
can commit himself to the la t te r  without committing himself to the*former.
Let us return to the particular instances of A v 1 A and ACK> B^ v ACH^IJ
which Dummett discusses. In the a r t ic le  'Realism' Dummett introduces the
case of 'Jones v/as brave' by saying that he w ill view the attribution of
character-traits to people under certain idealizations.
For the sake of this example, I assume that there is no vagueness in the 
characterization of human actions - for instance, that no disagreement 
can arise over the application to a particular act of the predicate 
'brave'. I shall also ignore the fact that the performance of a single 
act possessing a certain quality is not suffic ient for the ascription of 
the corresponding character-tra it to the agent - e.g. that the performance 
of a single brave act is not enough to guarantee that we can say without 
qualification that the agent is a brave man: I thus in effect assume that
no one ever acts out of character, and that no one's character ever 
changes. ('Realism', p .148)
I t  is only in view of these idealizations that Dummett can assert that
'Jones was brave' has the same content as the counterfactual ' I f  Jones
had been in a dangerous situation, he would have acted bravely'. I f  one allows,
as seems re a l is t ic ,  that people sometimes act out of character and that a
single performance of an action does not suffice for the attribution of a
8. This is the case in Lewis' theory.
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ch aracter-tra it ,  then one can say only that the categorical has the same 
content as ' I f  Jones had been in a number of dangerous situations, he would 
probably have acted bravely'.
In his subsequent discussion Dummett dispenses with these idealizations.
He argues that there might well be situations in which neither disjunct of
(10) is assertible and that, consequently, (10) is not assertible in these 
situations. He presents his argument as though i t  were an argument against 
a re a lis t  interpretation of counterfactuals. But, as I have argued, a re a lis t  
need not accept every instance of Ai h  B^ v Ami^. One can see his objection 
to (10) as fa l l in g  into the second category of objections to this general 
scheme: because a human agent is involved, the processes involved in character 
manifestation are inherently non-deterministic.
But the disjunction (10) should be assertible under the idealizations  
which Dummett makes at the beginning of this discussion. Clearly to stipulate  
the idealization that a person always acts in keeping with his character 
is to rule out the possib ility  that when a person is brave, he might be in 
a situation which calls for bravery but fa i ls  to act bravely and the 
possib ility  that when a person is not brave, he might be in such a situation 
and acts bravely. This idealization, then, simply amounts to a denial that 
the processes involved in character-manifestation are inherently non- 
deterministic. So no objection fa l l in g  into the second category, considered 
e a r l ie r ,  can be lodged against (10), under the idealization Dummett makes.
Any objection to (10) fa l l in g  into the f i r s t  category, namely that the ante­
cedent of the counterfactual is underspecified, can be set aside as arising 
from an accidental feature of the example, which may be easily repaired.
. j
- 1 2 5 -
Let me sum up the results of this discussion. Dummett believes that a re a l is t ic
interpretation of counterfactuals is to be identified with the thesis that
the law of conditional excluded middle is valid for a ll counterfactuals
in the same way that a re a l is t  interpretation of categoricals can be
identified with the thesis that the law of excluded middle is valid for
a ll  categorical s. I have argued that this be lief is mistaken: a re a lis t
can. object to the inappropriately named law of conditional excluded middle
on the grounds that there are straightforward counterexamples to i t  which
have nothing to do with realism. Moreover, I have argued that Dummett's
argument against the law of excluded middle, which makes use of the
in va lid ity  of the law of conditional excluded middle, only works through
an unclarity about the status of certain idealizations. The argument proceeds
by identifying (6) with (8) and ( 7)  with (9) and then denying that (11)
holds on the grounds that (10) does not. But Dummett can make the identifications
of (6) with (8) and (7) with (9) only under certain idealizations, in which
case (10) is true and so is (11). But i f  these Idealizations do not hold,
the identifications cannot be made and the apparent fa ls i ty  of (10) in
these circumstances does not affec t the truth of (11).
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3 The Defeasibility  of Evidence
The importance in Dummett's work of the notion of reduction derives to a great 
extent from the fact that the notion of a sentence's being barely true is 
defined in terms of reduction. A simplified version of the defin ition  
Dummett gives is this:
(14) A sentence is barely true i f  and only i f  i t  is true and i t  does not 
reduce to any other sentence. ('Theory of Meaning I I ' ,  p .94)
The parallel notion of a sentence's being reducibly true can be defined in
a similar fashion:
(15) A sentence is reducibly true i f  and only i f  i t  is true and i t  does 
reduce to another sentence.
The notion of a sentence being barely true plays a more prominent role in
Dummett‘ s discussions of local anti-realisms than the notion of a sentence
being reducibly true. The reason for this is simply that Dummett believes
that the disputed sentences of most local anti-realisms do not reduce to
other sentences. The only instance of a reductionist form of anti-realism
which Dummett countenances is anti-realism about character-tra its . In the
f i r s t  section I discussed how Dummett's imposition of clause (2 ) ,  or rather
clause (4 ) ,  as a condition on reduction rules out the possib ility  of reductionism
for practica lly  a ll  local anti-realisms. Thus, for Dummett, most disputed
sentences, when true, are barely true.
Besides the class of disputed sentences for which no reductive theses hold, 
there is another class of sentences which can be barely true. This is the
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class of reductive sentences. ( I  am here assuming that the reductive sentences 
in^dispute are not themselves the subjects of reductive theses; Dummett 
never says anything for or against this assumption.) These reductive 
sentences can be barely true because, when they are true, the ir  truth does 
not consist in the truth of any other sentences.
Realism need not be thought of as being inhospitable to the notion of a 
sentence's being barely true. In fac t, given a suitable notion of reduction 
in terms of which i t  can be defined, the notion of a sentence's being barely 
true is very significant for the re a l is t .  Its  significance lie s  in the fact 
that the correspondence account of truth applies d irectly  only to sentences 
which are barely true. The heart of the correspondence account is that a 
sentence is true in virtue of its correspondence with some fa c t, where this  
fact may be recognition-transcendent in the sense that we cannot effective ly  
recognize i t .  The correspondence account applies only indirectly  to reducibly 
true sentences: such sentences are true in virtue of a correspondence
between the sentence to which they reduce and possibly recognition-transcendent 
facts.
Dummett tr ie s  to retain some of the s p ir i t  of the correspondence account by 
endorsing a principle he labels principle C. I t  states that i f  a sentence 
is true, there must be something in virtue of which i t  is true. ('Theory of 
Meaning I I ' ,  p.89) I t  would be misleading, however, to think that an 
endorsement of this principle amounts to anything l ik e  an endorsement of the 
full-blooded correspondence picture of truth. For one, Dummett's construal
9. A fa c t, in the terminology I shall adopt, is a state of a ffa irs  which 
actually obtains; so to recognize a fact is just to recognize that 
a state of a ffa irs  obtains.
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of reduction makes i t  possible for an undecidable sentence to be barely 
true. (Note that while an undecidable sentence belonging to a disputed 
class may not reduce, in Dummett's sense, to other sentences, i t  must 
quasi-reduce, in my sense, to other sentences.) For example, Dummett 
believes that mathematical sentences do not reduce to any other type of 
sentence; and so, when an undecidable mathematical sentence is true, i t  
must be barely true. But i t  would not be in harmony with the s p ir i t  of 
Dummett‘ s anti-realism to suppose, in conformity with the full-blooded 
correspondence account, that the truth of the undecidable mathematical 
sentence, in being barely true, must consist in its  direct correspondence 
with some recognition-transcendent fact.
One way in which Dummett presents the dispute between re a lis t  and a n ti­
re a lis t  overthe app licab ility  of the principle of bivalence to an undecidable 
sentence is by supposing that they both accept principle C. ( ‘Postscript 
to Truth', p.23) Dummett says that the a n t i - re a l is t  uses the principle 
to in fer that the undecidable sentence is not necessarily either true or 
fa lse, while the re a lis t  uses i t  to in fer that what makes the sentence 
either true or false is not e ffec tive ly  recognizable. What Dummett does 
not say is that the re a lis t  and the a n t i- re a l is t  can use the principle to 
infer these d ifferent conclusions only because they presuppose that the 
quantifier 'something' in the principle ranges over d ifferent domains: the
a n t i- re a l is t  presupposes that the quantifier ranges only over e ffective ly  
recognizable facts while the re a lis t  presupposes that i t  ranges over facts 
some of which are recognition-transcendent.
Dummett tr ies  to re s tr ic t  the domain of the quantifier in principle C 
to e ffec tive ly  recognizable facts by appealing to another principle which 
he labels principle K. I t  states that i f  a sentence is true, i t  must be
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in principle possible to know that i t  is true. ('Theory of Meaning I I ' ,  p .99) 
Dummett says that principle K is related to Principle C in the following 
way: that in virtue of which a sentence is true is the same as what is 
known in knowing that the sentence is true because both consist, in the 
terminology I have adopted, in some fact. As regards the domain of the 
quantifier in principle C, Dummett seems to entertain some train  of thought 
l ike  this: recognition-transcendent facts cannot be known and so they cannot
constitute that in virtue of which a sentence is true, or, in other words, 
they cannot belong to the domain of the quantifier in principle C. Effectively  
recognizable facts, on the other hand, can be known and so they can legitimately  
belong to the domain of the quantifier. (See'Theory of Meaning I I ' ,  
pp.98-101*, Frege, pp.464-468; 'Postscript to Truth', p 23-24)
This tra in  of thought is so unconvincing that the fact that Dummett seems 
to entertain i t  stands in need of explanation. The explanation is that 
Dummett interprets the expression 'know' in his discussions of principle  
K to mean 'e ffec tive ly  recognize' and on this interpretation the tra in  of 
thought, outlined above, is more in te l l ig ib le ,  even i f  no more convincing.
The fact that Dummett interprets 'know' in this way is especially clear 
when he attempts to characterize the way in which he thinks a re a lis t  must 
interpret principle K. Dummett says in a number of places that while the 
a n t i- re a l is t  can interpret ‘ in principle possible' in principle K to mean 
'in principle possible for us ', the re a l is t  must interpret i t  to mean 
'in  principle possible for some hypothetical being whose recognitional 
a b il i t ie s  exceed our own'. (See passages referred to in las t paragraph)
But there just is no reason for believing, as Dummett does, that the re a lis t  
must appeal to the conception of a hypothetical being whose recognitional
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a b i l i t ie s  transcend to our own to ju s t i fy  his adherence to principle K.
There are other models for how we may know that a sentence is true apart 
from the model of e ffec tive ly  recognizing the fact which makes the sentence 
true: we may know that a sentence is true by deducing i t  from general
laws or on the basis of an inductive argument. I t  is only on the assumption, 
which the rea lis t  w ill  hardly concede, that 'in  principle possible to know' 
in principle K must be interpreted to mean 'in  principle possible for us 
to recognize e ffec tive ly ' that the re a lis t  must appeal to the conception 
of a superhuman cognizer in order to ju s t i fy  his acceptance of the principle K.
Thus the re a lis t  has some grounds for objecting to the way in which 
Dummett tr ies  to re s tr ic t  the domain of the quantifier in principle C by 
interpreting principle K in a question-begging way. Nonetheless I shall 
not pursue this matter any further. What is significant in the preceding 
discussion is the fact that Dummett does indeed re s tr ic t  the domain of the 
quantifier in principle to e ffective ly  recognizable facts. This fact is 
significant because i t  confirms my conjecture in the last section that a ll  
undecidable sentences belonging to disputed classes quasi-reduce for the 
a n t i- re a l is t  to certain decidable sentences. The undecidable sentences 
belonging to disputed classes quasi-reduce to decidable sentences in the 
sense that no facts make such undecidable sentences true over and above 
the e ffective ly  recognizable facts which make their corresponding decidable 
sentences true; or, in other words, i f  such an undecidable sentence is true, 
i t  is true in virtue of the e ffective ly  recognizable facts which make 
its  corresponding decidable sentence true. This is exactly how things 
should be i f  the quantifier in principle C is interpreted as ranging over 
effective ly  recognizable facts. So I have examined two lines of thought, 
one in th e f irs t  section and the other in this section, which converge 
in the a n t i- re a l is t  thesis: when an undecidable sentence belonging to
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a disputed class is true, i t  is true, to put i t  in the material mode, 
in virtue of certain e ffective ly  recognizable facts or, to put i t  in the 
formal mode, in virtue of the truth of a (probably complex) decidable 
sentence.
Now I wish to consider a re a l is t  objection to the a n t i- re a l is t  thesis 
which the two lines of thought converge in. From the defin ition of 
quasi-reduction one learns that part of what i t  means to assert the anti-  
re a lis t  thesis that an undecidable sentence A is true in virtue of the 
truth of a decidable sentence A* is that 'A' is true i f  and only i f  ‘A '' 
is true. Given that the a n t i - re a l is t  can accept the equivalence principle, 
this amounts to saying A i f  and only i f  A '. The re a lis t  objection which 
I wish to make is directed at the a n t i - re a l is t 's  claim that, for every 
undecidable sentence A belonging to a disputed class we can find a 
(probably complex) decidable sentence A' such that ^  i f  and only i f  ^ ' .
Let us consider a particular case. Let A be the sentence 'John is in 
pain' and le t  A' be a decidable sentence expressing the d ifferen t types 
of broadly behavioural evidence which prima facie constitute grounds for  
asserting A. The re a lis t  objection is that, where A and A' are described, 
there is every reason for believing that the conditionals linking them are 
false: for i t  may be the case that John is in pain but his behaviour
does not make A' true and, conversely, i t  may the cast that John's 
behaviour makes A' true but John is not in pain. Even though A' might be 
a complex description of the kind of evidence which prima facie ju s t if ie s  
us in asserting 'John is in pa in ', the possib ility  that John is a spartan 
or a shammer makes the conditionals linking A and A' false. Moreover 
this is not a peculiarity of the example chosen. Any empirically
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undecidable sentence, whatever disputed class i t  belongs to, cannot ever
be conclusively verified: the claim ' I have conclusively verif ied  the
sentence' for such a sentence always betrays a misunderstanding of the 
.10
sentence. Thus any evidence which prima facie constitutes grounds for 
asserting an empirically undecidable sentence may subsequently be 
defeated. I f  A is an arbitrary empirically undecidable sentence and A' 
is a sentence expressing the existence of evidence which prima facie ju s t if ie s  
the assertion of A the conditionals linking A and A' w ill  be false.
This re a lis t  objection w ill  hold no matter how complicated the a n t i- re a l is t  
cares to make A'. The a n t i - re a l is t  may attempt to allow for the 
defeasib ility  of evidence for an undecidable sentence A by saying that 
A' must express not only the d ifferent types which prima facie ju s t i fy  
the assertion of A but also the d ifferen t types of defeaters for such 
evidence. The a n t i - re a l is t  might naturally represent A' in the form a 
disjunction of the following kind:
(l6) (B/lB'jj) V V . . .  v(^ l^B' )^
where B,, . . . ,  B are f in i te ly  complex sentences which describe the
— 0  — I — n
different types of evidence which prima facie ju s t i fy  the assertion 
of A and B'^,  ^ express the d ifferent types of defeaters
associated with the types of evidence. Even granting the a n t i - re a l is t  
this degree of complexity to A ', the re a l is t  can press his objection again. 
Suppose A' is true because the disjunct B^BlB'^ holds’, the re a lis t  argues 
that we can s t i l l  conceive of circumstances in which both conditionals
10. Crispin Wright in fact characterizes the empirically undecidable
sentences in terms of the defeas ib ility  of the evidence for them; see 
'Strawson on Anti-Realism', Synthèse, 40 (1979), p .286
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in 'A I f  and only i f  2  and "IB^ ' ' are fa lse, for the simple reason that
0 0
IB & 1 B '^expresses a type of evidence which is i ts e l f  defeasible.
0 0
I do not deny that the a n t i- re a l is t  has something to say to this objection.
The a n t i - re a l is t  may point out that, when the conditional is read in the
way that he favours, i t  is not clear that he must accept the biconditionals
of the form'A i f  and only i f  A '' where A is an empirically undecidable
sentence and A' an empirically decidable sentence.' A suitable generalization
of the in tu it io n is t ' s interpretation of the conditional is the following:
(17) A state of information ju s t if ie s  the assertion of ' I f  A then B^'
just in case we can recognize that any enlargement of i t  into a state
justify ing the assertion of A would eo ipso t ransform i t  into a state
justify ing the assertion of B^ll
In the case that was considered e a r l ie r ,  i t  was supposed that A is the
sentence 'John is in pain' and A' is some f in i te ly  complex sentence describing
the different types of evidence for A. The re a lis t  rejected ' I f  A' then A'
because he imagined a case in which the discovery that John was shamming
defeated the evidence described by A '. Now the a n t i - re a l is t  can reject
the conditional on the same grounds: for the possibility  that we should
learn that the evidence described by A' is defeated means that not every
enlargement of the given state of information into a state justify ing  the
assertion of A' would transform i t  into a state justify ing the assertion of A.
A similar argument can be given to show that the a n t i- re a l is t  can reject
the conditional ' I f  A then A '' for exactly the same reasons as the re a lis t .
A natural way of construing this a n t i- re a l is t  reply is to see i t  as implying 
that A' ,  which gives the non-classical truth-condition of A, must be even 
more complex than anticipated: i t  must be even more complex than (16)
11 . Taken from Crispin Wright, 'Truth Conditions and C r i te r ia ' ,  Proceedings 
of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 1976, p.236
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I t  might appear that the a n t i - re a l is t  could give expression to the indefinite
defeasib ility  of evidence for the undecidable sentence A by allowing A*
to have the form of a disjunction in which each disjunct is in f in i te ly  long:
on this view each disjunct would have the form:
(18 ) ((B_& I B '  . . .
0 0 0 0 
where B^' describes the defeaters of the evidence described by ^  , B/' describes 
0 0 0 
the defeaters of the evidence described by ' , and ^ ' ' ' describes
0 0 0
the defeaters of the evidence described by (B^ 5 i  B^' )^lB^' ' etc. I f  A'
0 0 0
were to be true in virtue of the truth of a disjunct of this form, A' 
would express the fact that there is evidence which ju s t i f ie s  the assertion 
of A and there is nothing which undermines this evidence. In these circum­
stances i t  would be plausible for the a n t i- re a l is t  to think that the truth  
of A' en ta ils , and is entailed by, the truth of A.
However natural i t  might be to state the truth-condition of an undecidable 
sentence in this way, the a n t i- re a l is t  cannot endorse such a statement.
For this would be to say that an undecidable sentence is true in virtue  
of the in f in ite  number of facts which make one of the disjuncts true. The 
a n t i- re a l is t  is committed to the thesis that one must be able to recognize 
effective ly  what makes a sentence true, but one cannot e ffec tive ly  recognize 
an in f in ite  number of facts. One can express the a n t i- re a l is t 's  objection 
to this construal of his reply by saying that for him the reductive sentence 
which gives the truth-condition of an undecidable sentence, that is,the  
sentence to which the undecidable sentence quasi-reduces, must be decidable; 
but a disjunction each disjunct of which is in f in i te ly  long is not decidable.
I f  this natural way gf interpreting the a n t i - re a l is t 's  reply must be ruled 
out, how exactly are we to understand the kind of truth-condition which 
the a n t i- re a l is t  assigns to an empirically undecidable sentence? I t  appears
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that an acknowledgement of the defeas ib ility  of the evidence for such a 
sentence rules out stating the truth-condition in a f in i te  form and 
a recognition of the self-imposed lim itations of anti-realism rules out stating 
i t  in an in f in ite  form. I f  the a n t i - re a l is t  has no way of explaining the 
truth-condition which he assigns to an empirically undecidable sentence, 
what right does he have to assume that his conception of truth for such 
sentences is in te l l ig ib le  at all?
Up until recently, Dummett never addressed these questions. The reason 
for this is that in practically  a ll  his past work he never acknowledges 
the de feas ib ility  of evidence for empirically undecidable sentences; 
when he speaks of the conditions which verify  an undecidable sentence, 
he assumes that the conditions conclusively verify  the sentence. (For 
example, see Frege, p.457; 'Theory of Meaning I I ' ,  p . I l l ;  the only 
exception to this generalization is the a r t ic le  'Realism', pp.163-164)
Dummett's fa ilu re  to acknowledge the de feasib ility  of this type of evidence 
is the result of his assimilating empirically undecidable sentences to 
mathematically undecidable sentences for which the evidence, namely our 
possession of a proof, is never defeasible. In the Preface to Truth and 
Other Enigmas, however, he acknowledges that the evidence for an empirically 
undecidable sentence may fa l l  short of being conclusive, (p .xxxv iii)
This acknowledgement is accompanied by a radical deviation from the pattern 
of his previous interpretations of local anti-realisms: according to this
pattern each local anti-realism involved the claim that the only admissible 
notion of truth for the disputed sentences is that which is equated with 
the existence of evidence for the sentences. He says in the Preface that 
he now believes that i t  is a mistake to present anti-realism about mental 
states, events, and processes (and also perhaps anti-realism about the past) 
as making this claim. He says that he adopts a Wittgensteinian position
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position with regard to mental states etc and that presenting this position
as conforming to the pattern above would make i t  indistinguishable from
behaviourism, which he takes to be incorrect.
Namely, i t  seems in many cases apt to characterize a dispute between 
one who accepts and one who rejects a re a lis t ic  interpretation of 
some class of statements as being over what, in general makes 
a statement of that class true, when i t  is true, as over that in 
virtue of which such a statement is true. In the present case,
I must, according to the re a lis t  view, say that what renders true a 
statement such as 'John is in pa in ', considered as a statement in my 
language, is i ts  being with John as i t  is with me when I am in pain. 
For the behaviourist, on the other hand, what makes the statement 
true is the pain-behaviour evinced by John. And, when the question 
is framed in this way, we cannot see a middle position: since
Wittgenstein rejects the re a l is t 's  answer, we cannot see what i t  can 
be that, for him, renders an ascription of pain true, i f  i t  is not 
the pain-behaviour. ( 'P reface ', pp .xx x ii i- iv )
Dummett makes i t  clear that he is not denying that the sentence 'John is in
pain' has a truth-condition. ( 'P re face ', p.xxxvi) But he claims that the
truth-condition can be expressed only in a t r iv ia l  way: that is ,  the tru th-
condition can be expressed only as "'John is in pain" is true i f  and only
i f  John is in pain'. He says that where a sentence is not the subject
of a reductive thesis, only a t r iv ia l  answer can be given to the question
'In  virtue of what is the sentence true, when i t  is true?' But even when
we can give only a t r iv ia l  answer to this question, he adds, i t  is s t i l l
necessary that a non-triv ial explanation should be possible of a speaker's
knowledge of the sentence's truth-condition. He describes what the knowledge
of the non-classical truth-condition of 'John is in pain' entails:
Now, for a statement l ik e  'John is in pain', this involves a grasp 
of the connection between pain and pain-behaviour. That does not 
entail the behaviourist's conclusion that i t  is the pain-behaviour in 
which the pain consists, which renders true the ascription of pain: 
that identification is su ffic ien tly  refuted by the possib ilit ies  of 
shamming and of inhibiting the instinctive response. To understand 
statement lik e  'John is in pain ', we must know how they are used.
That involves knowing that the pain-behaviour, or the presence of 
an ordinarily  painful stimulus, is normally suffic ient ground for 
an ascription of pain, but one that can be rebutted, in the former 
case by the clues that betray the shammer of by subsequent disclaimer; 
learning the symptoms of inhibiting the natural manifestation of pain, 
and the lim its  beyond which this is impossible; knowing the usual
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connection between pain and bodily conditions, and the sort of cases 
in which the connection may be broken; and so on. To know these and 
similar things is , on Wittgenstein's account, just as to know what 
'John is in pain' means; and, for one who knows th is , there need 
be no more informative answer to the question what makes that statement 
true than, 'John's being in pain'. { 'Preface‘,pp.xxxiv-v)
These remarks about 'John is in pain' become clearer in the l ig h t  of comments
Dummett makes in 'What is a Theory of Meaning? I I ' .  In the a r t ic le ,
Dummett says that the theory of reference, employing a truth-theory in which
the metalanguage is an extension of the object-1anguage, must assign a
t r iv ia l  T-sentence to.a sentence which can be barely true and a non-trivial
12
T-sentence to a sentence which can be reducibly true. (A t r iv ia l  T-sentence 
in the kind of truth-theory described is one which has the form 'S is true 
i f  and only i f p '  where S is the structural-description of p.) When a 
sentence has a t r iv ia l  T-sentence, Dummett says, the explanation of what 
i t  is for a speaker to know its  truth-condition must fa l l  wholly to the theory 
of sense. ('Theory of Meaning I I ' ,  p .95) As remarked in Chapter Two, the 
theory of sense correlates T-sentences with practical capacities possessed 
by speakers. Dummett mentions only two kinds of practical capacities: 
recognitional capacities consisting in a b i l i t ie s  to recognize effective ly  
when sentences'truth-conditions obtain and verbal capacities consisting in 
a b i l i t ie s  to restate sentences'truth-conditions by means of d ifferent sentences. 
Now the T-sentence for any given sentence merely states what is known by
12.. This needs qualif ication . Dummett, in fact, says that i f  there is an
obstacle to translating a reducibly true sentence into a reductive sentence, 
then there may be an obstacle to constructing a non-triv ial T-sentence 
for the reducibly true sentence. ('Theory of Meaning I I ' ,  p .95) But 
the only obstacle which Dummett mentions to translating a reducibly 
true sentence into a reductive sentence is the possibility  that the 
reductive sentence is in f in i te ly  long ('Theory of Meaning I I ' ,  p .94)
Since th is is only a possib ility  for a re a lis t  type of reduction, 
we can ignore Dummett's reservation that a reducibly true sentence may 
have a t r iv ia l  T-sentence, when we consider sentences which are 
reducibly true according to an a n t i - re a l is t 's  understanding of reduction.
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speaker who understands the sentence; i t  is only through the exercise 
of the practical capacity which the theory of sense associates with the 
T-sentence that the speaker can manifest his understanding of the sentence.
But whether the T-sentence corresponding to a given, sentence is t r iv ia l  
or not, in reflecting whether the sentence can be barely true or reducibly 
true, apparently determines, in Dummett‘ s eyes, the appropriate type of 
practical capacity through the exercise of which a speaker can manifest 
his understanding of the sentence. For Dummett seems to suppose that the 
fact that a sentence has a t r iv ia l  T-sentence means, at least in an 
a n t i- re a l is t  truth theory, that speakers must manifest th e ir  knowledge 
of i ts  truth-condition through exercising th e ir  recognitional capacities, 
while the fact that a sentence has a non-triv ial T-sentence means, in an 
a n t i- re a l is t  truth-theory, that speakers must manifest the ir  knowledge 
of i ts  truth-condition through exercising th e ir  verbal a b i l i t ie s .  ( ’Theory 
of Meaning I I ' ,  p .95 and p .98)
This confirms my conjecture in th e f irs t  section that Dummett believes that 
we have im plic it  knowledge of the truth-conditions of sentences which can 
be barely true and ex p lic it  knowledge of the truth-conditions of sentences 
which can be reducibly true and that the partial ordering of sentences, 
described in §4 of Chapter Two, in determining whether we have im plic it or 
exp lic it  knowledge of a sentence's tru th - condition thereby determines 
whether the sentence can be barely true or reducibly true.
Against the background of this summary of Dummett's views, I th ink that 
I can sketch the strategy he adopts in countering the objection I raised 
a short while ago, the objection that the a n t i- re a l is t  cannot explain the 
kind of non-classical truth condition he assigns to empirically undecidable
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sentences i f  these truth-conditions are to make allowance for the de feasib ility
of evidence. The f i r s t  step of the strategy is to point out that a ll
empirically undecidable sentences that are in dispute between re a lis t  
13
and a n t i- re a l is t  are barely true, when true at a l l .  Since this is the 
case, they have non-classical truth-conditions which can be stated only 
in a t r iv ia l  way. For this reason the a n t i- re a l is t  cannot informatively 
state this conception of these non-classical truth-conditions in a way 
which distinguishes them from the re a l is t 's  conception. The second step 
of the stragegy is to deny the consequence which the re a lis t  draws from 
this fa c t, namely, that non-classical truth-conditions are either un in te llig ib le  
or indistinguishable from classical truth-conditions. Dummett may argue 
that non-classical truth-conditions are in te l l ig ib le  but an understanding 
of these conditions is im plic it rather than e x p l ic i t . A speaker can 
manifest his understanding of the non-classical truth-condition of an 
empirically undecidable sentence by exercising his recognitional capacity: 
he can e ffective ly  recognize when the truth-condition obtains or fa i ls  to 
obtain. Moreover, such a non-classical truth-condition is distinguishable, 
Dummett can argue, from a classical truth-condition in that i t  can be 
embedded in a theory of sense which correlates T-sentences stating truth-  
conditions with practical capacities,while the classical truth-condition 
cannot be so embedded.
I believe that some strategy of this kind lies  behind Dummett's remarks 
in the Preface to Truth and Other Enigmas. But the strategy does not succeed.
13 . Dummett allows that sentences about character-traits are not barely
true. But then he says that these sentences could hardly be in dispute 
because any philosophically sophisticated person w ill re ject realism 
about character-traits! ('Realism', p .150)
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in my opinion, in rebutting the re a l is t 's  objection. Both steps of the 
strategy involve mistaken assumptions or premisses.
I shall begin by considering the f i r s t  step of the strategy. This step 
involves claiming that a ll  the contestable undecidable sentences are barely 
true, when true at a l l .  To go back to the discussion of th e f irs t  section:
Dummett can make this claim because he includes some such clause as (2) 
in his construal of reduction. For example, the sentence 'John is in pain' 
cannot reduce, in Dummett's view, to sentences such as 'John says that he 
is in pain* which describe the existence of evidence for i t :  for the
sentence 'John says that he is in pain' is not in te l l ig ib le  independently 
of 'John is in pain'. I argued in the firstsection that the defin ition of 
reduction which I attributed to Dummett is mistaken, in particular, because 
of i ts  reliance on a certain partial ordering of sentences and, in general, 
because of the irrelevant semantic considerations which enter into its  formulation.
I turn now to the second step of the strategy. Dummett is mistaken in
believing that i t  is possible to distinguish non-classical from classical
truth-conditions by saying that the former but not the la t te r  are embeddable
in a theory of sense of the kind he envisages. As Ï argued in%%3 and 5
of Chapter Two, i f  one includes speakers' inferential a b i l i t ie s  among the
practical capacities of the theory of sense, there is every reason to believe
that classical truth-conditions are embeddable in the theory of sense:
a speaker can manifest his understanding of the classical truth-condition
classicallyof an empirically undecidable sentence by accepting/ valid inferences
involving the sentences. Dummett's argument that a speaker cannot manifest 
knowledge of the classical truth-condition of an undecidable sentence 
re lies upon restricting the practical capacities suitable for manifesting 
such knowledge to recognitional a b i l i t ie s .  Of course, the re a lis t  objects
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to this restric tion as question-begging. Even from an a n t i- re a l is t  
perspective, the restric tion is permissible only i f  Dummett is correct in 
assuming that a l l  the contestable undecidable sentences can be barely true, 
that sentences which can be barely true have t r iv ia l  truth-conditions, 
and that sentences with t r iv ia l  truth-conditions require the exercise of 
recognitional capacities as the appropriate manifestation-procedure. I 
believe that even an a n t i - re a l is t  may find exception to the f i r s t  of these 
assumptions.
In order to make good the claim that non-classical truth-conditions are 
in te l l ig ib le ,  Dummett must say, according to the argument I have attributed  
to him, that even though we cannot informatively state these truth-conditions, 
we can e ffec tive ly  recognize when they obtain or fa i l  to obtain. But i f  
Dummett must rea lly  say something l ik e  th is , i t  is d i f f ic u l t  to refrain  
from asking why we cannot informatively state the truth-conditions. Surely, 
one has only to execute the appropriate effective procedure on a given 
occasion on which a truth-condition obtains and one w ill be in a position, 
not only to recognize that the truth-condition obtains, but also to 
describe i t  informatively. But i f  i t  is possible to describe the truth-  
condition in a non-trivial way, then the condition, in being effective ly  
recognizable, must be expressible by a decidable sentence. Moreover, 
since the decidable sentence is supposed to give the truth-condition of the 
undecidable sentence, i t  should be possible to frame a biconditional 
stating that the undecidable sentence is true i f  and only i f  the decidable 
sentence is true. But now we are back to the problem of how the an ti-  
re a l is t  can reconcile his acceptance of such biconditionals, in the case 
of empirically undecidable sentences, with the de feasib ility  of the evidence 
for such sentences.
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Now the a n t i- re a l is t  may refuse to fa l l  into this trap of stating the truth-  
condition in a non-triv ial way. He must concede that a speaker must be, 
able to recognize e ffective ly  when the non-classical truth-condition of 
an empirically undecidable sentence l ik e  'John is in pain' obtains or fa i ls  
to obtain. But he may deny that when a speaker is in a position to 
recognize that the non-classical truth-condition of ‘John is in pain' obtains, 
he is thereby in a position to describe the condition in an informative 
way: the a n t i- re a l is t  may say that what makes the sentence true on the
given occasion is simply John's being in pain and refuse to state i t  any 
other way.
I t  seems to me that this is a possible position for the a n t i - re a l is t  to
take, in fact one which is often taken. But i t  is essentially obscurantist.
I believe i t  is a legitimate demand to make of the anti-real 1st that he
explain, in terms which are in te l l ig ib le ,  even i f  not acceptable, to the
re a l is t ,  how he conceives of the various types of conditions which make
sentences true. In the a r t ic le  'The Philosophical Basis of In tu it io n is t ic
Logic' Dummett himself concedes the legitimacy of this demand in the case
of mathematical sentences.
I f  the in tu it io n is t ic  notion of truth for mathematical statements can 
be explained only by a Tarski-type tru th-defin ition  which takes for 
granted the meanings of the in tu it io n is t ic  logical constants, then the 
in tu it io n is t  notion of truth , and hence of meaning, cannot be so much 
as conveyed to anyone who does not accept i t  already, and no debate 
between in tu it ion is ts  and platonists is possible, because they cannot 
communicate with one another. I t  is therefore wholly legitimate, and, 
indeed, essential, to frame the condition for the in tu it io n is t ic  
truth of a mathematical sentence in terms which are in te l l ig ib le  to a 
platonist and do not beg any questions, because they employ only notions 
which are not in dispute. ('Philosophical Basis', pp.238-239)
In the subsequent discussion Dummett settles on a characterization of truth
for mathematical sentences. I t  is a variant of the characterization discussed
in §3 of the las t chapter: namely, a mathematical sentence is true just
in case we possess an effective procedure for obtaining a canonical proof
of i t .  ('Philosophical Basis', pp.243-244) In the a r t ic le  'The Justification
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of Deduction' Dummett generalizes this characterization for a l l  sentences.
A rough statement of this generalization is: a sentence is true just in
case we possess an effective procedure for obtaining a direct verif ication  
of i t .
These characterizations constitute a significant step by Dummett towards an 
explanation of how he conceives of the non-classical truth-conditions 
of mathematical and non-mathematical sentences. A further step towards such 
an explanation would be to say how these characterizations apply to particular  
cases. For a mathematical sentence, and in particu lar, a sentence of f i r s t -  
order logic, Dummett can explain what the canonical proof looks lik e  and 
what constitutes an effective procedure for obtaining such a proof. For 
an empirical sentence, on the other hand, there w ill be d i f f ic u l t ie s ,  which 
I discussed in the las t chapter, in explaining the distinction between 
the direct and the indirect verifications of an individual sentences. 
Regardless of how Dummett chooses to handle these d i f f ic u l t ie s ,  he must 
s t i l l  face the opposition of our in tuitions when he tr ies  to say that an 
empirically undecidable sentence is true when and only when we possess 
evidence for i t  of a certain direct kind. These intuitions stem, as I 
have emphasized, from our recognition that any evidence for sentences of 
this kind is necessarily defeasible.
I think i t  is appropriate at this point to put the discussion of this section 
in perspective. In the f i r s t  part of the section I argued that Dummett's 
remarks, about principles C and K make i t  clear that he thinks, or at least, 
thoughtjthat a ll undecidable sentences belonging to disputed classes are 
true in virtue of e ffective ly  recognizable facts, or in other words, a ll 
such sentences quasi-reduce to decidable sentences.
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Then î presented a re a lis t  objection to this line of thought centering 
around the fact that the evidence for empirically undecidable sentences is 
defeasible. The objection went that i t  is impossible for a decidable sentence 
A’ to state the non-classical truth-condition of an empirically undecidable 
sentence A i f  i t  is to make allowance for the defeasib ility  of evidence for_A.
On the assumption that the a n t i - re a l is t  would want to acknowledge the 
d efeas ib ility  of evidence, I then registered a new objection to a n t i­
realism: since the a n t i - re a l is t  cannot state in either a f in i te  or an
in f in i te  form the non-classical truth-condition of an empirically undecidable 
sentence, he cannot explain his conception of truth for such sentences.
I then outlined a strategy which Dummett does, or could, develop to counter 
this new objection. The strategy involved saying that the non-classical 
truth-conditions of a ll  the contestable empirically undecidable sentences 
can be stated only in a t r iv ia l  way but that these truth-conditions are 
in te l l ig ib le  because speakers can manifest the ir  understanding of them by 
effective ly  recognizing when the obtain.
I took exception to this strategy on a number of grounds. One was that the 
claim that a l l  contestable empirically undecidable sentences can have only 
t r i v ia l ly  statable non-classical truth-conditions rests on false assumptions 
about reduction. Another ground v/as that i t  seems plausible to say that 
when a speaker recognizes, on a given occasion, that the non-classical truth-  
condition of an empirically undecidable sentence obtains, he should be able 
to describe i t  in a non-triv ial way. I f  the a n t i- re a l is t  agrees that 
this is a possib ility , then he is faced again with the problem of reconciling 
the non-triv ial statement of the sentence's truth-condition with the defeasib ility  
of evidence for the sentence . I f ,  on the other hand, the a n t i - re a l is t  says
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that this is not a po ssib ility , he is refusing to meet the demand, the 
legitimacy of which Dummett concedes in the mathematical case, that 
he explain, in terms which are in te l l ig ib le  to the re a lis t  and do not beg 
any questions, his conception of non-classical truth-conditions.
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